Côte d’Ivoire at a Crossroads – Socio-economic Development Implications of Crisis-induced Returns to Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia

Robtel Neajai Pailey, Leander Kandilige, James Suah Shilue & Mahamadou Zongo
Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC)

Côte d’Ivoire Case Study:
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# Table of Contents

Authors ...................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. iii
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... iv
List of Acronyms ....................................................................................................... v
Executive Summary ................................................................................................... vi

1. Introduction, Background and Overview .............................................................. 1
   1.1. Methodology .................................................................................................. 3
   1.2. Political Violence in Côte d’Ivoire and the Implications for Migrants .............. 7

2. Crisis Situation and Long-Term Consequences ................................................... 10
   2.1. Contextual and Structural Factors ................................................................. 10
       2.1.1. Migration History, Demography and Human Capital Factors .................... 10
       2.1.2. Legal Situation and Relevance for Migrant Status .................................. 11
       2.1.3. Socio-Economic Position of Migrants in Comparison to Host Population ..... 13

3. Migrant Experiences of and Responses to Crises ............................................... 15
   3.1. Violent Encounters, Reprisals and Trauma .................................................... 15
   3.2. Loss of Livelihoods and Possessions .............................................................. 17
   3.3. Processes of Evacuation, Return and Repatriation ........................................ 17
   3.4. Resettlement and Reintegration ..................................................................... 19
   3.5. Remigration .................................................................................................. 21

4. Institutional Responses .......................................................................................... 23
   4.1. Civil Society .................................................................................................. 23
   4.2. Intergovernmental Organisations ................................................................... 24
   4.3. Private Sector ............................................................................................... 25
   4.4. States ............................................................................................................ 26

5. Policy Learning ...................................................................................................... 29
   5.1. Stakeholders .................................................................................................. 29
   5.2. Other Relevant Developments ....................................................................... 30

6. Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................... 32

7. Reference List ....................................................................................................... 34
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIN</td>
<td>Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEI</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAPO</td>
<td>General Assembly of the National Council of Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONASUR</td>
<td>Conseil National de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Ivorian Popular Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoL</td>
<td>Government of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMPD</td>
<td>International Centre for Migration Policy Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMI</td>
<td>International Migration Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRN</td>
<td>Liberia Returnee Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRRC</td>
<td>Liberia Refugee Repatriation Resettlement Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFDP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Development Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICIC</td>
<td>Migrants in Countries in Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDA</td>
<td>Migration for Development in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJP</td>
<td>Movement for Justice and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCI</td>
<td>Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (<em>Forces Nouvelles</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPIGO</td>
<td>Far West Ivory Coast People’s Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRU</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADMO</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCNs</td>
<td>Third Country Nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Fund for Population Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAEMU</td>
<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

Between 2002-2003 and 2010-2011, Côte d'Ivoire experienced episodes of political violence in a longer-term crisis in which hundreds of thousands of migrants, particularly non-citizens from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Liberia and Ghana (or those perceived as ‘non-citizens’), were not only implicated but also directly targeted amidst anti-immigrant sentiments. This case study report generally investigates the experiences of nationals of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia during and after the Ivorian crises with a focus on key actors who participated in the provision of evacuation, return and reintegration assistance and returnees’ re-integration experiences in origin countries. The report on Côte d’Ivoire presents the results of one case study among six of the Research Component of the four-year project ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an Evidence-based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action’, which provides policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises in host countries.

The Case Study

For many decades, Côte d’Ivoire served as a popular destination for foreign nationals from ECOWAS and further afield. Moreover, it had been a haven for economic and forced migrants alike, particularly those fleeing instability and conflict in neighbouring Liberia and Mali, amongst other countries in the ECOWAS sub-region. This follows a long historical trajectory of Côte d’Ivoire as a source country of large-scale immigration, largely due to its post-independence high economic growth rates generated from the production of cash crops such as coffee and cacao. However, austerity measures imposed in the 1980s led to the closure of many businesses and a decrease in public sector hiring, thus causing massive increases in the unemployment of Ivorian senior employees and graduates. Crises in the 2000s were largely spurred by this economic recession, which effectively overturned previous migrant-friendly policies.

Foregrounded by concerns about migration, identity, and belonging, electoral tensions in 1990 led to national discussions about ‘Ivoirité’ (strong claims to autochthony) and what it meant to be a ‘real Ivorian’ citizen, as well as deep fissures in Ivorian society pitting non-citizens against citizens, as well as Muslims in the north against Christians in the south. Although foreigners comprised 26% of Côte d’Ivoire’s population in 1998, with more than half of the foreign-born population originating from Burkina Faso, an onslaught of government-sanctioned, anti-immigrant measures followed in quick succession. From the mid-1990s to early 2000s, Ivorian policies and practices around nationality and citizenship severely restricted the rights of migrants and their descendants. Thus, there are undeniable connections linking the politicisation of identity and belonging, economic austerity, land disputes, and the outbreak of violent conflict targeting African foreign nationals and those Africans perceived as foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire in the 2000s.

In 2002, conflict in Côte d’Ivoire began when a group of disgruntled soldiers mostly from the north of the country who were expected to undergo demobilisation instead organised the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), later known as the Forces Nouvelles, comprising other splinter non-state armed actors. Reportedly, the Ivorian government and rebel forces recruited mercenaries from ECOWAS countries, prompting egregious violence involving foreigners or targeting them. In 2010, violence resumed in Côte d’Ivoire, specifically related to presidential elections postponed repeatedly and generally related to unresolved issues from the 2002-2003 crisis. As in the conflict of 2002-2003, the electoral crisis of 2010-2011 became a staging ground for anti-foreigner reprisals. While it is difficult to ascertain how many foreign nationals were actually affected by the two episodes of political violence, hundreds of thousands were compelled to return to their countries of origin with or without the assistance of external actors. Some of these migrants eventually returned to Côte d’Ivoire during and after crises.

Research Methodology and Findings

The methodology employed in this case study was largely exploratory and qualitative. Desk-based research as well as semi-structured interviews were conducted in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia with six categories of interviewees – namely government authorities; intergovernmental organisations; civil society organisations; experts and private sector actors; return migrants; and family members of return migrants. Migrants from Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia were selected based on their experience of crises in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002-2003 or 2010-2011, subsequent evacuation and return to
countries of origin. Family members of migrants were interviewed based on their knowledge of relatives’ migration and return experiences. Government authorities, intergovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, experts and private sector actors were sampled based on the degree of their knowledge of or involvement in policy formulation and execution, advocacy, protection, technical and logistical support or the provision of funding for evacuation, repatriation and reintegration of migrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees/Fieldwork Countries</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants (M)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Members of Migrants (F)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Authorities (A)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts and Private Actors (E)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisations (I)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organisations (C)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that empirical and desk-based data on the crises in Côte d’Ivoire are still evolving, it is difficult to compare generally across the two episodes of political violence. However, the case study of Côte d’Ivoire highlights a number of myth busting, empirical trends.

First, migrants implicated in the Ivorian political crises were targeted not because of their ethnicity or nationality per se, but rather because of their perceived involvement (and the involvement of their governments) in the crises (i.e. Liberians and Burkinabé) and their often falsely perceived advantaged socio-economic positions in Ivorian society.

Second, the degree to which origin country governments responded to the plight of their nationals in Côte d’Ivoire depended entirely on the political commitments of the governments to the migrants, the opportunity structures available, and the economic capacities of the states themselves. For instance, while war-ravaged Liberia was extremely limited in its ability to respond, Ghana and Burkina Faso were involved in evacuation and return assistance, with Burkina Faso further mediating in political negotiations involving warring factions.

Third, based on the respondent pool for this study, some migrants returned to their countries of origins on their own, receiving little to no support from external actors despite countless narratives about external interventions.

Fourth, although there was short-term ad-hoc emergency assistance and repatriation support by families, origin governments, intergovernmental organisations, civil society, and private sector actors during the Ivorian crises, longer-term socio-economic reintegration has been rather absent, compelling some migrants to return to Côte d’Ivoire before a complete halt of hostilities.

And finally, African Union and ECOWAS regional protocols on free movement and the right of abode are often unenforced during peace times, with gross violations during times of crises, as in the case of political violence in Côte d’Ivoire.

**Recommendations**
The case study on Côte d’Ivoire illustrates an urgent need for clear policies and standard operating procedures on the evacuation, repatriation, resettlement and re-integration of migrants implicated in crises situations outside of their countries of origin. Policies and standard operating procedures need to be costed and budgeted for, with clearly delineated mandates assigned to relevant stakeholders.
For instance, international policy makers must pay attention to challenges refugees face, including the need for countries hosting refugees to respect and honour UN-issued travel and identity documents. Origin country diplomatic missions abroad need to be fully engaged in the process of supporting their nationals, through providing easily accessible consular services beyond capital cities. Furthermore, the ability of origin governments to support their nationals abroad in crisis situations – particularly through embassy consular services – would be significantly enhanced by reliable data on their migrant populations abroad and nationally derived migration policies with crisis and emergency response protocols. The collation of credible migration data and real time access to migrant stock as well as migrant flow figures are also critical to international responses to crisis situations in which migrants are implicated.

Origin country governments as well as intergovernmental organisations working on crisis and emergency response must formalise relationships with civil society in order to increase long-term reintegration success rates amongst returnees, as this would curb unsafe remigration. Similarly, it is vital to build a database of skills migrants have acquired abroad, as well as introduce them to labour market opportunities upon return; it is also vital to provide technical and vocational training to return migrants. Moreover, well-resourced local disaster management organisations, with access to funding sources beyond government subvention, would greatly improve operational capabilities.

The 2002-2003 and 2010-2011 crises in Côte d’Ivoire exposed the need to capacitate the governments of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia and their inter-governmental, civil society and private sector counterparts in handling long-term mass returns of migrants implicated in humanitarian emergencies abroad. These stakeholders recognise the need to better organise actions and strategies to protect migrants in crisis situations, however, the political will to do so has been less than apparent, particularly evident in the lack of clearly stipulated provisions on emergency returns and long-term reintegration. This case study demonstrates a link between poverty, unemployment, regional economic integration and increased movements across the ECOWAS sub-region. However, the extension of political and socio-economic rights to migrants needs to be situated within a broader consensus to avert reprisal attacks on migrants during political crises.
1. Introduction, Background and Overview

General Introduction
In 2015, the four-year project ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an Evidence-based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action’ was launched by the European Union (EU) and has been implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) with EU funding. The project contributes to the global Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative, a government-led process co-chaired by the governments of the Philippines and the United States, which shares similar goals. It aims to improve the capacity of states and other stakeholders to assist and provide protection to migrants who find themselves in countries affected by crisis, as well as address the long-term implications therein. Within the project, six regional consultations with states and other relevant stakeholders have been conducted, contributing to the development of the MICIC initiative ‘Guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster’¹. In addition, capacity building activities² have been adopted to follow up on key recommendations that have emerged over the course of the project.

This report on Côte d’Ivoire presents the results of one case study among six³ of the Research Component of the MICIC project, which provides policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises in host countries. Between 2002-2003 and 2010-2011, Côte d’Ivoire experienced episodes of political violence in a longer-term crisis in which hundreds of thousands of migrants, particularly non-citizens from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Liberia and Ghana (or those perceived as ‘non-citizens’), were not only implicated but also directly targeted amidst anti-immigrant sentiments.⁴ The case study report generally investigates the experiences of nationals of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia during and after the Ivorian crises with a focus on key actors who participated in the provision of evacuation, return and reintegration assistance and returnees’ re-integration experiences in origin countries. Given that the EU-funded MICIC project explores how migrants are implicated in crisis situations and how their returns to countries of origin affect socio-economic development, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia were selected as fieldwork sites because they served as countries of origin and transit in the case of Ghana to which migrants fleeing political unrest in Côte d’Ivoire returned. Unlike Mali where security currently remains an ever-present concern, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia were selected because they are relatively safe sites for fieldwork.⁵

The Case Study
For many decades, Côte d’Ivoire served as a popular destination for foreign non-citizens from ECOWAS and further afield. Moreover, it had been a haven for economic and forced migrants alike, particularly those fleeing instability and conflict in neighbouring Liberia and Mali, amongst other countries in the ECOWAS sub-region.⁶ This follows a long historical trajectory of Côte d’Ivoire as a source country of large-scale immigration, largely due to its post-independence high economic growth rates generated from the production of cash crops such as coffee and cacao.⁷ However, austerity

² For more information on the capacity building activities, as well as the regional consultations, see: http://www.icmpd.org/our-work/migrants-in-countries-in-crisis/.
³ The other case studies under study are: Central African Republic (political unrest of 2013-2014); Libya (political unrest of 2011); South Africa (xenophobic violence of 2008 & 2015); Lebanon (situation of migrant domestic workers and the 2008 crisis); and Thailand (natural disaster of 2011).
⁵ No fieldwork was conducted in Côte d’Ivoire because the focus of the research was countries of origin to which migrants returned, rather than the country affected by crisis.
measures imposed in the 1980s led to the closure of many businesses and a decrease in public sector hiring, thus causing massive increases in the unemployment of Ivorian senior employees and graduates. Crises in the 2000s were largely spurred by this economic recession, which effectively overturned previous migrant-friendly policies.

Foregrounded by concerns about migration, identity, and belonging, electoral tensions in 1990 led to national discussions about ‘Ivoirité’ (strong claims to autochthony) and what it meant to be a ‘real Ivorian’ citizen, as well as deep fissures in Ivorian society pitting non-citizens against citizens, as well as Muslims in the north against Christians in the south. Although foreigners comprised 26% of Côte d’Ivoire’s population in 1998, with more than half of the foreign-born population originating from Burkina Faso, an onslaught of government-sanctioned, anti-immigrant measures followed in quick succession. From the mid-1990s to early 2000s, Ivorian policies and practices around nationality and citizenship severely restricted the rights of migrants and their descendants. Thus, some scholars have argued that there are undeniable connections linking the politicisation of identity and belonging, economic austerity, land disputes, and the outbreak of violent conflict targeting African foreign non-citizens and those perceived as ‘non-Ivorian’ citizens in Côte d’Ivoire in the 2000s.

Table 1. Categories of Residents in Côte d’Ivoire, according to Dembele

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ivorian</td>
<td>person whose ethnic origin is indigenous to Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>immigrant or descendant of immigrants, whether born or naturalised in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Non-Ivorian’ citizen</td>
<td>individual who migrated to Côte d’Ivoire whose ethnic origins may be ‘foreign’ to ‘Ivorian’ citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-citizen</td>
<td>individual who does not have formal Ivorian citizenship and is therefore a foreigner under the law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite previous episodes of political violence, Côte d’Ivoire still comprises large populations of foreign-born ECOWAS nationals and Ivorian-born descendants of foreigners. As a case in point, in 2012 immediately following post-electoral skirmishes implicating migrants, the country hosted...

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9 Translated into English, this is the first full reference in this report that was originally published in French. Subsequent French language references have been translated into English.


2,350,024 ECOWAS nationals\textsuperscript{12} and accounted for an astronomical 40% of the GDP of the West African Economic Monetary Union.\textsuperscript{13} Now dubbed “the fastest growing economy in Africa”\textsuperscript{14}, Côte d’Ivoire will likely continue to be a country of high net immigration. This raises a number of questions about the socio-economic embeddedness of migrants in Ivorian society, and what implications this might have for future crises should they occur.

1.1. Methodology

The methodology employed in this case study was largely exploratory and qualitative. Qualitative researchers deploy a wide range of interconnected methods, including desk-based research, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, participant observation, etc.\textsuperscript{15} For the purposes of the Côte d’Ivoire case study, desk-based research as well as semi-structured interviews were conducted in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia with six categories of interviewees – namely Government Authorities (A), Intergovernmental Organisations (I), Civil Society Organisations (C), Experts and Private Sector Actors (E), Return Migrants (M) and Family Members of Return Migrants (F).\textsuperscript{16}

Interview respondents\textsuperscript{17} were selected through snowball sampling. Migrants from Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia were selected based on their experience of crises in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002-2003 or 2010-2011, subsequent evacuation and return to countries of origin. Family members of migrants were interviewed based on their knowledge of relatives’ migration and return experiences. Government authorities, intergovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, experts and private sector actors were sampled based on the degree of their knowledge of or involvement in policy formulation and execution, advocacy, protection, technical and logistical support or the provision of funding for evacuation, repatriation and reintegration of migrants.

Six tailored interview guides were developed for the six main categories of interviewees, based on an overall topical guideline prepared for the MICIC project as well as a data collection manual developed by research teams at the ICMPD and the International Migration Institute (IMI). In consultation with the case study manager at the IMI, each of the research partners in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia conducted pre-fieldwork workshops for designated research assistants to train them on data collection protocols, research ethics and communications skills, including the use of translators, obtaining informed consent, guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality.

Ethical considerations

In cases where written consent was not possible because the respondent was illiterate, interviewers obtained verbal consent. For the sake of confidentiality, consent forms and interview guides were kept separate at all times, so as not to link interviewees with their responses. Researchers reiterated to interviewees that participation in the research (i.e. interviews) was voluntary and that withdrawal from the interviews would not lead to any sanctions.

Where possible and in most cases, researchers conducted interviews in locations where participants could speak freely without interruption or the risk of being overheard by others. In the case of Liberia, however, interviews held in Zwedru City markets were subject to frequent disruptions by commercial activity and noise. In these and other instances, interviewers in all fieldwork countries were trained to always be sensitive to the needs of interviewees, including interview timing and procedures. A


\textsuperscript{13} Awumbila, M. et al. (2013).


\textsuperscript{16} The capital letters A, I, C, E, M and F are abbreviations adopted to identify categories of interviewees, and will be employed throughout this report as references. For instance, while the first migrant returnee interviewed in Ghana is identified as GH-M-01, the fifth intergovernmental organisation representative interviewed in Liberia is identified as LIB-I-05.

\textsuperscript{17} For fieldwork conducted in Burkina Faso and Ghana, some non-migrant and non-family member interviewees were interviewed for two case studies, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya.
summary sheet containing information on the rationale for the project was presented to any participant who needed more background information.

In Ghana, it was agreed during the training workshop with research assistants that each migrant returnee and/or household member would be given a token amount of 10 Ghana Cedis (EUR 2.5) as compensation for their time, only after they granted the interview. Also, community leaders and representatives of civil society organisations were given 50 Ghana Cedis (EUR 12) each, only after granting an interview. Interviewees were not informed about any compensation prior to granting interviews so as to avoid any perceived biases in responses. Similar compensation schemes were not reported in Burkina Faso or Liberia, perhaps because of concerns by research partners that compensating interviewees might be perceived as financial inducements.

Criteria for Selection of Interviewees
The selection of various categories of interviewees was based on the following specific criteria, detailed in the data collection manual previously mentioned:

- **Migrants (M):** Migrants returning from Côte d'Ivoire as a result of the 2002-2003 and 2010-2011 socio-political and electoral crises;
- **Family members of migrants (F):** Close and extended family members knowledgeable about the migration experience, return process and impact of return on the household;
- **Government Authorities (A):** Government/state authorities (ministries, departments, agencies, legislators, governors, etc.) at the central, regional and local levels and representatives abroad (embassies, consulates) who actively participated in the evacuation, repatriation and reintegration of returnees from Côte d'Ivoire or could provide information about these processes. All government authorities interviewed were from the origin countries of migrants;
- **Civil Society Organisations (C):** International, regional, national, and local non-government organisations that worked with or are currently working with returnees from Côte d'Ivoire and whose members are individuals or associations;
- **Experts and Private Sector Actors (E):** Any other knowledgeable interviewees speaking on their own behalf and not covered in the previous categories, including academic experts, community leaders, professionals (doctors, lawyers, trainers, etc.) who may have provided services to returnees from Côte d'Ivoire;
- **Intergovernmental Organisations (I):** Membership-based regional and multilateral organisations such as the United Nations (UN), International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the EU which provided logistical, technical, financial or advisory support for the evacuation, repatriation and reintegration of returnees from Côte d'Ivoire.

While Table 2 provides a breakdown of the respondent pool by fieldwork country, Table 3 provides a detailed breakdown of the migrant respondent pool with respect to the period of crisis-induced returns and gender.
### Table 2. Numbers of Interviews per Stakeholder Group in Designated Fieldwork Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees/Fieldwork Countries</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants (M)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Members of Migrants (F)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Authorities (A)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts and Private Actors (E)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisations (I)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organisations (C)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3. Breakdown of Migrant Respondent Pool Based on Crisis Period Returns and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fieldwork Countries/Crisis Period/Gender Breakdown of Migrant Interviewees</th>
<th>2002/2003 Crisis-Induced Returns</th>
<th>2010/2011 Crisis-Induced Returns</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso (11)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana (9)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (21)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting here that in the Liberian respondent pool, some migrants returned to Liberia sporadically between 2003 and 2010, partly in anticipation of crises to come in Côte d’Ivoire and partly in expectation of post-war development in Liberia. For instance, in 2001 one male returned; in 2004, one male returned; in 2005, one male returned; in 2008 one male and one female returned; and in 2009 one female returned.

**Limits to Respondent Pool and Challenges Conducting Fieldwork**

Recruiting interviewees across the three fieldwork countries was difficult. In the case of Ghana, repeat appointments had to be made with returnees, as most of them are yet to secure gainful employment and are very mobile. Some interviewees across the three fieldwork sites complained about not benefitting in any practical way from being over-researched by different agencies and institutions, thus needing convincing that interviews were part of a research framework that could help protect migrants should future crises arise. It was particularly difficult finding family members who had remained in Ghana – where returnees had migrated as a family unit and therefore did not have any corresponding household members able to respond to questions for households – as well as family members who resided with migrant returnees in Liberia – where most migrant interviewees live in the Bartejam Gold Camp\(^{18}\) without their relatives.

More returnee women were interviewed than men in the case of Liberia because, based on the research team’s observations, men were more concerned about their daily earnings than sitting for

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\(^{18}\) Camp Master Interview, May 2016. According to a local resident, Bartejam is derived from two things, bartel, meaning the utensil used to range and dig the dirt when searching for gold, while jam is a Liberian colloquialism for when someone is desperately in need of something. The little mining camp is occupied by a combination of Ivorian refugees, Liberian returnees from Côte d’Ivoire and Third Country Nationals (TCNs). Bartejam borders Côte d’Ivoire and is said to have a population of approximately 7,000 and is situated in Gbarzon District, the largest district in Grand Gedeh County.
interviews. Furthermore, fieldwork in Grand Gedeh coincided with the farming season and gold mining activities in a region where food shortages and unemployment are rampant, making it difficult for interviewees to honour interview appointments. Challenges with conducting fieldwork in Monrovia consisted of the lack of institutional memory in government and intergovernmental organisations, where agencies such as the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), the EU and others did not have persons who were employed at these institutions during the crises of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011, and were therefore unable to provide concrete answers to some of the questions posed.

Fieldwork Period and Selection of Field Sites
Conducted in European languages (English and French) and local languages (Dioula and Mooré in Burkina Faso, Twi in Ghana, and Liberian English in Liberia), depending on interviewees’ proficiencies, interviews were audio recorded, transcribed and summarised, except in cases where interviewees opted not to be recorded. Where necessary, research teams hired translators to act as language mediators, although this delayed the pace at which interviews were conducted. All interview summaries were eventually translated into English.

In Burkina Faso, fieldwork was conducted from 2 April 2016 to 13 May 2016 in the Central Region (Ouagadougou), the South West Region (Poni province) and the Cascades Region (municipality of Niangoloko), the former where government, intergovernmental and civil society organisations are headquartered, and the latter two representing poor localities where most Burkinabé migrants returned, resettled and continue to maintain their livelihoods in agriculture, commerce, etc.

In Ghana, fieldwork started 1 April 2016 and ended 28 May 2016 with a focus on Accra, Ghana’s capital, and the Western Region. Accra was selected because it hosts the head offices of almost all government authorities as well as those of inter-governmental organisations. The Western Region accounts for the largest number of Ghanaian migrants to Côte d’Ivoire and returnees to Ghana in 2002-2003 and 2010-2011.

In Liberia, fieldwork was conducted from 11 April 2016 to 5 May 2016. Given that nearly a third of Liberia’s population reside in the capital, Monrovia, it was selected as a fieldwork site because the vast majority of Liberian government agencies, intergovernmental organisations, and civil society organisations have headquarters in the capital; in addition some return migrants reside in the capital. Grand Gedeh County, Southeastern Liberia, was also selected as a fieldwork site due to its proximity to Côte d’Ivoire and the presence of a number of functional refugee camps, including PTP Refugee Camp21, and mining enclaves such as Bartejam Gold Camp. Interviews were held in Zwedru City, the capital of Grand Gedeh, and Bartejam Gold Camp in Gbarzon District because most Liberian returnees are settled in adjoining towns and villages around the border between Grand Gedeh and Côte d’Ivoire. In preparation for fieldwork, the research partner and his team dispatched a colleague to start preparatory work in Grand Gedeh where target respondent groups are based. Community entry meetings were held to gain support from community leaders for the research and identify migrants who returned at different periods of the Ivorian crises. After an entry meeting23 with local authorities in Grand Gedeh, the research team identified a handful of returnees through snowball sampling.

The following section details the Ivorian crisis contexts for which interviewees and fieldwork sites were selected.

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19 In cases where audio recording was not feasible, research teams took copious notes and typed summaries directly into corresponding interview protocol sheets.  
21 PTP Refugee Camp is a yard built by a defunct logging company, Prime Timber Production Company in Grand Gedeh. During the Ivorian crisis of 2010-2011 the Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with other international groups turned it into a camp.  
22 According Grand Gedeh County Development Agenda, in 2007 there were 33,203 Liberian returnees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the county.  
23 A community entry strategy was employed to help explain the purpose of the research and solicit buy-in from local residents. It is a way of engendering local ownership.
1.2. Political Violence in Côte d’Ivoire and the Implications for Migrants

In 2002, conflict in Côte d’Ivoire began when a group of disgruntled soldiers mostly from the north of the country who were expected to undergo demobilisation instead organised the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), later known as the Forces Nouvelles, comprising other splinter non-state armed actors.24 It was reported that while the MPCI had recruited fighters from Mali and Burkina Faso, the Ivorian government and rebel forces such as the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and the Far West Ivory Coast People’s Movement (MPIGO) had enlisted Liberian (and to a lesser extent, Sierra Leonean) mercenaries, some of whom were living in Côte d’Ivoire as refugees.25 This prompted further attacks against non-citizens, as they were often accused of fuelling the conflict. In September 2002, after the outbreak of the rebellion, between 350,000 and 400,000 Burkinabé in particular were forced to flee Côte d’Ivoire for Burkina Faso to escape the repression of the security forces and militias.26 Both sides of the conflict perpetrated egregious violence, often involving foreigners or targeting them.27 In 2003 there appeared to be an impasse in the conflict with the negotiation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the installation of a unity government in May, which proved to be ineffective at curbing violence perpetrated by government and militia forces.28

It is estimated that between 2002 and 2005, up to 1.1 million people were driven from their homes, many of whom fled to neighbouring countries, including, but not limited to: approximately 360,000 Burkinabé, 70,000 Guineans, 200,000 Malians, and 44,000 Liberians.29 Some of these migrants eventually returned to Côte d’Ivoire ‘post-crisis’. Although exact figures remain inconclusive, it is believed that non-citizen foreigners from Burkina Faso and Mali, in particular, returned to Côte d’Ivoire in large numbers after the crisis abated in 2003.30 Forces Nouvelles continued to control territory along the northern borders with Mali and Burkina Faso, allowing into Côte d’Ivoire Ivorian citizens and non-citizen foreigners from within the ECOWAS sub-region who felt safe enough to return.31 By 2005, the population of non-citizen foreign nationals (or migrants) had reduced to 12.3% of the total population of Côte d’Ivoire, largely due to anti-immigrant sentiments and rising insecurity precipitated by conflict in 2002-2003.32 A lull in the generalised violence from 2003 onwards led to the signing in 2007 of the Ouagadougou Political Accord by opposing factions bringing about a transitional

government and plans to hold subsequent national elections. In the same year, the Government of Burkina Faso estimated that more than two thirds of Burkinabé migrants previously resident in Côte d’Ivoire had returned to the host country. 

In 2010, violence resumed in Côte d’Ivoire, specifically related to presidential elections postponed repeatedly and generally related to unresolved issues from the 2002-2003 crisis involving non-citizens and those perceived as non-citizens. In February 2010, the party of incumbent Laurent Gbagbo maintained that 429,000 names were fraudulently listed on the electoral register, and this sparked anti-northern Ivorian and anti-foreigner sentiments because the vast majority of names were northern in orientation. There were also concerns that the northern-based Forces Nouvelles had not been sufficiently demobilised and disarmed.

The first round of elections in October 2010 did not result in a 51% or more decisive victory for any of the presidential hopefuls, and in a second round in December 2010, the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) pronounced opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara the winner by 54%. Predictably, the results were rejected by Gbagbo, immediately after which the Constitutional Council, comprising mostly Gbagbo loyalists, declared him the winner instead by 51% because they claimed that the ballots in a number of pro-Ouattara northern districts were fraudulent. Following failed diplomatic discussions, the northern-based Forces Nouvelles, which supported Ouattara, began an offensive into the capital, Abidjan, which sparked a resumption of violence in the west.

Between December 2010 and June 2011, as the pro-Ouattara Forces Nouvelles committed acts of violence so too did security agents, mercenaries and militias loyal to Gbagbo, with the latter targeting real or perceived Ouattara supporters – most notably non-citizens and those deemed ‘non-Ivorian’ citizens from the north. As in the conflict of 2002-2003, the electoral crisis of 2010-2011 became a staging ground for anti-foreigner reprisals against non-citizens and ‘non-Ivorian’ citizens, who were arbitrarily detained, attacked at checkpoints, burned alive, or had their homes or businesses looted or confiscated.

As the conflict drew to a close, Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011 by international forces for politically-motivated war crimes and Ouattara was sworn in as president in May 2011. Although the conflict ‘officially’ ended in May 2011 with the capture and turning over of Gbagbo to the International Criminal Court (ICC), Côte d’Ivoire continued thereafter to be plagued invariably by insecurity, community-based clashes, attacks on non-citizens in the west, and cross-border attacks by all parties to the conflict, particularly along the border with Liberia.

Similar to 2002-2003, the number of non-citizens affected by Côte d’Ivoire’s political crisis of 2010-2011 is unknown. Nevertheless, official records from Ghana’s National Disaster Management Organisation (NADO) in 2010 and early 2011 suggested that about 12,250 Ghanaian migrants were

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38 United States Institute of Peace
39 This is not a regional or international body, but rather one set up in 2001 by Côte d’Ivoire comprising permanent and non-permanent representatives of various levels of government, civil society, both in the ruling and opposition parties. For further information, see: https://www.cei-cl.org/presentation.php.
implicated in the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and were compelled to return home. In 2011, the UN estimated that as many as 90,000 Liberian refugees had returned to Liberia due to the post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. More generally, the IOM estimates that in March 2011 alone, approximately 100,000 non-citizens required repatriation assistance to their countries of origin although these figures are low given the inconclusive number of migrants who fled the crisis on their own. Estimates in 2012 by the Ivorian government revealed that there were five million ‘foreigners’ still residing in the country – comprising both non-citizens and descendants of non-citizens who may or may not have been born in Côte d’Ivoire.

Given the unavailability of reliable data on migrant populations in Côte d’Ivoire due to complex definitions around who constitutes an Ivorian, a ‘non-Ivorian’ citizen, a non-citizen, descendant of a non-citizen or a foreigner, it is difficult to ascertain how many foreign nationals were actually affected by the episodes of political violence in 2002-2003 and 2010-2011. While fieldwork data suggests more interviewees were displaced as a result of the first episode of violence than the second, it is virtually impossible to compare the scale of migrant displacement across the two crisis thresholds overall. Although the number of non-citizens declined because of the outbreak of conflict in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002-2003 and 2010-2011, the composition of the population of ECOWAS migrants has remained relatively unchanged as Burkina Faso and Mali still account for the largest number of non-citizen migrants in the country.

2. Crisis Situation and Long-Term Consequences

2.1. Contextual and Structural Factors

As indicated previously, Côte d’Ivoire’s episodes of political violence in 2002-2003 and 2010-2011 did not occur within a vacuum. The sections that follow illustrate important correlations between the country’s history of immigration, pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence socio-economic development and migrants’ legal status, socio-economic positions, as well as how they were treated during times of crisis.

2.1.1. Migration History, Demography and Human Capital Factors

A leading country of immigration in West Africa since the colonial period, Côte d’Ivoire hosts today a high proportion of foreign nationals. The importance of foreigners has its origins in the colonial development policy adopted by the French metropolis.51 Indeed, in view of the huge potential of natural resources in the colony that is present day Côte d’Ivoire, France decided to make it a pole of economic growth; the demographic weakness of the colony was compensated by the use of populations from neighbouring countries, including Burkina Faso and Ghana, which has major contemporary implications.52 Widespread immigration to Côte d’Ivoire continued after the country gained independence on 7 August 1960. Ivorian governments in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s encouraged internal labour migration and immigration of economic migrants, from sub-regional countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Niger, Liberia, Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Senegal, Mauritania,53 as well as from France, Lebanon and Syria,54 who were all protected by migration and land policies that enabled them to contribute meaningfully to Côte d’Ivoire’s socio-economic development, particularly in the agricultural sector.55

According to Ivorian censuses of 1975, 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2014, non-citizen foreigners accounted for 28.09%, 25%, 26.04% and 24,22% of Côte d’Ivoire’s population, respectively, with Burkina Faso nationals constituting by far the largest foreign community in Côte d’Ivoire. Côte d’Ivoire has been a prime destination particularly for ECOWAS citizens including Burkinabé, Ghanaians and Liberians due to its strong post-independence economy and migrant friendly policies aimed at increasing agricultural production.56

Ghanaian migration to Côte d’Ivoire is mainly driven by a search for employment opportunities, which intensified in the 1970s due to socio-economic crisis in Ghana.57 Anarfi et al.58 note that employment in the cocoa plantations59 in particular attracted many low-skilled Ghanaians to the extent that the 1975 Ivorian census recorded over 42,000 Ghanaian living in Côte d’Ivoire. Later in 1986, the number of Ghanaians in Côte d’Ivoire was estimated to be between 500,000 and 800,000. This figure represented about 5% of the 15 million total population of Ghana at that time.60 Migrants from Ghana interviewed for this study included nine returnees from Côte d’Ivoire (seven females and two males) between the ages of 30 and 35 years, somewhat reflective of the composition of Ghanaian labour

migrant populations in Côte d’Ivoire in general. In addition, the majority of these Ghanaian migrants had lived in Côte d’Ivoire for between 10 and 24 years on average. Akin to Ravenstein’s ‘laws of migration’, which argues that women tend to move over shorter distances, the majority (64%) of Ghanaian migrants in Côte d’Ivoire are women. This was partly because of the proximity and the socio-cultural similarities between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, which enabled independent female migrants to relocate without their husbands, thus serving as pioneers.

Rather than abject poverty, a degree of access to economic and social resources combined with intrinsic global inequalities in income and development have driven Ghanaian and Burkinabé migration to resource-rich Côte d’Ivoire, with Burkinabé having migrated to Côte d’Ivoire for longer periods than their Ghanaian counterparts. Before independence, Burkinabé flocked to Côte d’Ivoire because of the country’s abolition of forced labour, free transportation in 1946 and the creation in 1951 of the Inter-professional Union for labour migrants. Because of Burkina Faso’s close proximity to Côte d’Ivoire and long standing history of labour migration, Burkinabé migrants – between two and three million people or 20% of the population of Burkina Faso – accounted for the largest group of non-citizens in Côte d’Ivoire before the crises of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011. In slight contrast to migrants from Ghana, Burkinabé are on average young male heads of households who settle with their families in Côte d’Ivoire, and this is somewhat indicative of the interviewees of this study who were men between 35 and 71 years of age. In the case of elderly male interviewees – who were once young heads of households – they reported migrating to Côte d’Ivoire generations before episodes of political violence ensued in the 2000s.

Although Liberia has a history of regular migration with Côte d’Ivoire – primarily due to strong ethnic, social and economic links between the two countries; frequent intermarriage; contractual work in cocoa plantations in Côte d’Ivoire; and cross-border trade – armed conflicts in Liberia between 1989-1997 and 1999-2003 facilitated the largest volume of Liberian migration to Côte d’Ivoire, as corroborated by the Liberians interviewed for this study, all but one of whom migrated to Côte d’Ivoire during intermittent wars (LIB-M-01; LIB-M-20). Liberian sub-political divisions (counties) along the frontiers, specifically Nimba, Grand Gedeh and River Gee, have ethnic ties with Côte d’Ivoire, and while ethnic diversity across national frontiers and solidarity amongst kinsmen across borderlines was exploited by various warring factions in Liberia to create regional instability in the Mano River Union (MRU) basin in the 1990s and early 2000s, these ties also provided opportunities for Liberian migrants to seek protection and shelter in Côte d’Ivoire during the country’s armed conflicts.

2.1.2. Legal Situation and Relevance for Migrant Status

Having integrated fully into Côte d’Ivoire’s socio-economic milieu, in the 1960s through the 1980s, foreign-born non-citizens and Ivorian-born non-citizens were treated as de facto citizens although they did not have legal status as citizens. However, declining cocoa and coffee prices and a sudden spike in unemployment in the 1980s stoked anti-immigrant sentiments, leading to competition over land resources between citizens and non-citizens in the western area of the country, where non-citizens had previously enjoyed unfettered access. The adoption of the Rural Land Law in 1998

Ravenstein argued that most people who are mobile move short distances, and the spaces left by internal migrants who move into a fast-growing town are quickly inhabited by migrants from further afield (Ravenstein, E.G. (1885). The laws of migration. Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 48, 2, 167-235).


Information based on knowledge and experiences of local research partner and his team.


further revoked non-citizens’ customary ownership of property, declaring that “only the State and public authorities and national citizens of Côte d’Ivoire are permitted to [...] become landowners.”

Although non-citizens were landowners under previous customary arrangements, they now could only rent or lease land. Effectively, non-citizens were unable to transfer their customary land rights to long-term leases approved by the government.

Economic crises spilled over into the political realm. Pro-immigrant president Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s granting of the right to vote to West African citizens in national elections in 1980 would later foment dissent in 1990 when defeated presidential hopeful Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), claimed that the ruling party had given Ivorian national ID cards to foreigners to secure votes. After the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, the Ivorian government adopted laws that formalised ‘ivoirité’, thereby severely limiting the rights of non-citizens. For instance, during the presidency of Henri Konan Bédié in 1995, voting rights and access to employment for non-citizens were severely restricted. Similarly, the national army delisted non-citizens and insisted that ‘non-Ivorian’ citizens serve five years before being granted active duty.

Another amendment enacted during this period required presidential candidates to be ‘true Ivorians’ through the third generation – both parents had to be indigenous inhabitants of Côte d’Ivoire – which would have direct bearing on the 2010-2011 electoral crisis in which the eligibility of presidential contender Ouattara was called into question because of his Burkinafré roots despite his Ivorian citizenship by birth.

Gbagbo’s successful presidential bid in 2000 significantly altered citizenship law; only those who could provide documentary evidence of their indigenous Ivorian origins and the Ivorian origins of their parents were granted citizenship, regardless of birthplace. The new government’s definition of ‘ivoirité’ barred approximately 30% of the country’s 16 million people from essential rights and exposed them to violence meted out by civilians and government security forces alike – on the basis of their national origin, ethnicity, religious affiliation or profession.

The legal status of West African foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire was and remains, until now, governed by the first laws of the Conseil de l’Entente (Council of Understanding) (1959), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) (paragraph C of Article 4 of the Treaty of WAEMU) and ECOWAS (Dakar Protocol of 29 May 1979) under which the free movement of persons and freedom of establishment amongst the 15 member states is recognised. By law, Burkinabé, Ghanaians, Liberians and other ECOWAS nationals can settle and live without restrictions in Côte d’Ivoire, although the protocol on free movement is not always enforced. In some cases, the protocol has been selectively applied or actively misapplied and ignored, as Liberian interviewees in this study in
particular reported being hounded and deterred by Ivorian border security while attempting to flee political violence in the 2000s.

Given the long history of Burkinabé migration to Côte d’Ivoire, the legal rights of Burkinabé in the country is particularly textured and complicated. As a case in point, in 1998 nearly half of Burkinabé in Côte d’Ivoire born there did not have Ivorian nationality under the Nationality Law (Law No. 72-852 of December 21, 1972) which is based on the right of blood. Among the Burkinabé enumerated for the 1998 census, many were born to parents who settled in Côte d’Ivoire during the colonial period and who, therefore, should have been regarded as Ivorian citizens at the time of Independence in 1960 but were not. Similarly, Liberian refugees were supposed to be protected under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the AU 1969 Convention on the Status of Refugees in Africa, yet their refugee status was restricted thus limiting their ability to freely move without harassment from Ivorian state security before and during crisis (LIB-M-11; LIB-I-02), as corroborated by these interviewees who returned to Liberia in 2002 following the outbreak of political violence in Côte d’Ivoire:

“We had refugee cards while other West African nationals (Ghanaians, Togolese, Burkinabé, and Nigerians) had Carte de séjour [residence permits], which the Ivorian authorities wanted us to acquire but it cost US$ 55.27 [EUR 58] and we could not afford it. With that card, harassment becomes much less although you still need to pay little bribe but not equivalent to a person carrying UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] refugee identity card. As for the Ivorians, they had another form of identity card.” (LIB-M-11)

“The security forces also created obstacles for our movement despite having UNHCR identification cards. Most Ivorian security officers do not respect and honour the refugee card and the United Nations did nothing to assist us.” (LIB-M-11)

While Ivorian President Houpouhet-Boigny granted Liberians free access to live in Ivorian communities rather than being relegated to refugee camps in the early part of Liberia’s armed conflict in 1989, towards the end of 1999. Liberian refugees were no longer granted special access on a prima facie basis. In general, residence, citizenship, voting and land tenure rights previously extended to Liberian, Ghanaians and Burkinabé populations in Côte d’Ivoire under President Houpouhet-Boigny later became sources of discontent and exposed immigrants to physical attacks during political unrest in the 2000s.

2.1.3. Socio-Economic Position of Migrants in Comparison to Host Population

Côte d’Ivoire, like many other countries of immigration, has a dual/segmented labour market with a primary labour market of high-wage, secure and high status jobs mostly occupied by the ‘native Ivorian’ population and a secondary labour market comprising low-wage, insecure and low-status jobs mostly occupied by immigrant populations. Prior to political unrest, and as previously mentioned, Burkinabé and Ghanaians immigrants to a large extent enjoyed relatively high access to socio-economic opportunities in Côte d’Ivoire, similar to other immigrant populations, due to the extension of legal and political rights to such groups in the 1960s through 1980s.

Burkinabé migrants in Côte d’Ivoire appear to be less affected by unemployment than newer immigrants because of their established socio-economic embeddedness in Ivorian society. They are especially engaged in sectors that do not require a specific qualification: 73.5% in agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry; 9.9% in small businesses; 6.6% in trade; 4.6% as skilled workers; 2.4% in trade and 3% in other areas. According to the 2014 Ivorian general census, the Burkinabé in Côte

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Burkinabé are mostly illiterate (63.9% Burkina Faso nationals compared to 43.85% Ivorians), although some received primary level education, and are mainly resident in rural areas (73.1% compared to 29.9% in urban areas).  

The source communities for the bulk of Ghanaian migrants to Côte d’Ivoire are poor, rural, agrarian communities that have very few paid employment opportunities in Ghana. Given their low level of educational attainment, all the Ghanaian interviewees in this study held secondary labour market jobs in Côte d’Ivoire. The migration of Ghanaians to Côte d’Ivoire is generally associated with the realisation of aspirations such as sending remittances to pay for the cost of education of migrants’ children, investment in building projects, gaining employment and subsequently marrying spouses either in the host country or during return visits to Ghana (GH-M-13; GH-M-15; GH-M-17). Moreover, employment undertaken by Ghanaian migrants in Côte d’Ivoire is to some extent gendered. For instance, the predominant employment for female Ghanaian migrants in Côte d’Ivoire is trading and prostitution. These two sectors are readily accessible to female migrants (GH-M-12; GH-M-15; GH-M-16; GH-M-17; GH-M-19) compared with the fishing and farm labour available to male migrants (GH-M-13; GH-M-14; GH-M-20). According to Awumbila et al, the scarcity of male-oriented jobs in Côte d’Ivoire for Ghanaian migrants stems from an over-supply of cheap labour from other ECOWAS countries such as Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. This gender segmentation is supported by evidence from the Burkinabé respondent pool in this study comprising all men.

On average, Liberians residing in Côte d’Ivoire are rural, agrarian, low-skilled and from border areas with restricted work opportunities as former refugees; thus, their socio-economic position in Côte d’Ivoire is deplorable compared to many Ivorian citizens who occupy formal sector jobs and are proprietors of cash crop farms (LIB-I-01; LIB-M-05). Most of the Liberian interviewees interviewed for this study were initially accommodated by their kinfolk in Côte d’Ivoire as well as in various refugee camps where they were at the mercy and goodwill of the Red Cross and UNHCR for food and other social services including water and sanitation, healthcare, etc. (LIB-M-01; LIB-M-04; LIB-M-16; LIB-M-21). Similar to their Ghanaian counterparts, Liberian interviewees on average lacked post-secondary education and mastery of French, which restricted them to blue-collar work and petty trading in the informal sector. Reflective of the Liberian migrant stock in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberian men interviewed for this study were involved in brushing Ivorian cocoa farms, hewing wood, and other menial activities (LIB-M-05) while migrant women sold wood, worked as prostitutes for money and protection, weeded farms, sold dried goods, etc. (LIB-M-01; LIB-M-02; LIB-M-08; LIB-M-17).

One can deduce several points of commonality across the migrant respondent pool in this case study, including similarities in their socio-economic positions, legal statuses, and migration histories. The following section demonstrates how these factors impacted the ability of Liberians, Ghanaians and Burkinabé to respond to political violence in Côte d’Ivoire in the 2000s.

3. Migrant Experiences of and Responses to Crises

As illustrated in this section, migrants’ experiences during crises have a bearing on the possible long-term implications of their return on countries of origin. Their resource accumulation strategies during peace times and (lack of) return preparedness resulting from crises greatly affect their reintegration options, leading some to re-migrate back to host countries even before a complete halt of violence. Although migrants may exhibit vulnerabilities to violence, intimidation and loss of livelihoods during crisis situations, they simultaneously demonstrate varied levels of agency in responding to and coping with the consequences of crises.

3.1. Violent Encounters, Reprisals and Trauma

While only some migrants were implicated in the Ivorian crises as mercenaries, interviewees from Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia generally reported being subjected to physical attacks, intimidation, and harassment, thus experiencing trauma beyond the crisis periods.

Burkinabé and Liberian migrants in particular were confronted with violent reprisals during the 2002-2003 and 2010-2011 episodes of political violence during which some were accused of fuelling conflict by fighting on multiple fronts. As a case in point, the northern-based Force Nouvelles was reported to have been formed in Burkina Faso with the support of the Burkinabé government and this sparked anti-Burkinabé sentiments in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly amongst Gbagbo loyalists. Confronting arrest, detention, and in the worst cases, executions, some of the most vulnerable migrants were seasonal agricultural workers from Burkina Faso as well as older Burkinabé of the Mossi ethnic group who were easily identifiable because of their facial markings. Landowners and agricultural workers from Burkina Faso were at acute risk of dispossession during and after both episodes of political violence because what privileges they enjoyed under customary law (such as purchased rights to land) were systematically nullified in the 1990s. Moreover, most Burkinabé resided in the districts of Abidjan considered by the Ivorian government to be ‘rebel nests’, leading nearly 350,000 and 400,000 to flee Côte d’Ivoire for Burkina Faso in 2002 to escape the repression of security forces and militias (BF-C-02; BF-M-06; BF-M-05). This was corroborated by a Burkinabé migrant who had lived in Côte d’Ivoire for 26 years before returning to his country of origin during the crisis of 2002-2003:

“We were in Tai zone when Ivorian people started to chase us with the support of young Liberians they have recruited. They were chasing foreigners, taking all goods they have and setting firehouses.” (BF-M-05)

As the previous quote indicates, Liberian mercenaries were forcefully and voluntarily recruited more than any other nationality during both Ivorian crises. Consequently, some Liberian migrants were scapegoated for the generalised violence and targeted in retaliatory attacks, whether they actively participated in the conflicts or not. While all interviewees denied involvement in the two episodes of political violence under study, a few Liberians admitted that some Liberian men may have been involved as fighters (LIB-M-6; LIB-M-11; LIB-M-13; LIB-M-15; LIB-M-16; LIB-M-20). Moreover, Amnesty International reported that many in the 2002-2003 crisis Liberians were physically attacked, with their children conscripted into Ivorian army/rebel groups and used as child labourers. Because

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of widespread allegations that Liberians were warmongers, some Liberian refugee civilians were frequently intimidated, harassed, beaten by Ivorian citizens and generally denied security and protection at all levels (LIB-M-03; LIB-M-11; LIB-M-17). As a case in point, accounts by returnees who fled the crisis in 2002 were substantiated by an international report stating that Liberian refugees were the victims of atrocities committed by various parties to the conflict.102

Generally, migrants fleeing both crises experienced torture, abuse, rape and death, as explained by this Liberian female respondent who escaped Côte d’Ivoire in 2010:

“My brother who used to be a hunter was molested [physically assaulted] and died in the process in Ivory Coast. Also while we just arrived in Liberia, my father who went fishing in Konobo River behind the PTP Camp near the Ivory Coast, was grabbed by the Ivorian people and we have not seen him till today.” (LIB-M-08)

Though all Liberians were branded ‘trouble makers’ and subjected to violence and intimidation, most Liberian interviewees claimed that Liberian men were particularly targeted (LIB-M-13; LIB-M-16), as articulated by this Liberian migrant who fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2002:

“[…] but Liberian boys were major targets for the Ivorian security because there was a perception that they [Liberian boys] were aiding and abetting the [Ivorian] war in support of former President Gbagbo.” (LIB-M-17)

Liberian interviewees also claimed that Liberian women were raped by some Ivorian men with impunity (LIB-M-17). Many interviewees argued that Ivorian security personnel who were supposed to protect refugees did not, failing in many instances to remove barriers impeding the free movement of Liberian citizens during the crises of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011 (LIB-M-02; LIB-A-01). Treatment by Ivorian security reminded some interviewees of the brutality they witnessed, experienced and fled from in Liberia. The lack of legal protection and general insecurity was particularly problematic for migrants who lived outside refugee camps, as corroborated by this Liberian senior immigration officer:

“Sometimes we get angry at the Ivorian security men due to the way they handle issues with our people as if they are not part of ECOWAS. All frameworks are on paper and the Ivorian government just talk big talk without enforcing the aspect of the protocol that can help free movement of humans and trades across our borders.” (LIB-A-01)

The African Union (AU) 1969 Convention protects the rights of refugees in AU member countries but this was not adhered to during the Ivorian crises, given the ill-treatment of some Liberian refugees who were also targeted because they did not speak French (LIB-M-13; LIB-M-17).

The uncertainty and trauma associated with violence in Côte d’Ivoire adversely impacted Liberian, Burkinabé and Ghanaian migrants and shaped their decision to return to their countries of origin, as corroborated by these Ghanaian female migrants who fled political violence during the 2010-2011 crisis:

“The conflict was very severe in my neighbourhood. It was so intense that we wake up every morning to hear rumours circulating that hundreds of people have been massacred on the streets. It was very scary, the cry of gunshots intensified each passing day. Sometimes you could hear people shout ‘they are coming’ referring to the rebels, then you have to run and look for a good place to hide.” (GH-M-12)

“One day at the market I heard people screaming and running and there was a tenant who lived in our house who wanted to close his store before running and he was hit by a bullet. So we went to the village where my husband was working and we walked, we couldn’t take any of our things. So we walked till we got to a point and we boarded a bus and came to Ghana […]” (GH-M-18)

The impact of the Ivorian crises extends beyond adult migrants to affect children with long lasting implications for their mental health, as explained by this female Ghanaian migrant who fled the crisis in 2011:

“When the war happened, my child really suffered. She was just eight years [old] as at that time, the kid walked for miles in trying to come to us. She was made to jump over dead bodies that were lying on the streets. She was made to handle a gun as young as she was to protect herself, it was even broadcast in the print media. She walked all the way from Bouaké to Abidjan, most of the kids she came with became paralysed and they couldn’t walk again [...]. Because of the war, my children became traumatised and terrified by any sound, anytime they heard any sound or loud noise they would quickly run to hide. It really affected them psychologically [...]” (GH-M-12)

As demonstrated throughout this section, egregious violence against migrants was customary during both episodes of political violence in Côte d’Ivoire, with some nationalities (Liberians and Burkinabé) reportedly facing more retaliatory attacks than others (Ghanaians).

### 3.2. Loss of Livelihoods and Possessions

Migrants reported losing their livelihoods, possessions, and hard-earned savings as a result of the crises, particularly those under precarious working conditions. Some Liberian migrants complained of poor treatment at work while in Côte d’Ivoire before, during and after crises (LIB-M-11; LIB-M-17). For example, migrant contractors said they were not paid an agreed amount by their employers because they were instead fed by employers while performing assigned duties. In other instances, employers would not honour their promises of payment upon completion of tasks, as corroborated by this Liberian woman who fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2002:

“We could not determine our monthly pay because these activities were very irregular and the Ivorian farmers were delinquent in paying for your service because you are not Ivorian. My brother and father used to split woods but they [Ivorians] used to sell the product very cheap. They [Ivorians] buy it cheap from us and sell it at higher prices and sometime they do not even buy from you because you are a refugee.” (LIB-M-17)

Migrants reported being adversely impacted by the crises in other meaningful ways. Some complained that supplies given to them by humanitarian agencies were taken away by Ivorian citizens during the crises (LIB-M-07). Similarly, migrants’ gardens and small farms were taken away during the time of harvest, and they were stopped from using the forest for livelihood activities such as fetching firewood and food (LIB-M-11). Some migrants lost their property and means of livelihood because they had to flee at short notice, as articulated by these female Ghanaian traders who were compelled to abandon their personal possessions and shops, and cash in commercial goods. While the former fled crisis in 2002, the latter two escaped Côte d’Ivoire as a result of the 2010-2011 political violence:

“I was selling when the war broke out. I had to run without packing my things. We walked to ‘Konzak’ and we boarded a vehicle to Ghana. I get worried sometimes because I had to leave everything I had in Côte d’Ivoire.” (GH-M-14)

“I was trading. I was selling fish also. When the war started we were in the market selling our fish and other products. I had to run because guns were being fired. So I left the things I was selling behind and came home. I was thinking the war would stop but it rather worsened, so I had to leave that country because my life was in danger.” (GH-M-16)

“When coming [to Ghana], I left a lot of my things back there in the woman’s camp [sheltered accommodation provided by a Ghanaian female pastor in Côte d’Ivoire]. I only came with a small bag loaded with my books, shoes and some dresses and I left.” (GH-M-20)

### 3.3. Processes of Evacuation, Return and Repatriation

Evacuation and return were arduous for Burkinabé, Ghanaian and Liberian migrants in spite of the geographical proximity of their origin countries to Côte d’Ivoire. Migrants returned via a variety of modes during both episodes of crisis, including on foot (GH-M-13; GH-M-12; GH-M-14), by hired cars (GH-M-12), boats (GH-M-13) and buses (GH-M-16; GH-M-20). While transportation was organised by the UNCHR and IOM in some cases (GH-M-20; GH-I-01), other migrants escaped on their own.
Migrants had to navigate several checkpoints and barriers that were manned by multiple actors in the conflicts such as military personnel, rebels and vigilante groups. Crossing each barrier involved thorough searches and the extortion of cash and personal possessions, especially by vigilantes. Failure to succumb to demands for bribes could lead to death (GH-M-12). These conditions exacerbated migrants’ experiences of crises in Côte d’Ivoire, as demonstrated by this female Ghanaian migrant who fled political violence in 2011:

“Each living thing crossing any of these barriers was given an amount to pay, including children and even the unborn babies before they were allowed to cross. This amount is per head so I, for instance, had five kids and I was also pregnant. I was made to pay for each and every child, including the one I was carrying in the womb. Failure to pay would mean you can’t cross. You would have to die. They would kill you should you fail to pay.” (GH-M-12)

Data from the three fieldwork countries for this case study demonstrate that, on average, more migrants returned between 2002-2003 than 2010-2011, although there were more Ghanaian returns in 2010-2011 and Liberian interviewees indicated returns at other times between the two episodes of political violence. In the case of Liberia, this could be attributed to the challenged nature of post-war recovery processes in Liberia, with the slow pace of socio-economic development possibly hindering returns. The decision of Liberian migrants to flee Côte d’Ivoire was initiated by the migrants themselves, based on their tactile experiences of instability in Liberia, as illustrated by this female respondent who fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2010:

“The war in Côte d’Ivoire pushed us back home. When we left Liberia, it was boiling and when Côte d’Ivoire started boiling, we decided to come back home [to Liberia] as it was safer.” (LIB-M-08)

The majority of Liberian migrants reported receiving no assistance from families during crises in Côte d’Ivoire and subsequent return expeditons (LIB-M-13; LIB-M-20; LIB-M-21), although three interviewees stated that they received money periodically from family members in the US and Europe through Western Union money transfers (LIB-M-03; LIB-M-07; LIB-M-16). They were outliers, however. In the cases where family members did not support relatives during crises and return, it was due in many instances to the fact that they were also ravaged by war, especially those left in Liberia, while others were in exile in other West African countries where they faced similar circumstances (LIB-F-01).

In addition to lacking the support of family members, most Liberian migrants interviewed for this case study claimed that there were no organised formal institutions or informal social networks that provided any support to them during crises. This could be attributed to the fact that some interviewees reported being discreet in divulging information about their Liberian nationalities because “being a Liberian could lead to molestation [harassment]” (LIB-M-06; LIB-M-13; LIB-M-15; LIB-M-16; LIB-M-20). This was aptly captured by one respondent who fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2002:

“As Liberian refugees, we were often treated badly by our hosts and we were constantly trying to find areas where we will feel less threatened. We were sometimes considered ‘trouble makers’, ‘rebels’, ‘strangers’ and all sorts of names and this made Ivorians to treat us cruelly. For example, if a Liberian refugee did a piece of job, like brushing farm, cleaning yard, transporting cocoa on his/her head from one place to another, as soon as the job is completed and the refugee asks for payment, Ivorian employers will ask you to leave his compound or else threatens to allow security to arrest the refugee.” (LIB-M-11)

Like most Liberians interviewed for this study, some Ghanaian migrants returned to their towns and villages without any contact with government agencies and officials. These migrants returned to their towns and villages along the shared border with Côte d’Ivoire without going through any immigration control processes. This is possible because these are communities sharing common linguistic, cultural and familial relations with communities in Côte d’Ivoire and they were actually one community prior to the artificial carving of national borders by colonial powers:

“Nobody met us, we just crossed and entered our homes with no reception from anywhere. We weren’t even expecting anything. All we wanted was to get home safely which we did, so that was okay for us.” (GH-M-12)
Because of deteriorating living conditions during both sets of crises in Côte d’Ivoire, some Burkinabé migrants returned to rural and urban centres in Burkina Faso. These returns were facilitated by migrants and their families in some cases and in other cases by government and intergovernmental agencies (see chapter 4 on ‘Institutional Responses’). In most instances, for the Burkinabé migrant returnees interviewed in this study, those who returned settled in provinces different from their provinces of origin (BF-M-01; BF-M-05; BF-M-06), for reasons outlined in the section that follows.

3.4. Resettlement and Reintegration

For returnees who made it back safely to their countries of origin, the processes of resettlement and reintegration proved to be difficult, particularly for those without strong social networks and transferable skills that could easily be absorbed into the labour market.

Migrants who returned to their villages were received by their extended families and provided with shelter and food (BF-I-02), as corroborated by these Burkinabé and Ghanaian migrants who fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 and 2011, respectively:

“I somehow became a kind [of] burden to my [extended] family who discussed and found a piece of land for me to farm.” (BF-M-02)

“Oh yes, as I said my family received me warmly, they supported me financially since we returned empty-handed. My elder siblings supported me in terms of money and food, they gave us almost everything and my children never lacked. They really did well.” (GH-M-12)

Similarly, for Burkinabé returnees who chose to settle in provinces different from their provinces of origin, they benefitted from the support of residents, first returnees who had anticipated their return, traditional authorities as well as Burkinabé associations (BF-C-02), which helped them acquire land and seedlings for agriculture, offered them food and provided financial credit for economic activities (BF-C-02; BF-C-06). In some places like the South-western part of Burkina Faso, however, internal migrants and returnees compete for access to land, leaving returnees severely disadvantaged, as demonstrated by this Burkinabé government representative:

“There is the problem of access to land. At the beginning as there was still space, native people offered their land, but now the tendency is the withdrawal of those lands. Conflicts also [arise] related to farm boundaries.” (BF-A-05)

In addition to limited access to land, Burkinabé migrants faced other difficulties; in rural areas, the main problem was food insecurity due to irregular support from associations and the Government of Burkina Faso. In cities, returnees faced, in addition to food insecurity, housing scarcity and the lack of access to health care (BF-M-01). Those who stayed in towns lacked substantial family support, instead opting for limited donations of food organised by associations (Munyu, a women’s association of Comoé; Bao Toumtasé association; Relwendé association) and government (High Council Abroad; the National Emergency Relief Council).103 Facing difficulties, some Burkinabé were forced to either leave for other provinces in Burkina Faso or re-migrate to Côte d’Ivoire, as later explained (BF-A-01).

The Ivorian crises of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011 had diversified impacts on migrants and their families. Poverty, difficulties in schooling children of returnees as well as divorce were mentioned as major obstacles to reintegration (BF-M-02; BF-M-07; BF-M-10). Members of return migrants’ households, particularly in Burkina Faso and Ghana, attested to the lack of material as well as monetary possessions during the involuntary return of their relatives. For migrants’ families, the abrupt return of their relatives contributed to increased household expenses, which have been sources of tension. Nonetheless, families have had to extend reciprocal gestures of support to returnees in recognition of remittance income received during periods abroad, as articulated by these Ghanaian interviewees, the second of whom fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2011:

“She [my sister] lost all her room possessions including the things at her shop so she couldn’t bring anything along. Getting these things now will be quite difficult. We can’t eat without her because she used to provide for our feeding. So, since she doesn’t have anything now, we give her some of what we have.” (GH-F-15)

“[…] my family received me warmly, they supported me financially since we returned empty-handed. My elder siblings supported me in terms of money and food, they gave us almost everything and my children never lacked.” (GH-M-12)

Beyond direct kinship relations, some return migrants received support from non-familial ties such as friends, including a 45-year-old male returnee from Ghana who said: “Some of my friends helped by giving me money or even food” (GH-M-13). This support was critical especially in cases where returnees’ nuclear and extended families perceived their returns as particularly burdensome, as indicated by the following quotes, the first two from Ghanaian returnees who fled Côte d’Ivoire during the 2010-2011 crisis:

“I didn’t get any help from the family. They were all looking up to me. They didn’t consider the fact that I could have died. They were rather complaining about the fact that I couldn’t bring anything when I was coming. The major problem is that I am not earning enough to help my family the way I want. I am not getting help from anywhere. So that is my worry at the moment. That is why I go to the bush to work to make ends meet.” (GH-M-13)

“I’m now a useless person over here with nothing. It’s my younger brother who even helps because he now works after he completed school. He also takes care of my mother.” (GH-M-18)

“She lost all her room possessions including the things at her shop so she couldn’t bring anything along. Getting these things now will be quite difficult. We can’t eat without her because she used to provide for our feeding. So, since she doesn’t have anything now, we give her some of what we have. We are also helping her with her feeding and it’s our prayer that we can support her with some money to start a business. However, there’s a struggle now. Since we were depending on those items she was sending and now we don’t get them, it’s really hard for us.” (GH-F-15)

It is worth noting that not all return migrants were gainfully employed in Côte d’Ivoire and therefore able to support family and friends while abroad. Household members are ambivalent about the impact of return if migrants previously lamented hard times while abroad and failed to remit, as articulated by this Ghanaian respondent spouse:

“Initially I did not want her [my wife] to go, but she managed to take the kids with her when I was not at home. She returned when the war started. She told me she was selling fish but it wasn’t lucrative enough. I can’t really tell if she told me the truth. She was always complaining of hardships. She couldn’t even call, I was always doing the calling. I can’t really tell what she lost. She came with just a polythene bag. Aside the clothes I bought for her on credit when she returned, I did not help her in any way. She had to join me in the firewood business in order for us to earn a living.” (GH-F-14)

Migrants underwent a series of changes and adaption in exile, yet despite most migrants returning to Liberia without wealth and skills, communities in Grand Gedeh in particular welcomed them with open arms and even gave them land to farm, as articulated by this respondent who fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2010:

“My community people gave us land to farm for some time and food before we started on our own in the [Bartejam Gold] Camp here. Other community dwellers were in sympathy with me and my children as they have already been staying with my sister some weeks before I returned to join them.” (LIB-M-08)

For the few interviewees who returned and resettled in Monrovia, they sought support from local Liberian civil society organisations (Liberia Returnee Network (LRN)), government agencies (Liberia Refugee Repatriation Resettlement Commission (LRRRC)) and intergovernmental organisations (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)) primarily because of ease of access compared to those who returned to Grand Gedeh (LIB-M-01; LIB-M-02; LIB-M-03; LIB-A-01). These returnees in Monrovia garnered vocational and entrepreneurial training in agriculture (animal husbandry-piggery; vegetable production-cabbage), cosmetology, event decoration and business development from governmental (LRRRC), intergovernmental (UNIDO), and civil society (LRN) agencies (LIB-M-01; LIB-M-02; LIB-M-03), although they said training did not translate into consistent, full-time employment (LIB-M-01; LIB-M-03). In fact, post-training the returnees neither received assistance with job placement, shelter/housing/accommodation, scholarships for further studies, nor were they given land or start-up funds for farming (LIB-M-01; LIB-M-03), as had been promised by the agencies and expected by the migrants themselves.

Regardless of the support rendered by external sources, coming back home without relevant skills and education leaves most returnees vulnerable, as noted by one Liberian respondent who fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2010:

“Most of my friends with whom we returned home or some of them brought by the UN repatriation programme do not learn any skill. They are suffering, begging people for money and nobody has time for them.” (LIB-M-13)

Other challenges of reintegration and resettlement abound, particularly for those returnees in the Southeast of Liberia. Amid high youth unemployment in Liberia, there is also growing social and security problems evidenced by pervasive drug abuse, alcoholism and prostitution in the Bartejam Gold Camp, as articulated by this respondent who fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2002:

“Since returning to Liberia, I have been in this [Bartejam Gold] Camp with my family mining gold without fear of molestation [harassment] and life has been good. Life here is far better than what we went through in Côte d’Ivoire. We are well integrated in this community as we have people from different parts of the West Africa region including Ivorians who did all sorts of things to us. But there are issues with the young people engaging in drug abuse, prostitution because men make quick money here.” (LIB-M-11)

Despite the difficulties encountered by returnees, many of them have also contributed to the socioeconomic development of the areas to which they returned. For instance, young repatriates to Burkina Faso returned to cultivate their coffee and cocoa plantations after the different crises. Similarly, Burkinabé migrants with vocational training and skills contributed not only to the creation of livelihood activities such as sewing and catering, but also to agricultural outputs with the introduction of palm oil production, tree farming, and the processing of cassava into ‘attiéké’, which has enabled returnee and non-returnee women to earn incomes (BF-M-01; BF-C-02).

### 3.5. Remigration

For migrants who were unable or unwilling to fully reintegrate in their countries of origin, remigration to Côte d’Ivoire proved to be an enticing alternative. For example, after the Lina Marcoussis agreement of 2003 was signed between the Ivorian government and rebels, bringing the first Ivorian crisis to an end, many Burkinabé returnees re-migrated to Côte d’Ivoire, especially those who wanted to reclaim farms and property they had abandoned. In 2007, the Government of Burkina Faso estimates more than two thirds of Burkinabé migrants previously resident in Côte d’Ivoire returned to the host country. Thus, the Ivorian crises did not significantly influence the migration of Burkinabé to Côte d’Ivoire; rather migrations multiplied to Côte d’Ivoire even before the crises ended. Though the government of Burkina Faso had been able to organise the evacuation and repatriation of Burkinabé


nationals during the Ivorian crises with the support of intergovernmental organisations, long-term socioeconomic reintegration programmes did not receive sufficient funding, however,\textsuperscript{107} thereby compelling some returnees to re-migrate (BF-A-01; BF-I-01).

Interviews with a range of interviewees during this study demonstrate that donors allocate funds during emergency situations, but do not support full reintegration of returnees (BF-A-01)\textsuperscript{108}, leading some who do not receive substantial support from families or those who did not prepare for their return to explore remigration as a durable solution (BF-A-01). This was not unique to Burkinabé migrants, however, as Ghanaian returnees also cited lack of employment opportunities and reintegration programmes in Ghana as the catalyst for their remigration to Côte d’Ivoire (GH-M-12; GH-M-13; GH-M-18). Some returnees to Ghana found that, apart from reception and accommodation, they received almost no contribution from families, which forced them to re-migrate.\textsuperscript{109} This also highlights the nexus between provision of economic opportunities and reduction in international migration in the longer term, even though the migration literature indicates initial short-to-medium term increases in migration flows due to development.\textsuperscript{110}


4. Institutional Responses

Aside from migrants and their families, external actors such as civil society and intergovernmental organisations, private sector actors and origin country governments were also involved invariably in the evacuation, return, and reintegration of Burkinabé, Ghanaian, and Liberians fleeing episodes of political violence in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002-2003 and 2010-2011. This section highlights their interventions and the implications for successful return and reintegration.

4.1. Civil Society

The degree to which civil society organisations intervened during the Ivorian crises varies considerably by fieldwork contexts, with Burkinabé civil society reportedly providing more support than their Liberian and Ghanaian counterparts. Among the key civil society organisations that contributed to the reception, resettlement and reintegration of Burkinabé returnees, it is worth mentioning the associations situated at the borders of Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire such as Munyu, a women's association in Comoé; Bao Toumtasé association; and Relwendé association (BF-C-03; BF-C-06). Their work reportedly involved negotiations with traditional authorities and community leaders to secure returnees' access to land, paying for seedlings for returnees to plant, and aiding returnees in their negotiations with the ministries of agriculture, environment, and social action (BF-C-03). While some civil society organisations reported organising a collection of food items for Burkinabé returnees in the Southeast of the country (BF-C-07), others, like advocacy organisation Tocsin, which promotes the rights of migrants, said they played a very important role in stirring national opinion (through conferences, statements on TV and radio) to pressure the Burkinabé government to condemn atrocities against its citizens in Côte d'Ivoire (BF-C-01). The previously mentioned civil society interventions were neither independently verified by Burkinabé migrant interviewees, nor were the years of intervention reported. In fact, only two Burkinabé migrants who returned in 2003 reported receiving any assistance from external sources (food, mattresses and agricultural inputs for farming from the Government of Burkina Faso as well as the German development agency (GIZ) in one case) (BF-M-10; BF-M-11).

In slight contrast to Burkina Faso, the Liberia Returnee Network was the only civil society organisation identified during the fieldwork period that provided direct reintegration assistance to Liberian returnees who had fled both episodes of political violence in Côte d'Ivoire (LIB-C-01), and this was corroborated by the three Monrovia-based returnee interviewees (LIB-M-01; LIB-M-02; LIB-M-03). Established in 2012 after the refugee cessation clause was evoked for Liberians worldwide, the LRN was established by returnees primarily from Ghana, who claimed that they understood the plight of returnees better than any other stakeholder and were therefore in the best position to respond to returnee needs. This was evident in LRN's outreach to returnees from Côte d'Ivoire who settled in Monrovia, though interventions in Southeastern Liberia were non-existent. Having established a self-funded vocational school and farm for returnees to train other returnees in sewing, cosmetology, event decoration, animal husbandry and crop production, the LRN also referred some returnees to UNIDO for enterprise development training (LIB-C-01; LIB-M-01; LIB-M-02) and assisted one returnee in securing a job at the Ministry of Youth and Sports (LIB-M-02) because it had established a database of returnees, including their particular skills, qualifications, and education background. Nevertheless, some returnees complained that the UNIDO/LRN trainings did not translate into full-time employment (LIB-M-03), and LRN lamented its lack of consistent financing, particularly from the Government of Liberia and donors (LIB-C-01).

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111 On 30 June 2012, the UN terminated the refugee status of Liberians worldwide because they deemed Liberia peaceful and stable. This was preceded by an eight-year period of voluntary return and reintegration assistance by the UN for those Liberians willing to go back to their country of origin. See: UNHCR (2012, June 29). End of refugee status for Angolan and Liberian exiles this weekend. UNHCR Briefing Notes. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2012/6/4fed82459/end-refugee-status-angolan-liberian-exiles-weekend.html.
Ghanaian civil society organisations or community groups played a minimal role in crisis response, with churches reportedly providing spiritual and financial support to return migrants who fled Côte d’Ivoire during both episodes of political violence (GH-M-14; GH-M-15):

“Yes they [the church] did help. They gave me advice and words of encouragement.” (GH-M-15)

Beyond moral support, however, a church-based non-governmental organisation in Ghana also conducted vocational training for some return migrants who acquired skills in carpentry and hairdressing (GH-M-18) after the 2010-2011 conflict, thus highlighting the potential role for faith-based institutions in crisis-induced return and reintegration. The lack of reported involvement of established civil society institutions in Ghana, Liberia and Burkina Faso in response to the Ivorian crises is partly attributed to the proximity between fieldwork countries and Côte d’Ivoire; relaxed immigration controls at the borders; common kinship, cultural and linguistic ties; and support networks from household members.

4.2. Intergovernmental Organisations

Intergovernmental organisations reported intervening at different levels and scales during the Ivorian crises of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011, although there appears to be a disconnect between their assertions of support to returnees and returnees’ claims that assistance was either minimal at best or otherwise non-existent. This is attributed to the fact that returnee respondents interviewed for this study in particular cited minimal to no assistance from these agencies.

Intergovernmental organisations maintained their classic domains of crisis intervention, investing in ad-hoc, short-term evacuation, repatriation and socio-economic development initiatives with the aim of reducing irregular migration (BF-i-01) rather than long-term reintegration solutions (GH-M-20). As a case in point, some Burkinabé, Ghanaian and Liberian returnees who could access support from these agencies in times of crises reported minimal reintegration support upon return to their countries of origin.

Amongst the intergovernmental organisations canvassed for this study, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reportedly played the most significant role in the evacuation and assistance of migrants implicated in the Ivorian crises. IOM Liberia reported that it provided transportation assistance and reintegration packages (cash and kind, depending on the availability of funding) to Liberian returnees and Third Country Nationals (TCNs) living in Côte d’Ivoire during both crises (LIB-I-02). Although this information was not independently verified by returnee interviewees, IOM Burkina Faso said it helped to transport Burkinabé migrants to their villages or hometowns, including the evacuation of 4,545 Burkinabé to Ouagadougou (BF-I-02), although it is unclear when this assistance was actually provided. Similarly, IOM Burkina Faso reportedly offered further support (medical and food assistance, small subsidies for reintegration) to some Burkinabé returnees selected on the basis of socio-economic reintegration and depending on available resources (BF-I-02).

In its Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Report for July 2011 to June 2012, IOM Ghana112 reported assisting 13,958 migrants who were implicated in the 2010-2011 crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, representing 23% of the total 61,758 individuals supported by the Ivorian office and five other IOM offices in the sub-region (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, and Mali). Beneficiaries of this support included 12,800 (92%) Ivorian refugees; 893 (6%) Ghanaian return migrants; and 265 (2%) TCNs from Lebanon, Congo, Chad, and Cameroon, among others. IOM Ghana in particular received a total of US$ 5,339,757 (EUR 4,176,533) from a number of different donors113 and it was able to provide assistance to 41,111 persons in the provision of internal and cross-border transportation (22,038 people); health services (13,861 people); emergency travel documents (151 people); food and accommodation for TCNs (4,742 people).

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113 International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2012), p. 35
Some intergovernmental organisations reported intervening specifically in the 2002-2003 crisis by working independently, in concert with other intergovernmental organisations, or with origin state governments. For instance, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) provided Burkinabé with school kits for students, fuel, vaccines and medical consumables, while the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) provided kits, consumables and medicines to returnees.\textsuperscript{114} UNHCR, the Red Cross and church groups (Lutheran and Seven Day Adventists) assisted Liberian migrants with basic food and non-food items when they moved into ‘Peace Camp’\textsuperscript{115} in 2003 and other designated centres.\textsuperscript{116} Moreover, UNHCR reported providing a reintegration package for Liberian adult returnees during this period consisting of US$ 375 (EUR 350) per adult, US$ 300 (EUR 280) return grant, US$ 75 (EUR 70) transportation and skills training (vocational training and tools) (LIB-I-01), but said package could not be independently verified by returnees interviewed for this study. During the 2002-2003 crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, UNHCR, with the Government of Liberia and other UN protection agencies, visited communities/community leaders in Maryland, Grand Kru, River Gee counties in Liberia to sensitise them about forthcoming Liberian returnees from Côte d'Ivoire (LIB-I-01). At the level of donors post-crisis, the German cooperation agency in Burkina Faso (GIZ, formerly GTZ) was particularly important in the provision of agricultural inputs to returnees in the Southwest area (BF-M-10). In this region, GIZ reportedly implemented micro-projects worth EUR 1,000,000 (welding, agriculture, commercial mobile telephony) to re-integrate returnees after the 2002-2003 crisis.\textsuperscript{117}

Interventions by other intergovernmental organisations during the 2010-2011 crisis were also apparent, although according to UNHCR (LIB-I-01), 80% of its budget was spent on voluntary repatriation of Liberian refugees between 2004-2012, during the height of both Ivorian crises. In 2011, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ghana reportedly applied for and received about US$ 90,000 (EUR 65,000) from donor emergency funds to reintegrate Ghanaian returnees from Côte d'Ivoire (GH-I-02). As previously mentioned and verified by Liberian interviewees, in 2013, 2014 and 2015 UNIDO provided a month-long entrepreneurial development training for Liberian returnees including those from Côte d'Ivoire and they were certificated (LIB-M-02; LIB-M-03). UNIDO also trained returnees for six months to serve as trainers to other returnees in business development and management, and the trainers were paid US$ 400 (EUR 375) per month (LIB-M-01).

### 4.3. Private Sector

Private sector contributions to emergency relief were captured tangentially during fieldwork in Ghana and Burkina Faso, and were even less apparent in Liberia. This is indicative of the fact that the private sector may have played a rather minimalist humanitarian role during the Ivorian crises.

During fieldwork in Liberia, it was reported that private sector actors hindered rather than helped migrants. According to previously mentioned Liberian interviewees who were caught in the 2002-2003 crisis, some employers withheld salaries and other payments from migrant workers before and during episodes of violence, thus making it very difficult for them to flee with their wages (LIB-M-11; LIB-M-17). Other employers resorted to threats and intimidation, as articulated by this Liberian man who fled Côte d’Ivoire in 2003:

“Most times you work in the farm and the owner will tell you, ‘I don’t have money to pay right now until I get to the bank in Abidjan.’ In other instances, they will threaten you that you did not bring land from Liberia, so you should not expect to be paid and the authority could not do anything about that injustice.” (LIB-M-05)


\textsuperscript{115} This is a refugee camp in Nicla near Guiglo opened and operated by UNHCR. More than 72,000 Liberian refugees were in western Côte d’Ivoire as of September 2003 and about 4,000 refugees lived in Peace Camp. See: Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2003). Trapped Between Two Wars. Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte d’Ivoire. Human Rights Watch, Vol. 15, No. 14(A).

\textsuperscript{116} Amnesty International (2003a).

\textsuperscript{117} Ouedraogo, T. (2005); Bangré, E. (2011).
Although entrepreneurs have historically benefitted from crisis situations through maintaining commercial activities where others have fled, some private sector actors were generous with their time and resources during the Ivorian crises of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011. Commercial homeowners doubled as humanitarian actors because they shielded migrants temporarily from violence. For instance, one migrant from Ghana who fled the 2010-2011 crisis revealed how his Ghanaian landlady, a female pastor of a church, operated a ‘camp’ for stranded migrants where she provided free accommodation for migrants who carried out basic household chores before, during and after crises (GH-M-20). In addition, during peace times the landlady helped to orient newly arrived migrants in Côte d’Ivoire on accessing employment opportunities and relating to the police (GH-M-20). Her ‘camp’ became a place of refuge for migrants during both episodes of political violence in Côte d’Ivoire, in which she made contact with evacuation teams to enable Ghanaian migrants in particular to return to Ghana with UNHCR/IOM sponsored buses (GH-M-20).

In Burkina Faso, private sector donations to returnees were marginal and mainly consisted of food and limited amounts of money, which are difficult to quantify, according to the permanent secretary of the Conseil National de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation (CONASUR). For instance, during the Ivorian crisis of 2002-2003, food items were donated daily to CONASUR by private entrepreneurs and then distributed to returnees’ settlements.

### 4.4. States

The governments of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia responded to the Ivorian crises at different scales depending on their legal and political obligations to their nationals abroad, as well as the resources and opportunity structures available to them at the time. For instance, whereas Burkina Faso and Ghana were primarily responsible for their nationals in Côte d’Ivoire, the vast majority of Liberian migrant respondents interviewed for this study were refugees and therefore supposed to be the legal responsibility of UNHCR – although Liberian returnees cited no assistance from this UN agency, Government of Liberia representatives reported collaborating with UNHCR to repatriate and resettle Liberian refugees during the 2010-2011 crisis in Côte d’Ivoire (LIB-A-01), as explained later. Similarly, because the Liberian government was embroiled in an armed conflict in 2002-2003 and later constrained by post-war national priorities in 2010-2011, it did not have the wherewithal to airlift and evacuate its citizens during the Ivorian crises in the same way that Burkina Faso and Ghana may have. In many ways, these political and economic considerations ultimately impacted how the three states intervened, with Burkina Faso and Ghana having a more hands-on approach to cross-border humanitarian relief than Liberia.

The Government of Burkina Faso reportedly played a crucial role in supporting Burkinabé nationals during the Ivorian crises of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011, first through organisation, coordination and funding of evacuations, accommodation, and the provision of emergency food kits at the borders as well as transportation of migrants to their villages (BF-A-02). Admittedly, government-authorised evacuations were better organised in 2002-2003 than in 2010-2011, according to some authorities (BF-A-02). Between 14 September 2002 and 7 January 2003, Burkina Faso transported and repatriated to origin regions approximately 8,850 returnees through the ‘Bayiri Initiative’ (BF-A-02; BF-M-04).119 Burkinabé government officials organised convoys to the border; established five transit and reception sites for returnees; issued returnees travel documents; and provided food, healthcare, shelter and small stipends to returnees upon repatriation.120 According to some Burkinabé Faso government representatives, the Initiative successfully galvanised the support of donor partners (BF-A-02), however, one returnee who fled the crisis in 2003 reported that some migrants had to pay an unsubstantiated amount to be evacuated under the programme though it was pegged as free-of-charge (BF-M-05).

These previously mentioned interventions were financed by the Government of Burkina Faso to support the reception of returnees at the beginning of the first Ivorian crisis, particularly between

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September 2002 and the beginning of 2003. However, one respondent reported that in the initial stage of crisis response, community leaders had to fill gaps left by the government:

“…When the returnees arrived, there was no well-organised structure to manage [the returns]. We welcomed some of them for two days before the government began its intervention.” (BF-C-04)

After the emergency phase of the 2002-2003 crisis, the Government of Burkina Faso in September 2002 developed a programme121 to support socio-economic reintegration of Burkinabé returnees from Côte d’Ivoire. Bankrolled by the World Bank, the programme focused on agriculture, fisheries and forestry production, with the intention of drawing on the experiences and know-how of returnees through financing their micro-projects.122 Covering the Southwest region of Burkina Faso, the programme was aimed at supporting returnees and promoting the socio-economic development of the region (BF-A-02; BF-M-04).

Politically, the Government of Burkina Faso was involved in all steps of resolution of the Ivorian crises, especially in negotiations that led to agreements of the Lomé Summit (Togo) from October to November 2002; Lina Marcoussis (France) from 15-26 January 2003; Acore I and II (Ghana), respectively, in November 2003 and July 2004; Pretoria (South Africa) in June 2005; and especially the political agreements of Ouagadougou (PAO) in 2007 that helped to organise the Ivorian elections in 2010.123

The Government of Ghana, through the National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO) and Ghana Immigration Service, also reportedly played an important role during the Ivorian crises, particularly the 2010-2011 electoral conflict (GH-A-04). In 2010 during an exercise dubbed ‘Operation Quabgo’, NADMO coordinated activities of the Ghana Navy, Air Force and Ghana Immigration Services to screen, identify and register its nationals and other migrants arriving in Ghana (GH-A-03; GH-A-04). Because neither NADMO nor any other government institution has the explicit mandate to evacuate trapped Ghanaian nationals abroad in times of crisis, this severely limits NADMO’s ability to provide support until Ghanaian nationals physically return to the country (GH-A-04). This was certainly evident during the Ivorian crises. Though NADMO could offer reintegration support to returnees given its widespread presence at district and regional levels, funding limitations have constrained its ability to operate efficiently and swiftly (GH-A-04).

The Ghana Embassy in Côte d’Ivoire also provided support to Ghanaian migrants who were trapped during both Ivorian crises by shielding them in the embassy compound and transporting them in buses to Ghana (GH-A-02). However, some migrants complained that they could not access the embassy located in Abidjan because of the intensity of the fighting throughout Côte d’Ivoire (GH-M-13; GH-M-16; GH-M-18). As a result, migrants who were living in peripheral regions, especially those in close proximity to Ghana, fled by crossing the border rather than travelling to the capital to seek consular support (GH-M-13; GH-M-18). This was corroborated by a returnee who evacuated Côte d’Ivoire in 2011:

“Yes there is an embassy. However when the conflict started, one couldn’t go there because all the roads had been blocked and it was far from where we were […] There was a bus, but it got full before we got to know so we decided to use the route they showed us and we were able to return peacefully. The embassy provided buses for Ghanaians […] However when the conflict intensified, all the roads were blocked so there was nowhere to pass.” (GH-M-13)

Another constraint that inhibited the governments of Ghana and Burkina Faso in particular from responding swiftly and adequately during the Ivorian crises was the lack of reliable data on the actual number of Ghanaian and Burkinabé nationals resident in Côte d’Ivoire, and their specific areas of residence in the country (GH-A-01; BF-A-03). As a case in point, according to Awumbila et al124, the

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122 SP/CONASUR (2003); p. 21.
Ghana Statistical Service\textsuperscript{125} estimated in 2010 that there were only 63,919 Ghanaians across all ECOWAS countries, yet this figure is far less than the then estimated 186,015 Ghanaians living in Nigeria alone.\textsuperscript{126} Moreover, quantifying Burkinabé migrant stock figures in Côte d’Ivoire is further complicated by their obscure legal status in the country.

Despite these data challenges, however, the Ghana Immigration Service completed basic immigration processes during both episodes of political violence in Côte d’Ivoire thereby enabling Ghanaian migrants to return to their families in Ghana without formal government involvement in their reintegration plans (GH-A-02). This was particularly common in cases where migrants returned without any support from institutions such as IOM or UNHCR (GH-A-02). In the case of those Ghanaian migrants who accessed transportation provided by IOM, there were government programmes to welcome them back home. Moreover, minimal amounts of c30 Ghana Cedis (EUR 7) were offered by NADMO to cover the cost of domestic transportation to returnees’ hometowns (GH-A-04; GH-M-20).

Compared to nationals of Ghana and Burkina Faso, Liberian migrants interviewed for this study lamented more their government’s woefully inadequate response to their plight during both episodes of political violence in Côte d’Ivoire. While possible reasons have already been suggested for the lack of government intervention, returnees acknowledged that the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission in particular received and reintegrated some Liberian migrants upon their return to Liberia during the 2002-2003 and 2010-2010 crises (LIB-M-13; LIB-A-01). This was reportedly supported through budgetary allocations from the Liberian Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (LIB-A-02). Nevertheless, returnees complained that the Government of Liberia did not provide any evacuation assistance to those who were physically caught in the crises in Côte d’Ivoire (LIB-M-13). However, the government through LRRRC and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation (BIN) reportedly helped returnees after the cessation of refugee status by the UN in 2012 by providing compensation and resettlement packages to those who returned voluntarily from Côte d’Ivoire (LIB-A-01; LIB-A-03). The compensation package, consisting of EUR 354,16 for refugees 18 and above and EUR 259,72 for refugees below 18 to cover transportation and reintegration costs, was paid by UNHCR.\textsuperscript{127}

BIN reportedly played a major role in the registration of returnees and worked with UNHCR and LRRRC to send returnees to their various communities between 2011 and 2014, during which time the refugee status of Liberians worldwide was abolished (LIB-A-01). The LRRRC trained some returnees in basic agriculture on a farm site, and they were certificated in animal husbandry (piggery) and vegetable production (cabbage); nevertheless, this training did not translate into the provision of farm implements or job placements (LIB-M-03). One Liberian government agency (which opted for anonymity) established a mobile passport unit providing identity documentation to Liberians in Côte d’Ivoire (LIB-A-03), although this was not independently verified by returnee interviewees. This agency reported that it collaborated with IOM to evacuate and repatriate stranded Liberian migrants during both crises, though this was not corroborated by returnees themselves. It also provided reintegration packages to Liberians upon return (plot of land based on availability, scholarships for vocational schools and academic scholarships, small scale micro-loans) and helped with referrals to institutions requesting employment for returnees (LIB-A-03). The agency said it also provided household utensils and mattresses to returnees and assisted them with property retrievals working through the courts and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) (LIB-A-03). With a national budget for reintegration consisting of US$ 5 million (EUR 4.6 million) between 1999-2012, this government agency received most of its funding from the UN, particularly the UNHCR, rather than through national budgetary allocation (LIB-A-03).

\textsuperscript{125} Ghana Statistical Service. (2012). 2010 population and housing census summary report of final results. Ghana
Statistical Service, Accra, Ghana.


\textsuperscript{127} Palmisano, L. & Momodu, S. (2013, January 4). UNHCR completes repatriation of 155,000 Liberians. UNHCR
completes-repatriation-155000-liberians.html.
5. Policy Learning

The medium- to long-term implications of crisis-induced returns partly depend on the policy and institutional frameworks that exist in countries of origin, which varied considerably in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Liberia. While there appeared to be reflection and subsequent shifts in some policies as a direct result of crises in Côte d’Ivoire, other areas of policy and practice remain fundamentally unchanged.

5.1. Stakeholders

Whereas the governments of Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Liberia have undertaken general initiatives related to migration since the Ivorian crises of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011, other programmes and policies have been adopted specifically responding to the crises.

Although Burkina Faso has not generated a specific policy on evacuating nationals implicated in crises abroad, the government influenced the Ivorian state’s adoption of legislation in 2013 to solve the problem of statelessness amongst Burkinabé resident in Côte d’Ivoire, which will enable Burkinabé to obtain Ivorian citizenship (particularly those who were born in Côte d’Ivoire between 1961 and 1972, and all those whose wives or husbands are Ivorian).

Partially related to the experience of evacuating nationals from crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, Ghana included in Section 4.4.2 of its 2016 National Migration Policy a provision that enjoins stakeholders to “draft guidelines for the evacuation of Ghanaian nationals abroad, during situations of political crisis, deportation or natural disaster”. This previous lacuna in the policy framework – which could have guided the operations of agencies, government departments and ministries in evacuation and repatriation processes – was evident during the evacuation of Ghanaian migrants from Côte d’Ivoire in 2010. In response to crisis situations in the past decade, including political violence in Côte d’Ivoire, NADMO drafted a bill currently before the Ghana parliament to, among others, create the Disaster Management Fund to create a facility for donors to contribute funds into a central account for disaster management prior to disasters actually happening (GH-A-03; GH-A-04).

Despite the previously mentioned policy responses to the Ivorian crises, there still remain gaps. For instance, even though Ghanaian returnees mostly returned to their households, the mixed nature of the displaced population (returnees, asylum seekers and TCNs), suggests that a formal reception centre for the purposes of receiving large numbers of distressed individuals and the completion of immigration, healthcare and security assessments would be useful (GH-A-03; GH-M-04). However, there is still no reception facility provided to receive large numbers of nationals in times of crisis, even though some refugee camps were constructed to receive asylum seekers (GH-A-04).

Similarly, the dearth of data on Ghanaians, Burkinabé, and Liberians abroad has yet to be addressed in a comprehensive manner six years after the last crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. In the case of Liberia, there has been insufficient policy learning on the part of the Government of Liberia and its international partners (LIB-I-03). As articulated by this Liberian government official, international actors particularly have a peculiar inability to learn from the past:

“...The international community has to play a responsible role in dealing with crises in Africa. They have to understand our history, our culture, our traditions; otherwise we will be the source of perpetual research [on crisis].” (LIB-A-01)

Despite these critiques, international bodies and origin country governments have identified the crucial need to develop human capacity in the area of migration data collection and use, more generally, as discussed in the next section.

128 Law No. 2013-653 of 10 September 2013 on particular disposition to acquire Ivorian nationality.
5.2. Other Relevant Developments

- Although this was not a direct consequence of the Ivorian crises, ICMPD contracted the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, from May 2014 to April 2015 to draft a user manual on migration data collection and use, the final draft of which was finalised in September 2015. In addition, the EU has funded projects for improving the capacity of Ghanaian government officials in the area of migration management, such as the EUR 3 million Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach (GIMMA) (GH/I/01). A component of this three-year project (2014-2017) is the setting up of a migration information centre at the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana, which offers pre-departure migration information to potential migrants in order to better prepare them and reduce irregular migration.

- Though not directly as a result of the Ivorian crisis, IOM supported the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration in Ghana to set up a Diaspora Support Unit in 2012, which was later upgraded to the Diaspora Affairs Bureau in 2014 to manage relations between the Ghanaian state and Ghanaian nationals abroad in order to harness national development opportunities while extending rights to diasporas (GH-A-01). These developments have the potential to create avenues for Ghanaian diasporas to influence policy formulation at home and to shape future responses to crisis situations in their countries of residence.

- Burkina Faso has also pursued migration-related initiatives not necessarily linked to the Ivorian crises, but worth mentioning here because of their consequences for future crisis situations, should they occur. In 2002, under the recommendation of the General Assembly of the National Council of Population (CONAPO), a national symposium on migration was organised in 2006 around the topic ‘Management of internal and external migrations: which migration policy in order to bring down poverty in Burkina Faso’. This was followed by the formulation of the National Strategy of Migration in 2008 and its validation in 2009. Though the document has yet to be adopted, its formulation signals a will to address migration as part and parcel of broader political, social and economic change in Burkina Faso. In 2009, the government adopted a policy document that grants the right to vote to Burkinabé living abroad during referenda and presidential elections, which has foregrounded the state’s recognition of the importance of nationals abroad; its application was postponed to 2020 because the government has not generated an electoral list of Burkinabé living abroad, however. The government is also planning to encourage Burkinabé living abroad to participate actively in the socio-economic development of the country, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 2014 ‘Migration for Development in Africa’ (MIDA) project, by working for short or longer-term stints in the higher education and health sectors. Although these initiatives have been pursued to encourage diaspora engagement and bring Burkinabé closer to diplomatic missions abroad, the state has yet to generate sufficient demographic data on the number of Burkinabé abroad, as previously mentioned.

- While alluvial mining is a major source of income generation for Liberian returnees, Liberia’s armed conflicts were fuelled by proceeds from the misuse and sale of mineral resources. Attention and assistance need to be given to Liberians who are working in gold mining sites along the border with Côte d’Ivoire in order to support peace and stability in the sub-region.

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131 The manual was developed in the framework of the Rabat Process through EU funding. Similar guides were developed for Burkina Faso and Mali. For further info, see: https://processus-de-rabat.org/en/in-action.html.
Similarly, there are signs of ecological damage in Bartejam Gold Camp and the only road leading to it is being undermined by mining. If the alluvial mining continues without proper regulation from the Government of Liberia or international organisations, it is possible that toxins from the chemicals used in the process could cause further damage to the environment.

- Tensions between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire were further exacerbated during the Ebola outbreak when Côte d’Ivoire closed its border in August 2014, which was corroborated by the Immigration Hub Coordinator (LIB-A-01). The border was closed due to the ferocity of the virus and fears of its fast rate of transmission. As a result, Ivorians and Liberians could not travel freely and this affected their capacities to engage in income generating activities, cross-border trade and social gatherings.

- The European refugee ‘crisis’ due to arrivals from Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan has transformed relations between Europe and migrant-sending countries including Ghana. The Africa-EU Valetta Summit on Migration in November 2015 and the High Level Dialogue meeting (16 April 2016), which culminated in a Joint Declaration on Ghana-EU Cooperation on Migration, are part of a renewed migration management relationship between the EU and African countries. Nevertheless, these measures are increasingly being seen as a smokescreen to curb African migration to Europe, which is minimal compared to intra-Africa migration.

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137 This is evidenced by open pit mining that is devastating the landscape, muddying the water surrounding the camp, and creating bad sanitation conditions. Chemicals such as mercury are used to extract gold in the muddy waters.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

The 2002-2003 and 2010-2011 crises in Côte d'Ivoire exposed the need to capacitate the governments of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Liberia and their inter-governmental, civil society and private sector counterparts in handling long-term mass returns of migrants implicated in humanitarian emergencies abroad. These stakeholders recognise the need to better organise actions and strategies to protect migrants in crisis situations, however, the political will to do so has been less than apparent, particularly evident in the lack of clearly stipulated provisions on emergency returns and long-term reintegration. This case study demonstrates a link between poverty, unemployment, regional economic integration and increased movements across the ECOWAS sub-region. However, the extension of political and socio-economic rights to migrants needs to be situated within a broader consensus to avert reprisal attacks on migrants during political crises.

Given that empirical and desk-based data on the crises in Côte d'Ivoire are still evolving, it is difficult at this stage in the research to compare generally across the two episodes of political violence. However, the case study of Côte d'Ivoire highlights a number of myth busting, empirical trends. First, migrants implicated in the Ivorian political crises were targeted not because of their ethnicity or nationality per se, but rather because of their perceived involvement (and the involvement of their governments) in the crises (i.e. Liberians and Burkinabé) and their often falsely perceived advantaged socio-economic positions in Ivorian society.

Second, the degree to which origin country governments responded to the plight of their nationals in Côte d'Ivoire depended entirely on the political commitments of the governments to the migrants, the opportunity structures available, and the economic capacities of the states themselves. For instance, while Liberia was extremely limited in its ability to respond, Ghana and Burkina Faso were involved in evacuation and return assistance, with Burkina Faso further mediating in political negotiations involving warring factions.

Third, based on the respondent pool for this study, some migrants returned to their countries of origin on their own, receiving little to no support from external actors despite countless narratives about external interventions.

Fourth, although there was short-term ad-hoc emergency assistance and repatriation support by families, origin governments, intergovernmental organisations, civil society, and private sector actors during the Ivorian crises, longer-term socio-economic reintegration has been rather absent, compelling some migrants to return to Côte d'Ivoire before a complete halt of hostilities.

And last, but certainly not least, AU and ECOWAS regional protocols on free movement and the right of abode are often unenforced during peace times, with gross violations during times of crises.

Thus, this case study illustrates the urgent need for clear policies and standard operating procedures on the evacuation, repatriation, resettlement and re-integration of migrants implicated in crises situations outside of their countries of origin. Policies and standard operating procedures need to be costed and budgeted for, with clearly delineated mandates assigned to relevant stakeholders. For instance, international policy makers must pay attention to challenges refugees face, including the need for countries hosting refugees to respect and honour UNHCR-issued travel and identity documents. Origin country diplomatic missions abroad need to be fully engaged in the process of supporting their nationals, through providing easily accessible consular services beyond capital cities. Furthermore, the ability of origin governments to support their nationals abroad in crisis situations – particularly through embassy consular services – would be significantly enhanced by reliable data on their migrant populations abroad and nationally derived migration policies with crisis and emergency response protocols. The collation of credible migration data and real time access to migrant stock as well as migrant flow figures are also critical to international responses to crisis situations in which migrants are implicated.

Origin country governments as well as intergovernmental organisations working on crisis and emergency response must formalise relationships with civil society organisations such as the LRN in Liberia in order to increase long-term reintegration success rates amongst returnees, as this would curb unsafe remigration. Similarly, it is vital to build a database of skills migrants have acquired abroad, as well as introduce them to labour market opportunities upon return; it is also vital to provide
technical and vocational training to return migrants. Also, in order to enhance the efficacy of disaster response organisations like NADMO, it needs to work closely with the security attaché to each mission abroad to coordinate the management of disaster incidents. Moreover, well-resourced local disaster management organisations, with access to funding sources beyond government subvention, would greatly improve operational capabilities.
7. Reference List


In 2015, the European Union (EU) launched ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an Evidence-based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action’, a four-year project implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This EU-funded project is a contribution to the global Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative, a government-led process co-chaired by the governments of the Philippines and the United States, which shares similar goals. The project aims to improve the capacity of states and other stakeholders to assist and provide protection to migrants who find themselves in countries affected by crisis, as well as address the long-term implications of such situations. Within the project, six regional consultations with states and other relevant stakeholders have been conducted, contributing to the development of the MICIC initiative ‘Guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster’, which provide guidance for states and other stakeholders in responding to the needs of migrants caught in crisis situations. In addition, the project also develops capacity building activities to follow up on key recommendations that have emerged over the course of the project. This report presents one case study of the Research Component of the EU-funded MICIC project, whose goal is to complement these efforts by providing policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises for host, transit and origin countries.