MIGRANTS IN COUNTRIES IN CRISIS

LIBYA CASE STUDY

An Unending Crisis – Responses of Migrants, States and Organisations to the 2011 Libya Crisis

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Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC)

Libya Case Study:
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to the 2011 Libya Crisis
Insights from Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ghana, Niger and Tunisia

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List of Acronyms

AFTURD  I'Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Développement
ATFD    l'Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocratiques
AVRR    Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration
CAR     Central African Republic
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CeTuMa  Tunis Centre for Migration and Asylum
CISP    Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli
CNAM    National Medical Assistance Fund
CNARR   National Commission for Reception and Reintegration of Refugees and Returnees
CODDHD  Collective of Organisations Defending Human Rights and Democracy
CONAR   Commission Nationale pour l'Accueil et la Réinsertion des Réfugiés
CORLI   Collective of Returnees from Libya
CORNII  Collective of Nigerien Returnees
CSO     Civil society organisation
DG DEVCO Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG ECHO  Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EPAD    Ecole, Parainnage & Actions de Développement
EU      European Union
EUBAM   EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission
FGD     focus group discussion
FTDES   Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights
GIZ     German Development Cooperation
GNC     General National Congress
GRASPI  The Reflection and Action Group for a Solution to the Immigration Phenomenon
IADH    Arab Institute of Human Rights
ICMPD   International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICRC    International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC    International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMI     International Migration Institute
IOM     International Organization for Migration
ISIS    Islamic State
LTDH    Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme
MEFM    Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism
MICIC   Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative
MOJEN   Youth Movement for the Emergence of Niger
NADMO   National Disaster Management Organisation
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP     National Employment Pact
NGO     Non-governmental organisation
NMP     National Migration Platform
OCHA    United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR   UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
SHOC    Strategic Health Operation Centre
UAE     United Arab Emirates
UGTT    Union General des Travailleurs Tunisiens
UN      United Nations
UNDP    United Nations Development Programme
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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Executive Summary

This case study was conducted for the EU-funded project ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an Evidence-Based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action’. Six case studies were done under this project, to investigate the impacts of crises on migrants, particularly in the longer term.

The focus of the current case study is the political unrest in Libya that began with protests against Muammar Gaddafi in February 2011. With the fall of Gaddafi in August 2011, much of the international community considered the immediate humanitarian emergency to have ended, but political instability and conflict continued, reaching a state of civil war in 2014. The country remains unstable today. This case study centres on the migrants who were displaced by the 2011 crisis from five countries of origin (Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ghana and Niger) and one country of transit (Tunisia).

When violence erupted in 2011, migrants fled Libya in myriad ways, on foot or by bus, taxi, plane or ship. Some organised their own travel, while others were evacuated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Some used smugglers’ services. Countries of origin provided little support for the evacuation. Migrants helped each other, often receiving assistance from family for their return and reintegration. Most migrants lost everything in Libya. Upon their return they became dependent on relatives for financial support. Returning home empty-handed had far-reaching consequences, such as reduced educational opportunities for children and psychological and emotional stress, for the returnees and for their household. Domestic violence and depression were occasionally the result.

During the crisis there were outbursts of violence towards foreign nationals. Foreigners were accused of being mercenaries. Blacks, in particular, became targets of xenophobic and racial attacks. Migrants were harassed, intimidated and physically attacked by both Libyan citizens and militias, and thieves robbed them of their savings and possessions. State actors played various roles in the response to migrants’ situation during and after the crisis. The government of Libya and the governments of the countries of origin of the many sub-Saharan African migrants living in Libya played a minimal role in the migrants’ evacuation and repatriation, with the exception of the Ghanaian government. Intergovernmental organisations, notably IOM, were pivotal in managing migrants’ evacuation to all of the countries under study. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was an important actor in refugee status determination of displaced migrants, especially in Tunisia.

All the countries considered in this study promoted some kind of response to the migrants’ return or, in the case of Tunisia, to migrants travelling through or stranded in the country. In most cases, however, lack of funding, concurrent crises elsewhere and lack of comprehensive and long-term perspectives hindered adequate crisis responses. Tunisia is somewhat of an exception in this regard. Following the 2011 crisis, it formulated a contingency plan elaborating guidelines and roles for each relevant institutional stakeholder. This plan has since been used in managing displaced persons arriving from 2014 onwards. Migrant interviewees reported receiving little long-term assistance to help them cope with the consequences of the crisis. Most returnees continued to live precarious existences. A few of those who opted to stay in their country of origin or transit developed economic activities with the help of intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, due to lack of prospects for employment or enterprise, a large share of returnees remigrated to Libya or went to another labour migration destination.

This study underlines the need for clear policies on evacuation of nationals caught up in crisis situations abroad. Furthermore, it demonstrates that contingency plans are needed in countries of origin, transit and destination. In the Libya case, concurrent crises in the region meant that emergency humanitarian aid had to be prioritised over long-term reintegration assistance. Strictly speaking, those who fled Libya at the onset of the crisis may at present no longer be categorised as ‘returnees’ based on the time that has elapsed since their return. Nonetheless, effective and transparent reintegration programmes from governments are still needed.
1. Introduction

In 2015, the European Union (EU) launched ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an Evidence-Based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action’, a four-year project implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This EU-funded project is a contribution to the global Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC), a government-led process co-chaired by the governments of the Philippines and the United States, which shares similar goals. The project aims to improve the capacity of states and other stakeholders to assist and provide protection to migrants who find themselves in countries affected by crisis, as well as to address the long-term implications of such situations. Within the project, six regional consultations with states and other relevant stakeholders were conducted, contributing to the development of the MICIC ‘Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster’, which provide guidance for states and other stakeholders in responding to the needs of migrants caught in crisis situations. In addition, the project develops capacity building activities to follow up on key recommendations that have emerged over the course of the project.²

The current case study reports on one of the six case studies³ conducted under the research component of the MICIC project. The goal of the case studies is to supplement the other MICIC project outputs by providing policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises in host countries.

The case study reported on here concerns the political unrest in Libya that began in February 2011 with the protests against Muammar Gaddafi. Recent literature has cast this crisis in particular as an indicative example of a crisis with significant impact on migrants in a host country.⁴ While we take the 2011 crisis as our starting point, we also recognise and discuss where relevant the persistent nature of the crisis in Libya, especially in regard to longer-term impacts on displaced migrants.

With the fall of Gaddafi in August 2011 and the declaration of the country’s ‘liberation’ on 23 October 2011, much of the international community considered the immediate humanitarian emergency to have ended. In much of the literature on the Libyan migration crisis, too, 2011 is the year referred to in which urgent responses were needed and challenges posed related to the crisis.⁵ Studies refer, for example, to 2013 as “two years after the crisis”.⁶ Nonetheless, political instability and conflict have continued in the country, reaching a state of civil war in 2014, and the country remains unstable today. In Libya, given its long history of crisis and protracted tensions, which have ended 2011 crisis, it is more useful to refer to periods of

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² For more information on the capacity building activities, as well as the regional consultations, see: http://www.icmpd.org/our-work/migrants-in-countries-in-crisis/.
³ The other case studies under study are: Central African Republic political unrest of 2013-2014; Côte d’Ivoire political unrest of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011; South Africa xenophobic violence of 2008 & 2015; Lebanon situation of migrant domestic workers and the 2006 crisis; and Thailand natural disaster of 2011.
heightened violence, civil unrest, reflecting pre-existing fragilities. The protracted conflict has had clear consequences for the migrants who have remained in Libya, for those who returned to Libya after the initial crisis ebbed and for those who recently migrated to Libya for the first time.\(^7\)

The violence that erupted in Libya in 2011 laid bare a conspicuous lack of institutional responsibility in the current international system for protecting and assisting migrants displaced by a crisis in their host country. Indeed, the Libya crisis has provided impetus for a shift in policy priorities towards greater protection and assistance to migrants in countries of destination and transit. The MICIC Initiative itself is an outcome of this turnabout.\(^8\)

Already there is a significant literature on emergency responses to the Libya crisis.\(^9\) The added value of the current study is its focus on the longer-term impacts of the crisis on the migrants who at the time were living and working in Libya. Specifically, this research examines five countries of origin of migrant workers in Libya (Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ghana and Niger) and one country of transit (Tunisia). Tunisia had a large population of own nationals who returned due to the crisis. However, our study examines Tunisia as a transit country, because a proportionately large number of fleeing migrants travelled through Tunisia or became stranded there (compared to own nationals and migrants fleeing through other transit countries).

The countries studied were chosen to enable investigation of the crisis’ impact in a range of areas, including the situations and living conditions of the migrants returning from Libya and of those who remained stranded in transit countries, such as Tunisia. In particular, the research emphasises longer-term consequences for returnees and stranded migrants, as well as impacts on the socio-economic development of the origin countries. The aim here is to illuminate how migrants’ resource accumulation strategies during times of peace and lack of preparedness for return\(^10\) affected their options during the conflict, including their ability to evacuate and their integration or reintegration options in countries of origin and transit.

This case study draws on desk research and fieldwork conducted in the study countries identified above and is organised as follows. Following the introduction, section two presents background regarding the situation in Libya, both in 2011 and today. Section three outlines the methodology followed in conducting the fieldwork in the selected countries. Section four covers contextual and structural factors relevant to the migrant population under study, examining Libya’s history as a

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country of immigration. In addition, it discusses the legal status and socio-economic position of migrant workers in Libya prior to 2011, as well as the legal status and socio-economic position of migrants stranded in Tunisia. Section five analyses migrant responses to the crisis in each of the countries studied in terms of migrant experiences and coping strategies, as well as related decision-making processes and the consequences of those decisions. Section six examines institutional responses during and after the crisis, particularly responses by government authorities (in Libya, the countries of origin and the country of transit), by intergovernmental organisations and civil society, and by the private sector. This section touches upon other relevant developments too, such as events that have occurred in study countries since the crisis which may have impacted returnees, stranded migrants and those opting to return to Libya. Section seven is dedicated to policy learning, presenting lessons learned by the various stakeholder groups in crisis response in the countries examined. Section eight draws conclusions.
2. Case Study of the 2011 Crisis in Libya

2.1. Background to the Case Study

Prior to the protests and violence against the dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya hosted a large population of migrants. Some 1.5 million to 3 million foreign workers lived in the country, the latter number representing roughly 10% of Libya’s total population. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates the total number of migrants in Libya before the crisis as 2.5 million, divided as follows: 1 million Egyptians, 80,000 Pakistanis, 59,000 Sudanese, 63,000 Bangladeshis, 26,000 Filipinos, 10,500 Vietnamese and most of the remainder from Niger, Chad, Mali, Nigeria and Ghana.

After the violence began, and during the course of 2011, more than 790,000 migrants fled from Libya into neighbouring countries. Most migrants leaving Libya went to Egypt and Tunisia, but considerable numbers went to other neighbouring countries (Figure 1). Data on returnees are primarily collected by IOM, but these numbers are not exhaustive, as they do not include migrants who returned from Libya without assistance. Nonetheless, IOM reports having organised 173,873 returns to Egypt alone, and an estimated 800,000 Egyptian returns overall.

Table 1. Documented Returns from Libya to Study Countries as of January 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Returnees from Libya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>173,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>96,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>84,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>11,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1,661</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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12 Data for the following countries are inconsistent and unreliable, partly due to the long history of short-term circular migration, as well as the irregular nature of migration from these countries and lack of consular statistics.
13 International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011a). Socio-economic Profile of Egyptian Migrants Returning from Libya Due to the Crisis: Sample Analysis. Cairo: IOM.
Figure 1. Cross-border Movements from Libya into Neighbouring Countries (as of September 2011)


Most sources cite 350,00017 (registered) to 1 million (including unregistered) arrivals in Tunisia from Libya during 2011.18 As seen in Figure 1, IOM estimates that approximately 60% of the registered arrivals (208,489 people) were nationals from another country (TCNs), of whom some 55% (115,516 people) were repatriated by IOM.19 Of this group of people, most of those arriving in the early months of the crisis were single young men who lost their jobs when the conflict began. By spring 2011, numbers of arrivals had ebbed, but the proportion of vulnerable persons among them had increased; that is, those with medical conditions, emotionally distressed persons, families and unaccompanied minors.20

Among the non-Libyans compelled to leave Libya, some were recognised as refugees or registered as asylum seekers either in Libya or in another country they had resided in before reaching Libya. Such registrations were done by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or in state refugee status determination or asylum procedures. Prior to the 2011 crisis, UNHCR had registered more than 8,000 refugees in Libya. A further 3,000 cases were pending. Most applicants hailed from Chad, Eritrea, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia and Sudan.21 Libya likely harboured even more non-Libyan nationals and stateless persons who had not or not yet applied with UNHCR for international protection. This category would include persons originating from other countries in conflict or turmoil and residing in Libya as irregular migrants or migrant workers. Many had to leave at the onset of the insecurity and violence. Displacement in these cases was often a catalyst for applying for refugee status. Many of the irregular migrants who fled to Tunisia, for example, had thus far avoided engaging with authorities. A number of them registered when they found themselves stranded, unable to return to their country of origin.

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17 This is the approximate number most commonly cited, and may refer specifically to those recorded and/or registered by IOM.
After the fall of Gaddafi, the security situation in Libya remained perilous, as militias, previously united in their fight against Gaddafi, turned against one another. During the initial 2011 crisis, international organisations had minimal access to areas held by government forces, particularly in Tripoli. Similarly, there was no international presence on the borders with Chad and Niger, and agencies had difficulty obtaining security clearance to work in western Libya. As a result, humanitarian assistance within Libya was sporadic and geographically limited.\(^{22}\) In the face of these difficulties, the evacuation of third-country nationals from the Egypt and Tunisia borders heralded unprecedented cooperation between UNHCR and IOM, as discussed later in this report.

Libya’s neighbouring states generally responded supportively to displaced Libyans and non-Libyan nationals. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees at the time, António Guterres, publicly praised Egypt and Tunisia for keeping their borders open, despite the considerable pressure on public services exerted by the massive influx of migrants.\(^{23}\) For Tunisia, in particular, the open door policy was linked to historical, economic and political rationales. Tunisia and Libya introduced free movement of persons across their borders in 1988. Since then, Libyans have travelled to Tunisia as tourists and for business and personal reasons, while Tunisians travelled to Libya to work or for trade and business. Maintaining open borders has been an economic boon for both countries. Open borders were also considered a ‘neighbourly duty’ and sign of solidarity between the leaders who came to power following the revolutions against authoritarian regimes in the region. Tunisia’s decision in 2011 to keep its borders open and welcome those fleeing Libya was presented as a humanitarian action and outlet of international solidarity. Its open door policy continues to this day, benefiting the numerous displaced persons in the region, from the migrants who fled Libya in 2011 to the many who continued to flee this country in 2017.

### 2.2. The Choucha Transit Camp

In 2011, Tunisia hosted UNHCR-run refugee camps on its territory for the first time since the war with Algeria (1954-1962). Migrants and refugees were also hosted, in smaller numbers, by local communities in temporary camps in towns close to border crossings (e.g., Dehiba, Remada and Tataouine).\(^ {24}\) One of the UNHCR camps, the Choucha transit camp, was the only camp in Tunisia to remain active after 2011.\(^ {25}\) A former military camp 7 kilometres from the border at Ras Jdir and 25 kilometres from the town of Ben Gardane, Choucha was established as a transit camp at the peak of the crisis, on 24 February 2011.\(^ {26}\) Initially the camp received up to 18,000 people a day,\(^ {27}\) providing shelter and assistance to migrants and refugees fleeing the conflict. UNHCR ran the camp in collaboration with the Tunisian Red Crescent and a number of other institutions and organisations, such as the Tunisian Army, the Moroccan Royal Army, Save the Children, the Danish Refugee Council, the International Medical Corps, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Médecins Sans Frontières, Islamic Relief Worldwide and the Tunisian Ministry of Public Health.

The camp’s average population was 4,000, though it had as many as 22,000 inhabitants in March and April 2011. Riots and protests were daily occurrences at the camp, as migrants, refugees and asylum seekers considered the processing of asylum requests unacceptably slow and were incensed at the UNHCR’s rejection of some applications.\(^ {28}\) Nevertheless, UNHCR processed 3,543 asylum claims at the Choucha transit camp in 2011 and 2012. Of these, 84.9% were recognised as refugees.\(^ {29}\)

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In October 2012, UNHCR stopped providing food, water and medical services to rejected asylum seekers, and at the end of June 2013 the camp was officially closed. By the time of the closure, more than 3,170 refugees had already departed to resettlement countries (the USA and Norway were the leading hosts of refugees resettled from the camp). At that time, UNHCR counted 222 rejected asylum seekers in the camp who refused to leave but also declined to participate in integration programmes in southern Tunisia. At that point, the Choucha camp became a focal point for activism by many Tunisian and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) seeking to defend the rights of migrants and refugees, including those whose applications had been rejected.

Between 2013 and 2016, dozens of these rejected asylum seekers had to rely on themselves. As a last resort, many used the services of the smugglers operating along the border and in the western port cities of Libya, including Zuwara, to cross to Europe by sea. However, some remained in Tunisia. As of summer 2016, about 60 asylum seekers, including some whose refugee applications had been rejected, continued to live at Choucha. They were recognised neither by the Tunisian authorities nor by the UNHCR or IOM as ‘persons of concern’.

### 2.3. The Libyan Civil War from 2014 Onward

After the fall of Gaddafi, intermittent violence and instability continued across Libya, erupting into renewed civil war in 2014. As of this writing, the conflict was primarily between the Tobruk-based Council of Deputies government, which was elected in 2014 and internationally recognised, and the rival Islamist General National Congress (GNC), which was based in the capital Tripoli and rejected the results of the 2014 election. The Tobruk government, strongest in eastern Libya, had the loyalty of the Libyan National Army, under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. The Islamist GNC, strongest in western Libya, was led by the Muslim Brotherhood and backed by a wider Islamist coalition known as Libya Dawn and other militias. A political agreement reached in December 2015 was unsuccessful in resolving the conflict. Furthermore, a United Nations (UN) peace process had stalled, “leaving unresolved pressing issues like worsening living conditions, control of oil facilities, people smuggling, and the struggle against jihadist groups”.

A particularly violent episode was the beheading of Egyptian Copts by the Islamic State (ISIS) in January and April 2015. Egyptians interviewed during this research spoke of this period as a ‘second crisis’. Christian migrants were also targeted by the Islamic State, which claimed responsibility for the abduction and murder of 21 Egyptian Christians and 28 Christian Ethiopians in Libya.

Divisions between the rival governments deepened between February and September 2016. The lack of progress made by the interim executive, the Presidency Council, on key issues – not least, shortages of water and electricity – continued to undermine confidence in its leadership. Furthermore, the great exodus of African migrants bound for Europe provided a resource that Islamic State could exploit in its battles to expand in Libya. Islamic State fighters reportedly ambushed and abducted hundreds of refugees in 2016, turning women captives into sex slaves to reward the extremist group’s warriors.

At the same time, human rights abuses have been reported in Libyan detention camps and prisons where irregular migrants were being held. In February 2017, the German Embassy in Niger authenticated reports of executions, torture and other systematic rights abuses in Libyan camps along

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31 Al Aichi, D. & Dobbs, L. (2 July 2013).
32 Estimations advanced by migrants in Ben Gardane, as well as by UNHCR and IOM sources in Tunis.
the irregular migration and refugee transit routes. In January 2017, a joint report of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) highlighted a host of violations and abuses against migrants in Libya perpetrated both within and outside detention centres, by state officials, armed groups and individuals:

“[B]etween 4,000 and 7,000 migrants are held arbitrarily in detention centres run by the Department for Combating Illegal Migration. Numbers fluctuate and there is no registration system to record the movement of migrants in and out of detention.”

The report also pointed to a lack of legal process, judicial review and oversight. Migrants were being held illegally in both irregular detention centres and in “connection houses”, the latter being places for migrants to reside temporarily prior to being transferred to smuggling and trafficking routes. Conditions in the migrant detention centres were said to be inhuman. For example, “women held in detention centres run by armed groups across the country are commonly guarded by men, who have full access to their cells”. Indeed, migrant women using smuggling routes via Libya and women in migrant detention centres in Libya were reportedly frequently targeted for rape.

Cross-border movements were limited by security constraints, including strict exit control measures at Libya’s borders with Egypt and Tunisia. Obstacles encountered when seeking safety via land routes left the sea route as the only option available to many asylum seekers and refugees in Libya. Return to their country of origin was often not an option, due to fear, risks or unwillingness. Indeed, amid continued violence and abuse, thousands have sought to leave Libya by crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe in unseaworthy vessels. Numbers of people seeking to leave Libya by boat rose enormously from 2014 to 2016. Deaths in the Mediterranean Sea increased as well. Such deaths were still extremely frequent in the summer of 2017, the most recent at the time of this writing being the 74 dead recovered from a beach in western Libya.

The insecurity and terrorist threats that have plagued Libya since 2013 have compelled Tunisia to tighten its open door policy. After an ISIS-linked gunman attacked a Tunisian tourist resort in June 2015, the Tunisian government announced that it would construct a barricade at the Libya border. That structure, completed in February 2016, stretches some 200 kilometres inland from the coast, covering almost half the length of the 460 kilometres boundary. Tunisia closed its borders with Libya for two weeks following the 24 November 2015 attack against the presidential guard on Avenue

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Mohamed V in Tunis.\textsuperscript{47} This was the first such closure in 28 years. Since then, however, there have been other border closures due to terrorist attacks, as in March 2016.\textsuperscript{48}

Thus, both the generalised violence in Libya and the attacks on migrants, refugees and asylum seekers have significantly impacted movements of people in the region. While the 2011 violence is the immediate object of study in this report, it is clear that effects of the violence in Libya will continue to reverberate, as migrants and other displaced people seek a safe haven, returning to their country of origin or becoming stranded elsewhere.


3. Methodology

3.1. The Research Teams and Fieldwork

This Libya case study is the product of a coordinated effort by six research teams in five countries of migrant origin (Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ghana and Niger) and one transit country (Tunisia). Five research teams were made up of local experts with their own research assistants. One team (Egypt) was organised by the American University in Cairo. The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) acted as case study coordinator and supervised the fieldwork researchers in Egypt and Tunisia. The International Migration Institute (IMI) at the University of Oxford coordinated the fieldwork researchers in Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana and Niger. The contracted local experts conducted the fieldwork over different overlapping periods, between March and September 2016.

Background information was first collected through desk research, semi-structured interviews, focus groups and informal discussions, as well as drawing on and analysing available secondary quantitative data from institutional sources. Documentation consulted for the desk-based research included academic sources, factsheets published by international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, policy documents and local press articles.

ICMPD and IMI prepared topical guidelines for the interviews and focus groups. Based on these, tailored interview guidelines were developed for each stakeholder group in each of the selected study countries. This process ensured data comparability across the fieldwork teams. The teams adapted the interview guidelines to the local context, translating them when needed. Researchers were trained in the use of the topical guidelines for collecting data from the target populations. Furthermore, the terminology used was elucidated to ensure common understanding. A data collection manual was issued to each fieldwork team describing the research approach, the conduct of the fieldwork, ethical principles, interview preparation and coding. Finally, in each study country, IMI or ICMPD conducted a workshop with the local team at the start of the project, to familiarise them with the research tools and approach and raise key issues.

One of the issues raised was the risks vulnerable people face in talking about return from a conflict situation. The field assistants were therefore advised to strictly abide by the established guidelines for dealing with various ethical issues, such as informed consent and guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality of the participants. Researchers sought interviewees’ explicit approval for use of the interviews for this study. Furthermore, different levels of disclosure were offered, from full disclosure to complete anonymity.

Interviews were recorded, if consent was given, and translated when not in English or French. Some interviewees would not permit recording of the interview, in which case, researchers took notes. For the focus group discussions, a facilitator introduced topics based on the interview guidelines and stimulated group members to join in a collective discussion among themselves. In Egypt, six focus groups were conducted with between seven and 12 migrant returnees in each, for a total of 53 participants. Of these individuals, 15 migrants were selected for in-depth interviews. Anonymity was a particularly important issue among NGO stakeholders in Egypt, due to unprecedented steps by government to restrict independent human rights work by NGOs, threatening their very existence. Thus, representatives of one international and one local NGO preferred to remain anonymous.

Interviews were conducted in numerous languages. English, French and Arabic were used with institutional stakeholders. Local languages or dialects were used with returnees and their household members, as the majority did not speak English or French (e.g., the Mooré language was used in Burkina Faso).


In Chad, the field researchers conducted additional informal discussions with people connected to returnees in some way, such as taxi drivers, restaurant owners, traders and neighbours. Though not recorded, these talks helped the teams understand certain dynamics and thus deepened the formal interviews held with the returnees.

In Niger and Tunisia, the team ultimately had to speak informally with representatives of intergovernmental organisations, as it proved difficult to secure an appointment for formal interviews with them.

3.2. Fieldwork Locations

Exploratory missions identified appropriate research locations in the study countries. In all cases, fieldwork was done in the capital cities, as these hosted the head offices of international organisations as well as government authorities. In addition, with the exception of Burkina Faso, up to three other fieldwork sites were chosen in each study country, based on concentrations of relevant target groups of interviewees. For example, locations known for departures and returns from Libya and transit camps were included in the selection.

In Burkina Faso, interviews were conducted only in the capital, Ouagadougou, as it served as the institutional hub as well as having a large population of returnees.

In Chad, institutional interviews were conducted in the capital, N'Djamena, where most humanitarian organisations were based. Migrant interviews took place in Moussoro (Bar el Gazel region). This was an accessible area where many returnees lived.

In Egypt, interviews with institutional actors were conducted in Cairo. Returnees from Libya were found in three governorates: Fayoum, Minya and Sohag. These governorates are located in Upper Egypt and had the highest rates of migration to Libya. Interviews with returned migrants were conducted in rural villages there. While Nile Delta governorates, such as Sharqiya and Menoufia, were also regions of migration to Libya, locating a sample here was more difficult.

In Ghana, interviews were conducted in the capital, Accra, as well as in the Brong Ahafo region, as the majority of Ghanaian returnees from Libya were from villages and towns there. In Niger included Niamey, Tahoua and Tchintabaraden, the last two being, respectively, in the central and in the north-western parts of the country. These are regions of longstanding, traditional emigration to Libya. As such, they hosted numerous returnees from Libya.

In Tunisia, fieldwork was conducted in Tunis and in three cities in the south-east of the country: in Medenine, Ben Gardane and Zarzis. These cities are close to the border with Libya and to the aforementioned Choucha transit camp. Most of the migrants stranded there had inhabited the Choucha transit camp between 2011 and 2013. After 2013, they either continued to live at Choucha and surrounding towns, or moved on to the capital.

3.3. Interviewee Selection and Coding

Six interviewee categories were identified for fieldwork interviews, in line with the other five case studies done under the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative. Below are the categories and examples of each.

- **Migrants (M).** Most of the migrant returnees interviewed had migrated to Libya and witnessed and were displaced by the events of 2011, or they had chosen to leave Libya due to the crisis. Displacements after 2011 were also taken into account to a limited extent in Burkina Faso, Egypt and Tunisia.

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- **Family members of migrants (F).** Both nuclear and extended family members of migrants were interviewed in all countries of origin except Egypt.
- **Authorities (A).** Government or state authorities in ministries, official departments and agencies were approached for interviews, including legislators and governors, at the central, regional and local levels and representations abroad (e.g., at embassies and consulates).
- **Intergovernmental organisations (I).** Organisations interviewed were UN agencies, the IOM and agencies of the European Union (EU), among others.
- **Civil society organisations (C).** The CSO category included international, regional, national and local NGOs, as well as community-based organisations and village associations, migrants’ associations and media.
- **Experts and private sector actors (E).** This category included knowledgeable interviewees not covered in the other categories, such as academics, community leaders, employers, landlords and for-profit enterprise representatives.
- **Focus group discussions (FGDs).** Focus groups were conducted in Egypt only. Groups of returnees with similar backgrounds or experiences participated in collective discussions in each of the three governorates where interviews were held.

Each interview code indicates the location of the interview (an abbreviation for the country name), the stakeholder category and the number of the interview. For example, BF-M-01 signifies the first migrant interviewee in Burkina Faso. Some of the stakeholders interviewed in Burkina Faso, Chad and Ghana provided information for another case study as well (particularly the case studies on the Central African Republic (CAR) and Côte d’Ivoire). For example, a ministry representative in Ghana provided information about Ghana’s response to its nationals caught in both the Côte d’Ivoire and the Libya crisis.

The sampled government authorities, intergovernmental organisations and civil society organisations (CSOs) had some degree of involvement in policy formulation and execution, advocacy, protection and support, or provision of funding for repatriation and reintegration of migrants fleeing Libya. The number of interviews conducted in the study countries varied depending on the availability of interviewees. Though findings from the interviews cannot be considered statistically representative, taken together they do provide an indicative basis for certain conclusions. Table 2 presents the numbers of interviews conducted in the six study countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Group/Country</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Chad</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family members of migrants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts and private actors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organisations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: 53 migrants were involved in the focus group discussions, of whom 15 were chosen for in-depth interviews. For details on focus group compositions see Table 3 in Annex.*

All research teams adopted a purposive sampling approach for migrant and family member interviews, using either snowball sampling or selecting interview sites strategically (or a combination of the two). The aim was to identify participants fitting the profiles called for in the research design. In Burkina Faso and Egypt, the research teams used gatekeepers to facilitate recruitment of migrant
interviewees. In Egypt, a gatekeeper was identified in each governorate. The gatekeeper in Minya was the NGO Better Life Association, which had worked with rural inhabitants in Minya for a decade, albeit not with returnees in particular. In Sohag it was a practitioner at a local NGO in Cairo who had familial and social links in Tunis village, which is one of the main villages sending migrants to Libya. The gatekeeper in Fayoum was a key figure who had collaborated with UN and intergovernmental agencies on issues related to irregular migration from the governorate to Libya and southern Europe.

3.4. Migrant Sample Characteristics

We interviewed migrant returnees and migrants stranded in transit who had been in Libya and witnessed the events of 2011. Some had attempted or were successful in remigration to Libya again thereafter. While the focus of our research was displacement due to the 2011 crisis, interviews with returnees who had migrated or remigrated to Libya after 2011 were also included to highlight the strong circular pattern of migration in this region. Indeed, many migrants return to Libya again and again to work for shorter or longer periods, even though the violence in the country also continues, spurring ever new displacements and subsequent returns to countries of origin.

In Egypt, of the 53 migrants who participated in the focus group discussions, 26 remigrated to Libya after 2011. They reported having gone back and forth between Egypt and Libya from one to four times between 2012 and 2015 – meaning once a year on average. Of the 53 migrants involved in the focus groups, only six never went back to Libya. Seven migrated for the first time between 2012 and 2015 and had to return when the second wave of violence struck in 2015 (E-FGD-05; E-FGD-06). Half of the interviewees in the Egyptian sample left Libya through Tunisia.

In Burkina Faso, eight returned migrants were interviewed. Among those who returned to Burkina Faso in 2011, many, again, remigrated to Libya after a lull in the crisis. The majority of our Burkinabé migrant sample had remigrated to Libya and returned between December 2015 and February 2016.

Overall, most of the migrants interviewed were single men younger than 30 years of age and with a basic education. This reflects the overall trend in migration to Libya, which is dominated by men. Ghanaïans generally frown on migration of single women to Libya, due to the stigma attached to the jobs they are believed to engage in there, such as prostitution (GH-E-01).

In terms of age, in Ghana the majority of returnees interviewed (9 out of the 11) were between 20 and 30 years old. They reported having lived in Libya three years on average. In terms of marital status, nine of the 11 were married. All migrant interviewees in Chad were married, but their families remained in Chad while they migrated. They had spent between six and 20 years in Libya. All Nigerian interviewees were under 45 years of age.

The research team focused on Tunisia as a transit country. It thus interviewed non-Tunisians and non-Libyans who had sought safety there upon being displaced by the crisis in Libya in 2011 and in more recent years (2015-2016). Most could not reach their country of origin directly from Libya or did not feel safe returning to their own country. Interviewees in Tunisia included ten refugees under UNHCR protection in Medenine and Zarzis; 32 asylum seekers whose application for refugee status had been rejected by the UNHCR (referred to as rejected asylum seekers, they are technically irregular migrants); and three migrants who had arrived from Libya but were not seeking refugee status (also irregular migrants).

The Tunisia research team made several attempts and repeated contact with Syrians in Tunisia who had been secondarily displaced by the Libya crisis. Many reportedly planned to cross by sea to Lampedusa, but their crossings had been interrupted. We were unable, however, to find any Syrian refugee who had passed through Libya before arriving in Tunisia. All the Syrian refugees we encountered or obtained information on had passed through Algeria or travelled to Tunisia by air before Libya and Tunisia broke diplomatic relations in 2013.

In Tunisia, 45 migrants were interviewed from ten countries: Benin, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Somalia and Sudan. Most of our interview subjects (18) were from

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Sudan (Table 3). Table 1 in the Annex provides nationalities of these migrant interviewees identified by interview code. Their nationalities will also be referenced with the interview codes throughout this report.

Table 3. Countries of Origin of Migrants Interviewed in Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Tunisia, half of the interviewees (22) were 30 years or younger at the time of the interview. Thirteen were between 31 and 40 years of age, and ten were between 41 and 63 years of age. Eight were women, two of whom were interviewed in conjunction with their husbands. Most of the interviewees were single. As for their arrival in Tunisia, 30 of the 45 arrived in 2011-2012, one arrived in 2010, one arrived in 2013 and 11 came in 2015-2016. The arrival year of the remaining two was unknown.

3.5. Challenges During the Fieldwork

The fieldwork in the selected countries extended between one and five months between March and September 2016. One of the main challenges faced during the fieldwork was recruitment of interviewees, both migrants and other stakeholders. In Chad, it proved difficult to access returnees from Libya, since by the time of the fieldwork, most returnees had gone to their hometowns and villages in the extreme north of the country or remigrated back to Libya. Chad’s extreme north is
difficult to reach for reasons of both distance and security.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, the research team stopped in Moussoro, which limited the number of returnees that could be sampled. Neither the Chadian authority interviewed nor the EU representative could provide information on Chadian returnees from Libya. Instead, the interviews focused on Chadian returnees from CAR. No other government representatives involved in the management of returnees could be accessed for interview, given also the post-election tensions during the research period (April-May 2016).\textsuperscript{55}

In Ghana, repeated appointments had to be made with returnees, as most had yet to secure employment and were therefore very mobile.

In most countries, particularly Burkina Faso, Egypt, Niger and Tunisia, authorities were reluctant to agree to interviews, to allow the interviews to be recorded and to sign the consent form or share information, due to the perceived sensitivity of the issues addressed. In Tunisia, the Ministry of the Interior\textsuperscript{56} did not respond to correspondence from the researchers, and subjects at other ministries refused to allow their interviews to be recorded. In Egypt, only one government authority could be interviewed. The research team attempted interviews at two ministerial entities, but meeting requests were either declined or no response was provided.

In Burkina Faso and Ghana, mistrust towards the researchers arose as an issue during some of the interviews. In Burkina Faso some returnees assumed that the researchers represented organisations like IOM and would assist them. The fieldworkers had to carefully explain that they had no money or other assistance to offer, while clarifying the objectives of the interviews. A community leader in Ghana exhibited suspicion of any foreign-funded research into the experiences of returnees. Some returnees in Ghana complained of being over-researched already by different agencies and institutions, lamenting the fact that since they had returned they had not benefited in any practical way from answering researchers’ questions. In the Ghanaian district with the greatest number of returnees from Libya (Nkoranza) a compensation culture had developed. Returnees had become used to being paid substantial amounts for granting interviews. It was difficult to get such interviewees to speak without such compensation. Ultimately, the researchers decided to give each returnee or family member a token amount of 10 GHS (EUR 2.50) for their time. Community leaders and CSO representatives were given 50 GHS (EUR 12) each. Interviewees were not informed they would receive this compensation prior to granting an interview.

In Tunisia, the security situation on the border with Libya was an ongoing concern in planning team members’ movements and their contacts and interviews with migrants and refugees. Field researchers reported being under constant surveillance.\textsuperscript{57} This made it difficult, sometimes impossible, to conduct interviews with migrants, who distrusted police. This was especially true for rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Researchers had to expend great effort to first reassure migrants and, second, to convince them to allow the interviews. Moreover, many rejected asylum seekers who continued to live near the former Choucha transit camp refused to meet in Ben Gardane and demanded to be interviewed at the camp instead. From their perspective, being interviewed at the camp was a way to compel recognition of their status and legitimacy vis-à-vis the claims of international organisations, particularly UNHCR.\textsuperscript{58} But the area where Choucha is located has been a military exclusion zone

\textsuperscript{56} The Tunisian authorities, and especially the Ministry of the Interior, have always considered migration as a sensitive subject on which they practice a “closed doors” policy vis-à-vis researchers and CSOs, despite the a new law after 2011 which provides for the citizens the right to access to information by the administration. See: Boubakri, H. (2009). L’administration des migrations irrégulières par l’Etat tunisien: dispositifs réglementaires et relations avec l’Europe. In: Berramdane, A., Rossetto, J. (2009). La politique européenne d’immigration, Editions Karthala, pp. 289-309.
\textsuperscript{57} By plain-clothed or uniformed security agents.
since 2013, and access is prohibited to anyone outside the zone. The researchers’ request for access to the camp to meet the migrants was rejected by the governor of Medenine, who claimed “There is no camp. [...] [I]t has been closed since 2013." Therefore, interviews could not be conducted there.

The research teams dealt with refusals and mistrust by providing guarantees of confidentiality and further explanation of the purpose of the interviews, the goal of the consent form and the use of the data collected. They also sought access to administrative documents and mission reports to gain more insight into institutions’ activities.
4. Contextual and Structural Factors

Libya is a country of immigration with an economy that relies on foreign workers. Most interviewees from the selected countries of origin were migrant workers, though a few Sudanese interviewees in Tunisia had been asylum seekers or refugees in Libya. In Libya, public and private enterprises and individuals depended on foreign workers to perform not only arduous work but also ordinary tasks in sectors such as construction, transport, industry and agriculture. Most migrants worked without contracts, dependent on the goodwill of employers, who were seldom subject to control by authorities. Alternatively, newly arrived migrants sometimes joined more established migrants, who had prior migration experience in Libya and therefore had access to better jobs through their connections. In terms of legal status, the majority of interviewees interviewed had experienced irregularity, and educational levels were usually such that they were limited to unskilled or low-skilled work.

In all the study countries, interviewees reported abuse, violence, rape, robbery and payment of bribes to different smuggling rings for safe passage to Libya. Many migrants had, consequently, borrowed substantial amounts of cash from friends and relatives to make the journey. They arrived in Libya already in debt, with an urgent need to work to repay the loans. Generally, migrants were unable to rent decent accommodations from Libyan nationals, in part due to fear of being reported to local immigration authorities. Construction workers tended to live in uncompleted buildings on the construction sites they worked on. They then became temporarily homeless at the end of a project, until their next job was obtained. Migrants sent most of their earnings back to their families. They either did so immediately through returning migrants or kept savings hidden in safe places, as they lacked access to the formal banking system in Libya.

This section discusses the relevant historical, legal and socio-economic factors influencing the migrants who were in Libya at the time of the 2011 crisis. These constitute important contextual and structural drivers that shaped the options available to migrants when the violence erupted. As many migrants fleeing Libya ended up in Tunisia (included here as a country of transit), we also address the legal status of stranded migrants in this country, as it is relevant in determining their subsequent responses (e.g. local integration or remigration). As mentioned, of our sample of 45 interviewees in Tunisia, ten had been recognised as refugees by UNHCR, while 35 had irregular status in Tunisia (32 of them were rejected asylum seekers).

4.1. Migration to Libya

4.1.1. Libyan Migration Policies

Libya has historically been an important host country for labour migrants from within the region and further afield. The petroleum industry has dominated Libya’s economy since the early 1960s. Revenues increased significantly in the 1970s, allowing the country to launch ambitious programmes of economic and social development. The scale of work in these development schemes necessitated significant labour power, unavailable within the local population. Workers were initially supplied by Arab countries, predominantly neighbours Egypt and Tunisia. Egyptians were then, as now, the nationality with the largest presence in Libya. They worked predominantly in agriculture and education.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Libya enacted a series of decisions and bilateral conventions meant to implement Gaddafi’s pan-Arab policy. Among others, Libya signed agreements with Tunisia on the right of ownership and work (1973), with Morocco regarding labour (1983), with Algeria regarding work and the use of human resources (1987) and with Jordan regarding labour (1998).

Later, Asian and East European nationals were also brought over to work in Libya.

A reorientation of Libyan foreign policy took place in the 1990s. Following the Lockerbie bombing over Scotland in 1988, the UN Security Council sanctioned Libya with an air and arms embargo. In response to the embargo and the perceived lack of support from Arab countries, Gaddafi redirected

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policies towards sub-Saharan Africa, as he had received explicit support from the Organisation of African Unity against the international embargo. Libya subsequently facilitated entry of sub-Saharan African migrants by removing requirements such as residence permits and visas for non-citizens. These were replaced with a medical certificate as the only document required. This triggered a surge in trans-Saharan migration to the country, within the broader context of pan-Africanist solidarity. Libya’s pro-Africa policy also resulted in conclusion of a number of bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements with African states, for example, one with Sudan in 1990 and several treaties with Chad in 1994. In 1991, employment of non-Arab manpower was extended to new industries, including construction.

Libya also helped found the regional bloc of Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), of which the stated goals included creating a free trade and movement area among the signatory countries. Within the framework of this organisation, Libya eliminated the working visa for Africans who wanted to settle in its territory. Subsequently, nationals of many sub-Saharan African countries, especially Burkina Faso, settled in Libya. From 2001, African workers with low qualifications were given access to private and public sector jobs in agriculture, building and cleaning. However, in March 2007 Libyan authorities reinstated the visa requirement for all African nationals, including CEN-SAD members.

The Libyan labour market is generally divided into a primary segment, staffed by indigenes, and a secondary segment, comprising unskilled jobs filled mostly by sub-Saharan Africans, anchoring the importance of such migrant workers in Libya. According to Hamood, "Initially, due to the more modest flows, Libyan border police were able to direct migrants to areas where they could fill labour needs and many were sent to the Saharan border areas to work in major agricultural projects. With Gaddafi’s speeches, as well as the various policies and agreements signed encouraging trans-Saharan migration to Libya, migration of sub-Saharan Africans to Libya greatly increased, as did tensions between Libyans and sub-Saharan African workers.

As of 2000, Libya began toning down its Pan-African policies, in line with the country’s realignment towards Europe, Italy in particular. The Libyan government carried out large-scale expulsions, the majority targeting sub-Saharan Africans. In 2000, 4,000 migrants were deported, but this number quickly expanded, reaching 64,000 deportations in 2006. Mounkaila (2015) for example, documented large-scale expulsions of Nigeriens from Libya between 2000 and 2010. In 2007, in an effort to cooperate with Europe in managing irregular migration, Libya imposed entry visa requirements on both Arab and African migrants, except for Maghrebians. This cast thousands of migrants into irregularity, with the loss of free access to health care, education and other public services. After financing various projects, including reinforcing the border with Niger, the EU and Libya concluded a cooperation agenda in October 2010 to combat clandestine immigration. The aim

61 Replaced by the African Union in 2002.
was to strengthen border control and conduct a ‘dialogue on refugees’ which would override the issue of Libya’s non-ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

4.1.2. Reasons for Migrating

In all of the study countries, migration to Libya was a key strategy to prevent or alleviate the effects of food crises and to counter extreme poverty. Migration was mainly driven by unemployment in the countries of origin and the pursuit of better wages to support families back home. Fieldwork suggests that many Ghanaians who crossed the Sahara Desert to Libya were among the poorest in society (GH-M-02; GH-M-04; GH-M-08; GH-M-06; GH-M-10). The majority of Nigerian migrant interviewees (6 out of 9) and migrant family members (5 out of 8) reported that migration to Libya was driven by lack of food, work or sufficient income to meet household expenses in Niger (NE-M-02; NE-M-03; NE-M-05; NE-F-01; NE-F-02; NE-F-07). In some households, members migrated to ease the pressure on food supplies. “[To] reduce the number of mouths to feed”, said the mother of a Nigerien migrant during an informal conversation.

Furthermore, the existence of significant economic opportunities in Libya, well-paid jobs and some jobs that Libyans disdained to perform attracted migrants:

“We are looking to build ourselves. What makes young men want to travel? If I stayed in Egypt, I could not afford to get married. I may work a month in Egypt, but I am unemployed the month after.” (E-FGD-02)

The low wages in Egypt and lack of prospects were the main push factors driving young Egyptians to migrate to Libya:

“You could work for EGP 200 [EUR 9] a week. We lived off very little money in Egypt. If there is a job here [in Egypt] that would pay me EGP 1,000 [EUR 48], I would stay.” (E-FGD-03)

Chadian interviewees, too, noted that people went to Libya for employment and business opportunities:

“I migrated to Libya to look for work. I was living without any work, and my brothers who went to Libya asked me to come to Benghazi so they could find a job for me.” (CH-M-17)

Ethnic, family and social ties, as well as historical and geographical links between the countries, also facilitated migration. The Chadian tradition of migration to Libya dates back to the caravan times, between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. The territory of the Toubou people covers the extreme north of Chad, southern Libya and north-eastern Niger. These nomadic herders traditionally circulated between these countries. In Niger, the Tuareg, Arab, Toubou and Niger Hausa are the main communities that migrate to Libya. Of these, the first to emigrate to Libya were the Tuareg (a cross-border community extending from south-western Libya to Niger, southern Algeria, Mali and Burkina Faso).

The history of Egyptian migration to Libya can be traced back to the 1950s. During the Nasser era (1952-1970), Egyptian white-collar workers, including teachers, were sent to Libya to promote education. During the Sadat era (1970-1981), Libyan-Egyptian relations deteriorated due to hostilities between the two governments, leading to deportation of hundreds of Egyptians and an Egyptian state ban on travel to Libya. By 1989, Libya had reopened its labour market to Egyptian workers, and in

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August 1989, 70,000 Egyptians crossed into Libya. In 1990, the governments of both countries signed the Four Freedoms Act allowing freedom of movement.\(^8^1\)

With regard to irregular migration routes, most of the migrants interviewed for this research who had irregularly crossed Libya’s long border had done so overland. Our interviewees noted several ways for Chadian migrants to enter Libya. Some travelled the Moussoro Faya route by camel (up to the Chad-Libya border), then used cars (GH-M-17). Others travelled from Moussoro to Libya solely by camel, spreading the journey out over several weeks. Others made the journey from Moussoro to Libya by car (GH-M-16). The Ghanaians interviewed travelled through Niger and across the Sahara Desert. These routes were characterised by abuse, violence, rape, robberies and payment of bribes to different smuggling rings for safe passage (GH-M-11; GH-M-09; GH-M-10; GH-M-08). Consequently, migrants typically borrowed substantial amounts of cash from friends and relatives (in Ghana and others based in Libya) and arrived already in debt (GH-M-02).

4.2. Libyan Legal Framework on Migration and Asylum

4.2.1. Laws Governing Migration and Asylum in Libya

Libyan law, even today, criminalises irregular migration, both entry and stay. No clear distinction is made between migrants and those in need of protection, such as refugees and trafficking victims. In 2014, the European Commission characterised Libya’s legal and regulatory framework on migration as “poor, fragmented and not harmonised”, noting that irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are “all considered to be ‘illegal migrants’ and subject to fines, retention, and expulsion”.\(^8^2\) Provisions for migration-related violations are contained in bilateral conventions and two specific laws: Law No. 6 (1987) Regulating Entry, Residence and Exit of Foreign Nationals to/from Libya as amended by Law No. 2 (2004) and Law No. 19 of 2010 on Combating Irregular Migration. Both laws criminalise violations of migration provisions, sanctioning them with fines and imprisonment. Earlier, in accordance with Libya’s pan-Arab ambitions, Law No. 18 (1980) defined ‘Arab nationality’ and facilitated Arab citizens’ acquiring Libyan citizenship, expediting policy already introduced by the 1954 law on Libyan citizenship.

Law No. 6 (1987) Regulating Entry, Residence and Exit of Foreign Nationals to/from Libya states general conditions for foreigners to lawfully enter and stay in Libya. Article 17 of the law establishes grounds for the deportation of irregular migrants and those sentenced to expulsion by a court. Article 19 sets out penalties of fines or imprisonment for various immigration-related infractions such as providing false information or documents and irregular entry or stay.\(^8^4\)

In 2004, in response to pressure from European states regarding irregular migration routes to Europe, Law No. 6 (1987) was amended by Law No. 2 (2004). That legislation defines “illegal migration” as the “entry or exit of the country outside of the designated checkpoints or without authorisation from the competent authorities, or without a regular visa issued by the parties authorised to issue entry visas”.\(^8^5\) Penalties were increased as well, to include a monetary fine of at least 2,000 dinars (EUR 1,000) and imprisonment of up to 20 years, aggravated if the infraction was facilitated by an organised criminal network.

Moreover, the 2004 legislation introduced prioritisation for employment of foreign workers from countries with which Libya had bilateral agreements over nationals from other countries, thus ending the previous regional approach. Visa and travel document requirements were also established for all


\(^{8^3}\) The distinction between Arabs and Africans is not always clear. The ‘Arab’ countries of Africa are officially considered as Arab, like Sudan. Yet, the frontier between ‘Africans’ and ‘Arabs’ varies according to partners, speakers and circumstances.


non-citizens entering Libya, except for citizens of Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Arab states (though not including Iraqis and Palestinians).

However, Libya also tried to regularise some migrants. In 2007, it issued an ultimatum requiring regularisation of foreign nationals’ employment. As noted earlier, this rendered thousands of migrants irregular, causing them to also lose free access to health care, education and other public services. Law No. 19 of 2010 on Combating Irregular Migration gave irregular migrants two months after the law’s entry into force to legalise their stay. If they did not, they were subject to penalties.

As regards asylum law, Libya has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 protocol, and it has failed to adopt asylum legislation. Yet, thousands of de facto refugees live in the country as economic migrants. There is no official memorandum of understanding between UNHCR and Libya, although UNHCR’s presence has been tolerated and it has been informally allowed to conduct refugee status determinations in Libya since 1991. UNHCR letters of attestation, however, are not always recognised by Libyan authorities. In 2009, UNHCR was permitted to open an office in Libya, and a plan was launched to elaborate a national asylum system, following an agreement between UNHCR and Libyan governmental and non-governmental entities regarding the management of ‘mixed flows’. UNHCR was subsequently allowed to visit migrant detention camps to identify possible refugees. However, Libya temporarily expelled UNHCR in June 2010, during an episode of tense negotiations with the EU.

As of spring 2017, the situation was still highly repressive, and no changes had been introduced in legislation. In January 2017, a joint report of UNSMIL and OHCHR recommended to “[a]ddress urgently the situation of migrants to ensure that all individuals, regardless of their status, are able to enjoy their human rights, including by decriminalizing irregular migration, adopting an effective refugee status determination procedure and implementing alternatives to detention”. 88

Considering this legal framework and the Libyan policies previously outlined, it is perhaps unsurprising that the majority of migrants interviewed for this study were irregularly present in Libya, whether due to unlawful entry or to overstaying a visa. All Chadians, Ghanaians and most of the Burkinabe, Egyptians and Nigeriens interviewed had irregular status:

“We managed to arrive in Libya, but they imprisoned us. Arriving at the border, we paid a lot of money because we wanted to go to Sabbath. The Libyans took our money and put us in prison. We were mistreated until we got a number for Burkina Faso and called. I called the big brother of my father to explain our situation. Afterwards, he sent us money for the Libyans to free us from the prison. I [arrived in Libya in 2011 and] spent 26 days in prison. They left us in the street. We didn’t know where to go and where to stay. We slept under bridges for three months before finding a house.” (BF-M-09)

Of the migrants interviewed in Tunisia, more than half (24 of the 45) had irregular status while in Libya (as detailed in Table 4). 89

Table 4. Legal Status in Libya of Migrants Interviewed in Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Migrants</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Workers</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and Asylum Seekers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork interviews

86 Global Detention Project (February 2015).
87 Global Detention Project (February 2015).
89 See: Table 1 in Annex for national backgrounds.
Due to Libya’s stringent legal framework on migration, irregular status is often associated with difficulties in obtaining travel documents. A substantial share of those needing to travel must thus resort to the many migrant smuggling networks available.\textsuperscript{90}

**4.2.2. Irregular Status and Deportations of Egyptians**

The legal situation of Egyptian migrants in Libya has evolved along with security conditions and events, both before 2011 and during the more recent crisis in 2014 and 2015. In 2004, the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Labour signed an agreement with Libya requiring work permits for Egyptians entering Libya.\textsuperscript{91} In 2007, new regulations from Libya’s Ministry of Manpower and Labour required Egyptians to pay a number of fees on a monthly basis: 25 LYD (EUR 17) in income tax, 14 LYD (EUR 9) for insurance, 15 LYD (EUR 10) for an Arab identity card and 60 LYD (EUR 40) for an accredited work permit.\textsuperscript{92} A report in the Al-Ahram newspaper suggests that some 35,000 Egyptians returned to Egypt due to this measure.\textsuperscript{93} However, participants in five focus groups held under this research stated that entrance to Libya remained fairly easy and affordable prior to the 2011 uprising. Most had entered legally on a tourist visa, which they then overstayed (E-FGD-04; E-M-01; E-M-03). Interviewees in six focus group discussions and 12 interviews said they did not feel that overstaying their visa had exposed them to any particular danger while in Libya prior to 2011, though security conditions overall became perilous thereafter. The majority of our migrant interviewees from Minya and Sohag (Egypt) had entered Libya for the first time legally with a tourist visa, while those coming for a second time or more had been able to enter with just a passport stamp and no visa challenges. Interviewees who had migrated from Fayoum (Egypt) for the first time after 2011 entered through irregular channels, due to border closures following the 2011 crisis. While the majority of our sample mentioned entry with visas, very few admitted to having used a forged visa obtained through a broker in Egypt (E-M-15; E-FGD-02).\textsuperscript{94}

"[I]n 2012, there were a lot of Egyptians in Libya, around 3,000 to 4,000, out of which you could estimate that 600 entered through formal visas and the rest harabi [irregular channels]." (E-M-06)

Egyptian migrants in Libya were treated similarly, irrespective of how they had entered. They worked in the informal sector and their status – irregular or not – was not a barrier to finding jobs. However, those who had been to Libya before were much more familiar with the labour market and had better access to jobs through their connections with other Egyptian workers and previous Libyan employers.

Differences in legal status did manifest in migrants’ departure from Libya, since those who migrated to Libya after the 2011 crisis were deported rather than leaving voluntarily for safety reasons. Migrants’ said that deportations were more prevalent for those who stayed or (re-)entered after 2011 (E-FGD-06). As of 2013, the GNC in Libya began systematic deportations of Egyptians. Subsequently a crisis arose between the two countries due to the arrest of 50 Egyptian migrants who had entered Libya irregularly. They were convicted of proselytising, and one of them died in custody.\textsuperscript{95} In August 2013, the Libyan authorities denied entry to more than 2,000 Egyptians attempting to re-enter the country following the Eid holiday, saying they did not have the needed residency permits.\textsuperscript{96} In late 2013, Libyan authorities deported an estimated 400 Egyptian migrants daily. In 2014, relations between the two governments grew even more tense when pro-Gaddafi Libyans sought refuge in Egypt. The Libyan government promised to open its doors to Egyptians if the Egyptian government would hand over the pro-Gaddafi figures.\textsuperscript{97} Growing tensions between the two countries led to the targeting of Egyptians in Libya and denial of entry to Egyptian migrants arriving.\textsuperscript{98} One returnee in Fayoum experienced the consequences first-hand:


\textsuperscript{91} Pesha, M. & Mada Masr (18 February 2015).

\textsuperscript{92} Pesha, M. & Mada Masr (18 February 2015).


\textsuperscript{95} Tsourapas, G. (2015).

\textsuperscript{96} Tsourapas, G. (2015).

\textsuperscript{97} Tsourapas, G. (2015).

\textsuperscript{98} Pesha, M. & Mada Masr (18 February 2015).
“I did not decide, I was deported. I was on my way back home from work one day.” (E-M-13)

A focus group participant in Minya reported the following deportation incident:

“We were 54 people travelling together illegally. We were caught at the border and detained for 21 days, until the Egyptian ambassador came. Some people died in prison and some were injured due to torture. We were deported after 21 days.” (E-FGD-02)

4.2.3. Legal Status of Migrants Stranded in Tunisia

Corroborating other research on the subject, our interviews in Tunisia demonstrated the vulnerable position of migrants without a legal status in regard to the Tunisian authorities (police and government), public services (e.g. hospitals) and private individuals. For example, undocumented migrants could not sign a lease or be recruited by employers; many lived rough and worked illegally for substandard pay. Migrants emphasised that their situation in Libya was better, even if they had irregular status there:

“I had a lot of problems [in Tunisia]. I was always being arrested by the police and each time I had to call MDM [the House of Law and Migration/France Terre d’Asile] to release me. The situation in Libya was more favourable.” (TU-M-01, Côte d’Ivoire)

Irregular status in Tunisia reportedly deprived migrants of the ability to circulate freely outside the governorate of Medenine.99

“Well, we can only move within the governorate of Medenine due to our illegal situation, and we have friends who live in Djerba and Tunis, so I hope to visit them.” (TU-M-02, Côte d’Ivoire)

“My illegal situation made it difficult for me to move freely. I could not survive financially. Even when I wanted to go from the camp to the centre of town... the taxi driver tells me I have to pay 10 dinars [EUR 3.50] instead of 3 dinars [EUR 1] because I’m a refugee.” (TU-M-40, Côte d’Ivoire)

Even refugees under UNHCR protection and with UNHCR refugee identification cards faced obstacles in daily life:

“UNHCR provided us with legal documents. We even have refugee cards. But we didn’t have a resident permit. Even if we want to learn how to drive a car, it is difficult. I asked a guy outside and he said we are not allowed because we are refugees.” (TU-M-44, Eritrea)

The vulnerability extended to the labour market and living conditions. Private sector employers required migrants to have a work permit, which they could not obtain because of their irregular status:

“In Tunisia I cannot get a job because every time they ask me for the papers, residence permit. [...] I’ve contacted cafeterias and restaurants and filed applications at textile companies in Ben Arous [an industrial suburb of Tunis]. They accept them, but each time it is the papers that I’m missing.” (TU-M-01, Côte d’Ivoire)

Migrants were therefore either rejected or hired illegally to do manual labour, for example, at cafés and restaurants, in construction and in retail. To protect themselves, employers sometimes secretly informed security services,100 which often turned a blind eye. Undocumented migrants were also barred from vocational training provided by public institutions. Foreign labourers were subject to a fairly restrictive regime. For example, a rule of national preference prohibited employment of foreigners in positions that could be held by Tunisians. Also, employment contracts were limited to short periods

99 Tunisian authorities have always managed in a rather flexible manner the business transactions (informal economy) and the persons’ movements in the border area close to Libya, provided that they remain under control and do not extend to criminal or illicit activities.

100 This information is retrieved from a personal conversation between the local research partner and the Head of Security in Ben Gardane, Tunisia.
(a one-year fixed term, with only one renewal possible), and a Ministry of Employment visa was required for all work permits (Article 258 of the Labour Code). Certain occupational activities required prior authorisation, while others were completely off-limits to foreigners. Any foreigner seeking to take up paid work was required to obtain a job contract and residence card marked ‘authorised to exercise a salaried job in Tunisia’. Renewal of the residence permit required renewal of the contract and obtaining of permission to work. Foreigners who lost, even through no fault of their own, their employment, automatically lost the right to renew their residence permit.

4.3. Socio-economic Position of Migrant Interviewees

Migrants in all of our research countries tended to occupy lower socio-economic positions in Libya connected to unskilled or low-skilled occupations, primarily in agriculture, construction, transport and industry. Though wages for these jobs were low, most interviewees were nonetheless able to remit large portions of their earnings to their countries of origin. The following sections outline the situation in Libya as described by the migrants interviewed in Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ghana, Niger and Tunisia.

4.3.1. Wages and Jobs

**Burkina Faso.** Our Burkinabe interviewees had resided in Libya between one and 18 months (BF-M-01). Most reported that employment in the Libyan formal sector remained off-limits to Africans (BF-M-05). The only employment open to Africans was in informal jobs. This explains the profile of the majority of Burkinabe migrants interviewed for this study: most were unskilled construction workers with jobs in the informal sector. Most had irregular status and did not speak Arabic (BF-M-04; BF-M-08; BF-M-09). Some Burkinabe migrants interviewed were employed by Libyans (BF-M-03; BF-M-07; BF-M-09).

The formal sector, particularly commercial jobs, was primarily occupied by Libyans. Of the eight migrants from Burkina Faso interviewed, only one mentioned a semi-skilled occupation; he worked in plumbing (BF-M-04). The others performed unskilled jobs (digging holes, cleaning or doing other manual labour):

“It is in Libya that I learned this work [painting]. In Burkina Faso, I was a mechanic before I left. In Libya there are not enough bikes, so I had to change jobs and become a painter. I thank God, even though I did not earn a lot of money, I learned another job [occupational skill].” (BF-M-08)

“Yes, I worked in plumbing. It was a one-off job, not monthly employment. It depends on how you negotiate pay for the job to be done. You can get along on around EUR 75 or EUR 90 for one person.” (BF-M-04)

“My job was to help building [a labourer]. You go out in the morning, you find a job and you come back home. That's how we lived in Libya. With the departure of our president Blaise Compaoré [in 2014], all problems got more complicated. Work became very difficult to find [...] [I]t was a real problem.” (BF-M-01)

**Chad.** Our interviewees from Chad had gone to Libya looking for jobs and business opportunities. None had special qualifications. They were involved in trade (e.g., in apparel, blankets, jewellery and processed food) and business, or worked in construction or transport. Most women were involved in trade. They could earn enough to live on and send money back home to relatives. However, we cannot state whether they were economically better off than Libyans, as we lack comparative data on Libyans’ economic status. However, considering the trades they were in and the kinds of work they were doing, Chadian migrants were unlikely to have been better off than Libyan nationals. They kept in very close touch with their communities in Chad, sending back goods and money and investing back home.

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**Egypt.** Egyptians worked primarily in the construction sector, as there was high demand in the building trade in Libya. This demand certainly increased after 2011 (E-M-12; E-FGD-05; E-FGD-06). The majority of interviewees had worked as day labourers as ceramic or marble workers or as painters. The better-off Egyptians worked as brokers, recruiting Egyptians for day labour and supervising refurbishment of properties for Libyans. Some Egyptians worked at the Arab market, as street vendors (EM-05). Daily rates for Egyptian workers ranged from 30 to 40 dinars (EUR 20 to EUR 25) before 2011. Wages skyrocketed during the 2011 crisis to 60-70 dinars (EUR 40 to EUR 45). High daily wages compared to those in Egypt, plus a low cost of living and sufficient job opportunities, were strong pull factors for Egyptians.

Egyptians had access to the informal job market through networks and Libyan acquaintances, reflected in the circular migration pattern:

“There is an advantage in Libya. If the person you work for likes you he will keep you. He’ll ask you to recruit people too. Almost 90% of Egyptians were [manual] labourers.” (E-M-14)

Many interviewees noted that Egyptians were in the majority, compared to Tunisians, Chadians and other migrant worker nationalities.

While Egyptians did not share in the privileges that Libyan citizens had access to, they were self-reliant and could pay for their basic needs and find work. On many occasions, especially from 2011 onwards, they were deprived of their wages even after finishing the work expected of them (E-FGD-01; E-FGD-02; EG-FGD-03; E-FGD-03; E-FGD-04; E-FGD-05; E-FGD-06). There was no entity to report such abuses:

“T was working as a contractor for one Libyan and I had my friends work to finish his house. He owed us 8,000 dinars [EUR 5,000] in total. I had to pay the workers half their pay from my own pocket, so I lost a lot of money after paying all workers.” (E-M-15)

Analysing each presidential era, Tsourapas highlighted the recurring maltreatment of Egyptians in Libya, especially in times of crisis. Egyptian returnees complained of being scapegoated by Libyans. Before 2011, there was less of a threat, beyond random verbal attacks. In 2011, however, many actors became armed and Egyptians were particularly targeted because of the perception that their country was encouraging a revolution and, more importantly, that they were competing for Libyan jobs. Libyans have long perceived Egyptians as competitors for jobs:

“'You are here to eat our food!' That’s what they used to tell us.” (E-M-01)

### 4.3.2. Remittances

**Egypt.** A 2011 IOM study found that the majority (93.7%) of Egyptian returnees had sent remittances to their families in Egypt. Of those, 77.8% reported being the breadwinner of their household in Egypt. The low cost of living in Libya was referred to again and again as a major advantage. Migrants were not concerned with living costs there. They were able to save and send remittances to their families:

“You could live off 5 dinars [EUR 3,30] a day maximum, even if you don't work every day. Meat would not cost more than 2 dinars [EUR 1,30] and 0.5 dinars [EUR 0.30] for clothes and other costs. Life was very cheap in Libya. We used to live with 17 persons in one small house, it was hard but affordable.” (E-FGD-05)

Many migrants sent a large portion of their income back home. Of the 15 interviewees in the in-depth interviews, 12 affirmed sending between 50% and 90% of their income to their families back home. Remittances were used for various purposes, from marrying off siblings, repaying debts and covering the daily needs of family and extended family to, in some cases, savings and the purchase of real

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estate for later marriages (E-M-03; E-M-04; E-M-05; E-M-07; E-M-08; E-M-10; E-M-11; E-M-12; E-M-13; E-M-14; E-M-15). A migrant from Sohag, interviewed in Tunis village, talked about the amounts remittances that could be sent back:

“We also had to find extra work in Libya sometimes. You could have two different jobs. We all had lots of financial commitments in Egypt so we had to send money back. You would keep around 100 dinars [EUR 63] with you there and the rest could be sent back.” (E-M-09)

Focus groups described the process of sending remittances. Migrants handed amounts they needed to send in dinars to a Libyan who would exchange the currency to US dollars and send it to a Libyan in Egypt. That intermediary, in turn, handed the amount to the families of the migrants (E-FGD-05; E-FGD-06; E-M-13). The Libyans involved in the process earned on the exchange transaction and sometimes charged an extra fee. In Libya, Egyptians could not access funds in US dollars, thus accounting for the need for Libyan brokers. In other cases, trusted Libyan drivers were given the remittances in return for a percentage of the amount. Due to the frequent visits between Libya and Egypt, some migrants entrusted remittances to fellow migrants returning to Egypt for a visit. One interviewee said he preferred sending remittances regularly because of the risk of being robbed in Libya (E-M-12).

All the Egyptian migrants in our sample who had not sent remittances were single and preferred to keep all their earnings at their own disposal, though for one migrant a conflict with family back home had led him to keep his income in Libya (E-M-09). Remittances were sometimes used for gifts.106 Migrants bought electrical appliances and clothes and either sent them to family via an intermediary or brought them during visits. Gifts were purchased in advance to avoid large outlays at once. Indeed, migrants prepared for such visits over time, buying items and storing them (E-FGD-03; E-FGD-04; E-M-12). All this, however, applied only to the situation before 2011. None of the interviewees interviewed were able to transfer money or goods after 2011. Indeed, remittances sent from Libya fell sharply after the crisis, from a high of US$ 20.5 million in 2009.107

Ghana. Most Ghanaian migrants occupied very low socio-economic positions in Libya compared to the native population, due largely to their irregular migration status and different culture and language108 (GH-M-01; GH-M-02; GH-M-03; GH-M-04; GH-M-05; GH-M-06; GH-M-08; GH-M-09; GH-M-10; GH-M-11). Most of the returnees interviewed for this study held low-skilled jobs in Libya, as manual labourers or in agriculture or construction. The only female returnee interviewed (GH-M-07) had joined her spouse in Libya and been employed there as a domestic worker. Her duties included cleaning, caring for children and general housework. As noted earlier, migration of single women to Libya was frowned upon due to the stigma attached to the jobs they were believed to engage in there, such as prostitution (GH-E-01). Ghanaian returnees highlighted the erratic nature of work and living conditions in Libya:

“That kind of work wasn’t available all the time. It isn’t as if when you ended one job you could immediately move to another. [...] Over there we didn’t have a particular place we lived, as in, ‘this is my house’ or a rented house. When a Libyan asks you to plaster his house, he lets you stay in the uncompleted house while you plaster. So you just sleep on a piece of cloth in the dust and when the job is over you move out.” (GH-M-09)

Irregular migration status, lack of work permits and poor language skills blocked Ghanaians’ access to formal jobs in Libya. They were also unable to rent decent accommodation from the native population, in part for fear of being reported to immigration authorities (GH-M-09). As a result, newly arrived Ghanaians tended to work with more established migrants, for example, helping to complete the plastering of a building (GH-M-01). They lived in the uncompleted buildings too, becoming temporarily homeless at the end of a job, until their next project was found (GH-M-09). Migrant earnings were either sent back to Ghana immediately through returning migrants or hidden away from robbers, as migrants lacked access to the formal banking system in Libya (GH-M-02).

Our research indicates that the overwhelming majority of Ghanaian returnees had no formal education. The highest qualification found among our interviewees was a junior high school certificate (GH-C-01; GH-M-09; GH-A-01). Most of these migrants came from poor, rural, agrarian communities which offered very few opportunities for paid employment. Given their low level of education, it would be very difficult for them to compete for the few paid jobs available in their hometowns or villages (GH-E-01). This limited their ability to realise their aspirations in life in Ghana, such as to build a house, marry, send children to private schools, acquire property and start a business. Our research did turn up examples of migrants successfully attaining such aspirations through remittances, such as purchasing plots of land, building houses and paying school fees for children and siblings (GH-M-09; GH-M-01; GH-M-11; GH-M-06). These achievements enabled them to avoid living in an endless ‘holding pattern’. However, efforts to achieve these aspirations were abruptly curtailed by migrants’ unplanned returns due to the 2011 crisis. A typical example was Juliana who, together with her husband, had plans to build houses for their respective parents and also for their own use:

“We planned that my husband would complete the building he was raising for the family, so we could also start with ours and see afterwards if we could do the same for my parents as well. So that was the plan we had before the war situation began in Libya and we had to come home.” (GH-M-07)

**Niger.** Before the crisis, Nigerien migrants worked in various sectors of the Libyan economy. They were particularly numerous in agriculture, manual labour, construction, urban cleaning and security at shops and private residences (NE-M-01; NE-M-02; NE-M-03; NE-F-01; NE-F-02). Many were not shy about accepting jobs that Libyans themselves would not do.109 They were employed by private individuals as well as companies and municipalities. Migrants in Libya were a key economic force in Niger, because the remittances they sent back were an important resource for households and the national economy (NE-A-11; NE-F-03; NE-M-02). The Vice Mayor of Tchintabaraden confirmed the importance of migration-derived resources at the local level:

“Most of the money entering the department of Tchintabaraden is related to the transfer of funds and properties – like cars, food, electrical equipment, and the like – from migrants. [...] Many households depend on remittances from migrants to survive.” (NE-A-10)

Only one of the nine Nigerien migrants interviewed had not sent remittances from Libya; all the others had sent money to their families back home, and usually did so several times a year (NE-F-01; NE-F-03). The amounts varied, depending on the migrants’ incomes (NE-M-01; NE-M-02). Transfers were usually informal, but some migrants did use formal mechanisms such as the banking system and international transfer agencies like Western Union and Money Gram (NE-F-01; NE-M-03). Most remittances were spent on household consumption (NE-F-03). Transfers were first and foremost to provide for the family’s necessities: food, consumer goods (clothing, radios, TVs), health care, children’s schooling and socio-religious obligations (marriages, baptisms, funerals and, particularly, the pilgrimage to Mecca). Remittances were a particular help to households in emergencies, providing a fall-back in case of crop failure or food crisis.110

**Tunisia.** Migrant interviewees in Tunisia who had been in Libya before the 2011 crisis considered Libya a good destination for work in times of peace:

“Conditions were good before the conflict.” (TU-M-29, Côte d’Ivoire)

Interviewees said they could always find a job easily, everywhere in the country. Libya was considered the country that offered the best work opportunities, enabling migrants to help their families through remittances. While complaints were heard, they were fairly rare:

“I had positive working conditions, which helped improve my situation. I was well paid, well treated and could move freely. I lived with my friends with a quite cheap rent.” (TU-M-16, Sudan)

In Libya, I worked as an employee with a storekeeper. I was paid every two months and sent money to my family via the immigrants going back to the Chad refugee centre." (TU-M-14, Sudan)

“Work conditions were not that good. I earned a low wage of 150 TND [EUR 62] in 2002. Jobs were not regular, we could work one month and be dismissed the next. Work conditions were difficult as we worked all the time, but we were treated the same as Libyans. We were not subject to any injustice in Libya." (TU-M-30, Chad)

Most of the migrants interviewed were satisfied with their living and working conditions in Libya, particularly as they earned a salary that allowed them to lead a decent life and send remittances to family in the country of origin:

“I was in touch with my family. I was able to send them remittances. Before the outbreak of the crisis I was well treated. I was earning my living, I rented a garage where I lived." (TU-M-31, Sudan)

Migrant women also managed to earn a living and send remittances to their families:

“Upon my arrival, my living conditions were good. I was able to work and got paid a high wage of EUR 600 since I was a good housekeeper. In Libya, I was aspiring to improve my life conditions, and help my family. So I was able to send remittances to my family. I didn’t face any problems. It was war that changed everything, because they started to hunt out blacks. I fled Libya to save my life.” (TU-M-27, Mali)

A number of migrants had been entrepreneurs – meaning they worked independently or as enterprise managers in Libya. Some said they did not have any problems with the Libyans and even had Libyan friends:

“I was working for myself. Good working conditions. In 2010, I created another enterprise in Tripoli to enhance my activities. With my Chaabiya card I rented another store. I do not have relatives in Libya, I only have friends. I have no problems with the Libyan people. I was at home.” (TU-M-01, Côte d'Ivoire)

While most migrants did unskilled or low-skilled work, a few migrants had a privileged status in terms of health care, food and housing, thanks to a company job:

“My working conditions in Libya were suitable, I was well paid. It was the company that supported us regarding health care, food and housing. The company took care of everything, even the administrative procedures. I faced no difficulties. Every worker with the company had a card that allowed him to access to services and solved problems with the Libyan police. I was alone in Libya. I did not have direct contacts with the Libyan people because I worked in the desert.” (TU-M-02, Côte d'Ivoire)

In contrast, migrants described Tunisia as a destination appreciated for its safety, but not as a place to earn:

“In Libya, I could earn money but I am not safe, in Tunisia, it is the opposite.” (TU-M-28, Sudan)

“Job opportunities are better in Libya where I managed to save money and send remittances to our families.” (TU-M-10, Senegal)

“My situation in Libya was much better, especially from an economic perspective, and I managed to provide for my needs, such as food, water and care in Libya. But in Tunisia it's difficult. My economic situation was much better in Libya. I could send money to my family. At the end of each month I had a respectable amount I could send to my family. Now in Tunisia I earn enough but I cannot save.” (TU-M-02, Côte d'Ivoire)

112 Health care card delivered by the local authority called ‘Chaabiyat’ (popular committee).
In contrast to the affirmations of the good working and living conditions in Libya prior to the crisis, migrants described the severe conditions they were subjected to after 2011. Chaos and the reign of militias made foreigners in general and migrants in particular frequent victims of violence. Employers reportedly withheld their migrant workers’ pay. Those who demanded their wages were often kicked out or physically harassed (TU-M-28, Sudan; TU-M-29, Côte d’Ivoire; TU-M-32, Chad; TU-M-35, Sudan; TU-M-39, Sudan). Migrants reported being at risk of kidnapping, violence and even murder whenever they were out in public (TU-M-32, Chad; TU-M-34, Chad; TU-M-35, Sudan). All of the migrants interviewed in Tunisia, whether they had been present in Libya before 2011 or came afterwards, said that the crisis had a devastating effect on their finances. Migrants who went to Libya after 2011 did not stay long. Even those with relatives or friends in the country made a swift retreat.

In sum, the interviews in Tunisia indicate that virtually all migrants, regardless their country of origin, could find employment in Libya and that most were quite satisfied with their living conditions until the crisis broke out in 2011.
5. Migrants’ Responses to the Crisis

Following the outbreak of violence in 2011, migrant interviewees reported manifold ways of fleeing the country, from self-organised travel to IOM-arranged returns and smuggler transports, on foot or by bus, taxi, plane and ship. Among those interviewed in Tunisia, as a transit country, four had been rescued from the sea by Tunisian authorities. Countries of origin, overall, provided minimal support for the evacuations, leaving migrants mainly reliant on each other and on family for return and reintegration. Most migrants lost everything in Libya. Once home, they became dependent on relatives’ financial support. Their role thus shifted. Whereas before they had been a source of income for the household, they now were an economic burden. Returning home empty-handed meant that children could no longer enjoy the same educational opportunities and standard of living. This and other hardships brought psychological and emotional distress for both returnees and their household, occasionally with domestic violence and depression being the result.

Xenophobic and racial violence towards migrants, particularly blacks from sub-Saharan Africa, was common during the 2011 Libya crisis. Migrants reported being targeted, harassed, intimidated and physically attacked. They could not move around freely, as they were accused of being mercenaries. They were hounded by Libyan citizens and militias, as well as thieves who robbed some of their entire savings.

Among the returnees interviewed, very few reported receiving assistance for longer-term adjustment and reintegration. They continued to live precarious existences. Some of those who opted to stay in their country of origin or in the transit country Tunisia developed economic activities with the help of intergovernmental organisations and NGOs. A relevant share of returnees travelled back to Libya, as lack of employment opportunities and poor reintegration programmes left them little choice. Some reoriented their migration routes towards other countries.

This section considers migrant responses to the crisis, particularly evacuation and return as a strategy, and the longer-term consequences of the crisis on migrants and their families. Findings are presented for each of the countries of origin individually. Then the situation of the migrants remaining in Tunisia, as a transit country, is examined.

5.1. Burkina Faso

All migrants from Burkina Faso interviewed for this study portrayed the return from Libya as an escape from danger and violence (BF-M-01; BF-M-10; BF-M-12). Indeed, the sequence of events leading up to and following the death of Gaddafi made the situation for all foreigners difficult, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. They were targeted by rebels and thieves who stole their belongings and savings (BF-M-03; BF-M-06). During the crisis, there was an escalation of the injustices that Burkinabe migrants reportedly faced even before the 2011 violence, ranging from imprisonment to even murder (BF-M-08; BF-M-03). Since the Burkinabe migrate to Libya purely for economic reasons,\(^{113}\) most returned to Burkina Faso when it became impossible to earn an income there (BF-F-11):

“I came back [to Burkina Faso] because the living conditions [in Libya] were not good. They [Libyans] bothered us, stripped us of our possessions. We had become their animals. The black [person] does not have any rights there. It was total insecurity. Even children had weapons in Libya. Life in Libya has become like that now. When Gaddafi was there, the situation was better.” (BF-M-12)

Between 2011 and early 2016, more than 800 Burkinabe living in Libya were repatriated with the assistance of IOM\(^{114}\) and the consulate authorities of Burkina Faso in Libya (BF-I-02; BF-A-02). Some were evacuated by air (BF-M-10; BF-M-03) and others by bus.\(^{115}\) Because of the quickly deteriorating


\(^{115}\) In 2011, 1,658 Burkinabé were returned to Burkina Faso (877 by air and 781 by bus). See: International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011c). Response to Libya Crisis. Migration Crisis Operation in Middle East
living conditions, many returned overland, travelling via Algeria, Niger and Mali (BF-A-01; BF-M-06; BF-F-02). The interviews conducted for this study suggest that fewer travelled by road than were evacuated by air.

The 2011 crisis in Libya had considerable impact on the lives of Burkinabé migrants and their families (BF-F-07; BF-F-11). Returnees, especially those who had lost everything in Libya, became an economic burden on their families and the communities to which they returned:

“These are the financial difficulties. I am here. I need someone to give me food, or even one euro. I don’t have anything. What bothers me is how to repay my brother. In my family, it’s no problem. Actually, they are happy to have me back alive. If you are lucky enough that your relative who was shot could return alive, it’s a reason to be joyful. I went abroad with the idea that upon my return I would have something to bring for my family members. But instead they help care for me. It’s nobody’s fault. It is because it did not work out. Currently my wife and I are not living together. Since I arrived, as I said, she lives at my brother’s house, and I’m in this house under construction. We are not living together yet. This has caused many problems indeed. Only God can help us.” (BF-M-10)

Household budgets were affected because losses of remittances could not be offset by other sources of income (BF-F-07). In addition, return migrants often experienced discrimination and sometimes exclusion from household decision-making (BF-M-09).

Overall, the interviews in Burkina Faso revealed two main types of impact of return: economic and social. Economically, Burkinabé migrants faced a lack of housing, food and employment after their return from Libya. Most could no longer cover even the daily subsistence needs of their families (BF-F-02; BF-F-07). Occupationally, their early departure from Libya meant they had not had time to acquire the experience necessary to gain entry to the Burkina Faso job market (BF-M-03). Socially, returnees’ destitution affected their relationships with family and neighbours. Families could no longer afford daily meals, children’s schooling, rent and medical care (BF-A-03; BF-M-09). The conditions in which migrants returned, without money, forced them to depend on others’ generosity (BF-M-10). Feeling ashamed, migrants maintained a low profile. Some opted to move to the capital, Ouagadougou, where they could live in relative anonymity (BF-F-02).

5.2. Chad

5.2.1. Evacuation and the Return Home

The 2011 Libya crisis reportedly forced some 83,244 Chadians to return to Chad.116 Showing their Chadian IDs, which they had retained during their stay in Libya, enabled them to prove their Chadian citizenship. They also sometimes possessed consular cards provided by the Chadian consul in Libya. These did not certify legal residence in Libya, so they could be issued to Chadians with both regular and irregular status.

When the crisis erupted, the President of Chad, Idriss Déby Itno, appeared to be one of Gaddafi’s military supporters. This had direct consequences for Chadians in Libya, who were targeted117 by Libyan citizens and militias:

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117 This targeting did not build on any pre-existing tensions between host and migrant populations.
“All the Chadians were persecuted when the crisis started. Some were decapitated because we were told that our president was supporting Gaddafi, sending him weapons and troops. So the unlucky ones among us got killed or robbed.” (CH-M-18)

“I was intimidated by the opponents in the conflict. My daughter’s leg was injured by a bullet. We stayed in the conflict zone one month before leaving. Black people were targeted there because the Libyans accused them of being Gaddafi’s allies.” (CH-M-19)

Chadian migrants in Libya were harassed, intimidated and physically attacked. Their belongings were stolen, burnt or destroyed by the assailants. Chadians were also targeted because of their Toubou ethnicity. Chadian migrants could do little to protect themselves from the armed assailants engaged in the revolution against Gaddafi. It was difficult for migrant interviewees to elaborate on coping strategies as such, since the Chadians were not really prepared for their departure. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “more than 66,000 Chadians fled the Libya crisis and were repatriated by air and land to Chad on 31 May 2011”.

Some fled overland to Egypt and were then taken by IOM to N’Djamena, from where they travelled on to their regions of origin (Borkou, Ennedi, Tibesti, Barh El Gazal, Kanem) (CH-M-16).

The Chadian government offered little support, however. Migrants had to rely on family to help them return and reintegrate. Some families of Chadian migrants sent money to help them travel from Faya or N’Djamena back to Moussoro. They then continued to help by providing shelter, food and small amounts of cash upon the migrants’ arrival in Chad (CH-M-16; CH-M-17; CH-M-18):

“From Faya to Moussoro my parents put money together and sent it to me. That money enabled me to get to Moussoro.” (CH-M-16)

Upon arrival, returnees encountered many challenges, such as finding employment and securing capital to start a business (CH-M-19). While some led precarious existences, as they had lost their sources of income and had to rely on family members, others could benefit from the investments they had made while in Libya (CH-M-19; CH-F-02). Migrants who had sent, for example, money to build a home or goods for sale in Chad, were able to live off these assets when they arrived in Moussoro (CH-M-19).

However, for many the economic situation became bleak once back in Chad:

“I sent money every two months. I used to send CFA 20,000 [EUR 304]. I also used to send blankets, carpets and clothes. I sent it to my father and my brothers who were in Moussoro. It was just a gift. The amount of what I’ve sent is about CFA 10 million [EUR 15,250].” (CH-M-17)

Some relatives were obliged to pool resources to pay for the return trip of family members. The new economic burden these migrants represented for households was noted by a number of interviewees:

“My household can hardly subsist […] I don’t have any source of income.” (CH-M-17)

“My return has affected my household because I lost everything during the war. I can no longer support my children and provide goods and money for my wife.” (CH-M-16)

Most of the Chadians who had migrated to Libya were young and maintained close relations with their families and communities back home (CH-16-M; CH-M-17; CH-F-2). Some left wives and children behind, travelling back and forth regularly, at least once a year (CH-M-16; CH-M-17). According to

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119 The CFA franc is the name of two currencies, the West African CFA franc (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) and the Central African CFA franc (Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, Guinea and Gabon). Although theoretically separate, the permanent parity of the two make the two currencies effectively interchangeable.
IOM,120 many Chadian women lost their husbands in the Libya crisis. They faced a new precarious life as heads of household with children to care for. Children born in Libya to Chadian parents faced ongoing reintegration problems, particularly linked to language and cultural adaptation. Most were not attending school. Many suffered serious psychosocial problems as a result of the violence they had experienced during their flight from Libya. Many had lost family members, which made reintegration into their new community in Chad all the more difficult.121

5.2.2. Remigration

None of the Chadian returnees in our sample indicated readiness or willingness to go back to Libya:

“I won’t go back to Libya again because my entire investment was lost. In the future, I’d rather stay in Moussoro and work in construction.” (CH-M-17)

The migrant quoted above had worked in construction while in Libya. He managed to earn a livelihood, but lost everything in the upheaval. He hoped to start a new life in Moussoro. According to IOM,122 numerous single male returnees left their villages in 2012 in search of jobs in urban centres. However, due to their lack of resources, many continued to live extremely precarious existences.

5.3. Egypt

5.3.1. Evacuation and the Return Home

Half the Egyptian interviewees in this study left Libya through Tunisia (E-FGD-05; E-FGD-06; E-M-07; E-M-08; E-M-09; E-M-10; E-M-11; E-M-12). Egyptian government statistics indicate that some 63,000 Egyptian nationals left Libya via Tunisia between 28 February and 3 March 2011.123 They faced exploitation during their flight. Drivers often charged exorbitant fares, some 300 LYD (EUR 194) for three individuals compared to the 30 TND (EUR 12) per person charged before the crisis. Fares paid offered no guarantee of arrival, as police sometimes apprehended migrants at the border and returned them to the airport under armed guard (E-FGD-04). The journey to Tunisia presented numerous dangers, including confiscation of mobile phones and money (E-FGD-04; E-M-15). An interviewee in Fayoum said returnees had spent up to four days in border camps managed by the Tunisian government and organisations before being repatriated to Egypt. Migrant returnees were critical of what they perceived as a lack of assistance from the Egyptian government. They said that army personnel in Tunisia had even encouraged them to start a hunger strike to demand help from the Egyptian government (E-FGD-04; E-M-10; E-M-12).

Overland travel to Egypt, usually by car, was fraught with danger. Belongings were confiscated at checkpoints, where returnees were also ordered to pay bribes to militias. A returnee in Minya reported an incident in which the car he was travelling in was shot at, killing nine people and leaving some injured (E-FGD-02). At one point, Egyptian migrants in Libya were advised to go to the airport in Tripoli.124 Yet, upon arrival no flights were available. Migrants stayed for some 13 days before deciding to travel on to Tunisia (E-FGD-03). A returnee in Sohag said that belongings were often confiscated at the airport in Tripoli purportedly because of lack of space (E-FGD-03).

Some returnees relied on smugglers to return to Egypt (E-E-01; E-FGD-01):

“You pay a Libyan 700 dinars [EUR 464] and he’ll take care of everything. He’ll hand you over to others who help you on your journey.” (E-FGD-06)

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The Libya crisis had significant impact on the livelihoods of the Egyptian migrants. Prior to their escape, they lost their jobs, faced food scarcity and their lives were even in danger in the deteriorating security situation, as xenophobic and racial violence escalated. Some cases of forced deportation were reported (E-FGD-02; E-FGD-06; E-M-13). According to more than half of the interviewees, loss of jobs at the onset of the crisis was sometimes due to employers leaving Libya. Loss of income was a factor in the decision to return to Egypt. A interviewee in Minya said that even though his employer, who was leaving Libya, provided him shelter during the crisis by letting him stay at the farm where he worked, he decided to leave Libya because of the security situation and loss of income (E-FGD-01). Furthermore, income was sometimes forfeited because employers refused to pay wages during the crisis (E-M-07).

Egyptian returnees recounted a number of instances of xenophobia and racial discrimination in Libya during and after 2011. Egyptians were treated badly by Libyans.\textsuperscript{125} Threats, attacks in the street and refusals by employers to pay wages were particularly common (E-FGD-03):

“We were beaten up and sworn at.” (E-M-05)

From the start of the crisis, many Egyptian migrants in Libya experienced sudden attacks on their homes and were at risk of being shot at when out in public to buy necessities (E-M-04). Interviewees attributed this violence to a variety of factors. First, there was a perception that Egyptians had instigated the Libya crisis (E-M-01; E-M-06), though all our interviewees denied any Egyptian involvement in the start of the conflict.

Second, Gaddafi’s support of Egyptian workers was cited. Egyptian migrants were therefore perceived as his allies during and after the crisis (E-M-03). Saif al-Islam (Gaddafi’s son) instigated the targeting of Egyptians when he accused them on air of driving the Libyans to revolt in light of the Egyptian revolution (E-FGD-03; E-M-07). Although involvement in the conflict was rare among Egyptian migrants in Libya, a small number did grasp opportunities in the upheaval to generate income for themselves and their families (E-M-01). Such involvement resulted in an increase in physical attacks on all Egyptian migrants. This was not reflected in the sample but briefly commented on in one interview (E-M-01).

Third, migrants suggested that the lack of action by the Egyptian consulate had emboldened perpetrators’ aggression, in effect giving Libyans free license to attack Egyptians (E-M-06; E-M-07).

Finally, resource shortages drove Libyans to attack Egyptians for gain. In general, there were ample resources in Libya before the crisis, so Libyans were not generally in need. This changed, however, after the crisis began.

5.3.2. Impact of Return on Families

The decision to return to Egypt had longer-term effects on returnees and their families. Fewer job opportunities and diminished daily wages meant losses of income. Occasional violence at home, depression and reduced educational opportunities for children were among the issues noted by returnees (E-M-04; E-M-06):

“There are domestic tensions resulting from lack of income. My wife was reluctant to sell her jewellery to help us cover our expenses. But what can we do? [...] I’ve become less tolerant and more aggressive with her and the children. I am under a lot of pressure. The only way to release it is being violent with the family.” (E-M-01)

A needs assessment conducted by an international NGO in Egypt showed domestic violence against women to be linked to spousal unemployment following the returns from Libya. An interviewee from the organisation explained:

“It was challenging for [returnees] since they had gone to work and were earning good money in Libya, around 1,000 dinars [EUR 664] per month. And now they can barely cover their

needs and schools [...]. There was some child labour; 40% of children dropped out of school because there was no money to cover school fees.” (E-C-01)

Incidences of child labour, though not found in our sample, were heard of in the community.

Social values in Upper Egypt place particular emphasis on men’s role as breadwinners. These high expectations of men were sometimes mentioned when discussing returnees’ inability to provide for their family. Such inability, a returnee in Minya explained, can be immensely shameful for the father as head of household (E-M-03). Diminished income forced many returnees to prioritise needs, such as children’s needs and medical care (E-M-07). There was less money available to prepare siblings for marriage or build new homes (E-FGD-04; E-M-08). One returnee in Sohag noted increased competition for jobs and the effects of reduced income on his children after his return to Egypt. His children had to leave their private school and now attended public schools:

“I returned with no money at all! Demand for jobs increases with the large numbers of Egyptians returning. [...] Many people were in debt and had to repay the cost of their travel or return. I am now unable to give my children the same pocket money and privileges they used to have. I took my children out of private nursery school and sent them to public ones. I decided to be more creative and went to work as a taxi driver.” (E-M-12)

It should be noted, however, that some returnees did not consider competition for jobs to be a significant issue. On the contrary, they said, returnees in their villages helped each other find temporary jobs as day labourers:

“Many people are related to each other. If I know someone is in need I will try to help by recommending them to others, like someone who needs painting done in their house.” (E-M-14)

Another difficulty returnees faced in their hometowns was lack of medical care. An interviewee in Minya said, “Our medical centre in the village has no physician. If you ever go there, you’ll never find one” (E-FGD-02). Another interviewee in the same governorate noted the high cost of private medical treatment. He was told that a surgical procedure he needed would cost 50,000 EGP (some EUR 5,000) at a private clinic. This was a prohibitive amount considering his current situation (E-FGD-02). In some cases, loss of income made returnees financially dependent on older family members. Also, as noted, money sometimes had already been borrowed for the return trip to Egypt:

“Some young people who returned had to borrow from others and now cannot repay them.” (E-M-07)

One returnee noted some of the problems he was facing:

“I and others in similar circumstances have been in debt for so long to repay the costs of our trip, our return and other things. I still have a sister to prepare for marriage, which is very difficult.” (E-M-10)

5.3.3. Remigration

The impact of the Libya crisis was reflected in the precarious financial situation of the returnees in their home communities. Alternative migration paths, particularly to the Gulf States, were blocked by the high costs involved. Beyond the funds needed to migrate to the Gulf States, the kafala (sponsorship) system126 in these countries was an additional hurdle (E-FGD-04). An interviewee in Sohag said that most of the money he earned while working in Saudi Arabia had to be paid to his sponsor:

“In Saudi you’re under the kafala system. Your visa is in someone else’s name. In Libya you are more free, you work daily. [...] If you travelled to another place, like Qatar or Saudi Arabia, you would not be able to pay your debts.” (E-FGD-02)

“Some people are going to Jordan, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. I know about two people who went to Jordan together, one to Kuwait and one to Saudi Arabia. I wouldn’t mind going to the Gulf

126 The kafala system grants employers significant control over migrant workers’ legal status.
but I can't afford the visa. The Saudi visa is 10,000 riyals [EUR 2,288], the Jordanian one is 7,000 Jordanian dinars [EUR 8,475], and the Kuwaiti one is 30,000 Egyptian pounds [EUR 1,438].” (E-M-05)

Libya had lost its attractiveness to some as a migration destination, due to the security situation in the country:

“It’s unsafe to go to Libya now, but if the conditions became better and I could afford the travel, I’ll go. But you have to know, those who have gone to Libya can only go to Libya. They become familiar with the environment and work venues. They would never go to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, not just because those are more expensive but more because they are not familiar to them. Also, the Libyan exchange rate compared to the Saudi one is much better and travel costs are lower.” (E-M-12)

Others, particularly from the governorate of Fayoum, migrated to and returned from Libya in 2015:

“I personally know about ten people who have returned. Even though the security situation in Libya is unstable, we still want to go there because we need to earn an income.” (E-M-05)

Detention at checkpoints and deportation were common, sometimes because of problems with documentation. One returnee in Fayoum said that even when passport stamps were valid, Egyptian migrants would be asked to provide medical certificates (E-FGD-06). An interviewee in Fayoum described his current situation as follows:

“I need to work to pay back the money I borrowed. I have a young child and I need money. There is no work here so I plan to go back to Libya.” (E-FGD-06)

5.4. Ghana

5.4.1. Evacuation and the Return Home

The 2011 crisis worsened the already precarious existence of Ghanaian migrants in Libya. Temporary shelters in uncompleted houses were caught up in the fighting, and migrants had to flee, exposing them to even greater risk of attack and death. These risks are captured in Kwabena’s account:

“When the war started I was plastering a multi-storey building. They fired a gunshot and the bullet came through the walls I was working on. I saw it with my own eyes! Meanwhile that was where we were staying, but we thank God nothing happened to us. When I thought about what happened I said to myself, ‘What if that bullet had gotten to where we were sleeping? What would have happened then?’” (GH-M-09)

Some migrants did fall victim to physical harm and death. Here again, African migrants were thought to be implicated in the Libyan conflict because of their alleged role as mercenaries of Gaddafi. 127

Improvised savings arrangements were jeopardised too as a result of the crisis. Migrants could not access the formal banking system, and many lost substantial amounts of savings that they had buried in safe locations. Ernest, a Ghanaian migrant who had to make a fast departure, left US$ 8,000 behind:

“I couldn’t bring my stuff. It all happened in a rush because of the war. I left some of my money there – about US$ 8,000 and some of my luggage. I remember the amount because we used to wrap every US$ 1,000 we’d get and I had wrapped about eight of them by then. Not that I forgot to take it. The fight was getting more intense and scary. We were lucky because we were under a kobri [overhead bridge] and even it was destroyed by bombs.” (GH-M-02)

Fear and trauma suffered during the war interrupted the long-term plans of Ghanaian migrants in Libya. Personal socio-economic decisions regarding, for example, the accumulation of capital to invest in house construction, as part of household livelihood strategies, were upset by the crisis. An

unplanned return and the loss of both cash and in-kind remittances plunged some migrant families into poverty:

"While I was in Libya, the war broke out and it became more intense every day. Everywhere you turned you’d hear the sounds of deadly weapons and bombs flying all over, and I knew I could easily lose my precious life. I therefore decided to come back home, because I know that while there’s life, there’s hope [...] In fact, I wasn’t ready to come back, if it had not been for the war. My main plan was to buy a plot of land and finish putting up a building before coming home. [...] However, the war disrupted my stay in Libya. I was forced to return to Ghana." (GH-M-01)

"It wasn’t good at all. I did not plan for this. The preparation was very poor. I did not have anything. During the war period, prices of goods went up. Prices tripled. I was unable to buy anything." (GH-M-04)

Migrants’ emergency responses included seeking help from trusted Libyan nationals and landlords, to escape to airports where international and intergovernmental organisations had arranged evacuation flights.

One Ghanaian migrant, Juliana, said that evacuees used social contacts with political elites in the country of origin, the media and locals in Libya to escape. After receiving information from her husband in Ghana regarding UN-chartered airplanes, she was able to get a ride to Tripoli with a police officer. She also adopted the Muslim dress code to blend in and avoid detection as a foreigner. However, upon arrival they were informed that the last plane had already departed. Transportation to pick-up points was not free, Juliana said:

“We got a bus to Tunisia. We paid money to get from Tripoli to Tunisia. The Arabs are gossips. We later heard that the government provided the buses to pick us up and bring us to Tunisia. There were about 50 buses, but they collected money from each passenger. They are very bad people. They weren’t supposed to collect money from us but they did.” (GH-M-07)

5.4.2. Impact of Return on Families

The conflict affected migrants’ families through the loss of remittance income, dependence of return migrants on meagre household resources, the burden of catering for depressed and seriously ill returnees and accusations of mismanagement of remittances (GH-F-01; GH-M-02; GH-F-08). These pressures triggered acrimony, separations between spouses and downward social mobility in some households (GH-F-05). For instance, Ernest, who had left US$ 8,000 in savings behind to escape with his life, accused his wife of misappropriation of remittance money. The couple is currently separated:

“She was the recipient because I thought that if [the remittances] go through another family member, my wife and children would not benefit. But unfortunately, she’s not been able to account for even a penny of the money I asked her to save for me [...] Even what the children will eat or take to school tomorrow is my headache now. The Women and Juvenile Unit (WAJU) has instructed me to provide ‘chop’ money for the children every day, and that’s a great worry to me too.” (GH-M-02)

The spouse, however, said the accusations were false and negligent. She did acknowledge the adverse impact of her husband’s unplanned return on his social standing and ability to support his extended family:

“Oh yes! He was a respected man in the community before he travelled. He came back with this attitude of blaming me for everything and not taking care of his family. As a returnee, you need to earn respect within your family for outsiders to respect you the more. They say charity begins at home. So for me, I don’t respect him and whoever hears the story doesn’t respect him either. [...] I should think his return has affected his family. He was the one providing for his family." (GH-F-05)

128 Maintenance allowance.
Some family members sketched the devastating impact that migrants’ abrupt returns had on the family unit and standards of living. Adwoa, the 36-year-old spouse of a returnee, said her spouse had to take up small-scale farming to survive, which was totally different from the trade he had engaged in while in Libya (plastering buildings):

“We started everything from scratch, I mean the two of us. No support from the church, no support from the community, no support from government, no support from the Assembly, no support from anywhere. […] Now the main challenge is that he is unemployed. Aside from farming he does not do anything. […] I would like him to go back [to Libya]. You can see from his demeanour. Everything shows he is not a happy man.” (GH-F-01)

Claims of losses were corroborated by members of migrants’ families (GH-F-07). For instance, Akosua confirmed that her husband had returned from Libya without any property of value, and that they had to settle for public rather than private schools for their children:

“Nothing! He didn’t bring anything. The only things he brought were his personal belongings. He said he had bought some things he was going to bring home, but he couldn’t bring them because of the conflict. When he was there, we had to make up our minds about buying a car, but we couldn’t [go ahead with the purchase] because of the conflict. If he was still there, we would have bought it. And now life is not like before, the money we earn has gone down. […] Our children would have gone to good schools, but now they attend the government school.” (GH-F-10)

Even where family members were happy and relieved to have migrant relatives back safely, they expressed dismay at the effect of the migrants’ return on their social standing in the community. Some family members provided counselling for their returned relatives, as well as practical support to help their reintegration into the community (GH-F-07; GH-F-01). Juliana’s mother said her daughter had returned traumatised and without any money or property, and she had tried to counsel her to help her cope with her reintegration difficulties (GH-M-07). According to her mother, Juliana is currently engaged in peasant farming, which yields far less income than the domestic work she did in Libya:

“I am actually happy she is back in her country where she can work and have peace of mind, instead of being in another man’s country where things were difficult for her. With her here with something small to do [peasant farming], it’s better and brings comfort to all of us. I advised her to thank God that she got home safely, because one of the friends she travelled with to Libya never came back. […] But my dignity in the community has been affected. She used to send us remittances and I used some to look good, but I can’t do that anymore.” (GH-F-07)

Returning home empty-handed brought psychological and emotional stress to both returnees and their households. These feelings were exacerbated by the Ghanaian socio-cultural expectations of a man being head of household and providing for the needs of his family. Anita spoke of the destruction of her family’s hopes and plans by her husband’s unplanned return due to the conflict:

“So his coming is a problem for us, but it is quite understandable because it wasn’t his wish. The situation over there forced him to come back. It has even messed him up and he is depressed because he can’t take care of his own family. He is no longer happy. It’s a worry because he is a grown man with his burdens on other people. He is expected to take care of the family, but lack of money has brought hardships and worries, which isn’t good for his health.” (GH-F-08)

Ultimately, the loss of remittance income has challenged socially constructed gender roles in Ghana’s largely patriarchal society. Men are traditionally perceived as the breadwinner. Women being thrust into this role is a social anomaly. In an attempt to maintain the status quo, returnees’ brothers have sometimes stepped in to take over the responsibility of providing for their brothers and their spouses:

“He was our financier so for him to experience this sudden conflict and come home empty handed was really bad. Now I will have to assist in providing food for the house.” (GH-F-04)
The frustration, stress and trauma of migrants who were caught up in the conflict and compelled to return sometimes manifested in anti-social behaviour. Our research indicated some level of alcohol abuse among returnees and also acts of vandalism (GH-E-01; GH-C-01):

“At funerals too [returnees] cause a lot of problems. For instance, they always attribute the death of their colleagues to unnatural causes and pick fights with the old women and men in the deceased person’s household or family because they suspect them of witchcraft, which they claim was used to kill their friend. During such funerals, they sometimes block the main road and force drivers to pay them money before they are allowed to go.” (GH-E-01)

5.4.3. Remigration

Even though migrants were targeted in the crisis, and many suffered physical attacks, nearly half of Ghanaian interviewees (5 out of 11) reported travelling back to Libya at least once after escaping in 2011 (GH-M-09; GH-M-06; GH-M-10; GH-M-08; GH-M-05). These trips were stimulated by lack of employment opportunities and difficulty reintegrating at home. Few projects have been initiated to provide returnees the support they need and dissuade them from embarking on such journeys. Some return migrants stayed in Ghana for just one month before returning to Libya – despite the dangers involved (GH-A-01). This trend was noted even by an official from the Ghanaian mission that organised the evacuation from Libya:

“It differs, some stayed for just a month and others two months before returning. A typical example was the Ghanaian pastor of a non-denominational church, who evacuated his wife and children by the government-chartered aircraft. They all returned to Libya within a month. We in the mission ourselves didn’t want to leave.” (GH-A-01)

5.5. Niger

5.5.1. Evacuation and the Return Home

Most migrants from Niger sought to return home during the crisis. While some anticipated events and returned before the conflict became violent, many stayed on, wrongly believing the crisis would blow over.129

Early in the crisis, some employers – particularly western companies130 – advised their migrant employees to leave the country (NE-M-01). Then suddenly hundreds of thousands of migrants were caught up in the worsening situation and found themselves unemployed as the companies closed (NE-M-02). Or they found themselves unable to reach even their workplaces because of the fighting.

Another reason to leave was that Nigerien migrants suddenly became targets of rebels’ xenophobic and racial violence (NE-M-01; NE-M-02; NE-M-03). As noted previously, foreigners, especially blacks, could not move freely during the crisis. They were accused of being mercenaries, whether they were or not, since some Nigerien people (the Tuareg and Toubou in particular) did become involved in the conflict in support of Gaddafi (NE-M-01; NE-M-02). At the same time, the Niger authorities issued an official statement recognising the National Transitional Council in Libya (NE-C-06). This statement drew the anger of Gaddafi supporters, who then scapegoated Nigeriens.131 Thus, Nigeriens were caught in the tangle of multiple warring factions during the crisis. They were persecuted, stripped of their property, arrested and condemned (NE-C-05).

Some crossed the border to Niger directly, travelling there overland using their own resources or supported by family. Others evacuated through Tunisia, Mali or Egypt (NE-A-01; NE-M-01; NE-M-05; NE-M-08). The main factors determining the routes taken were the resources available to the migrants, the cost of travel, the time available for the journey and the safety of the routes (NE-M-01; NE-M-03). Fear of scapegoating led one interviewee to hide his true identity. He identified himself as Malian, and was thus repatriated to Mali, from where he returned to Niger (NE-M-01).

Agadez and Niamey were the main points of arrival for migrants returning from Libya. An ad hoc committee established by the Nigerien government monitored the situations of Nigerien migrants in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, and IOM arranged buses to transport the migrants to their home villages (NE-M-08; NE-M-09; NE-C-07).

Most returns seem to have been self-organised (NE-C-07; NE-M-02). Indeed, IOM reports having repatriated only 18,500 Nigeriens by air, of the more than 200,000 Nigerien migrants who returned from Libya. IOM further notes assisting more than 67,000 Nigerien migrants and West African nationals returning from Libya or Algeria at the IOM transit centres in Dirkou and Arlit between 2011 and 2013.

Transportation, again, became more expensive during the crisis, because travel demand was high and travel conditions were difficult due to attacks on the road. Road transport was some EUR 150 under normal circumstances, but during the crisis fares increased to some EUR 230 (NE-M-02). Conditions were often terrible at transit camps where migrants awaited evacuation. There was a lack of shelter, food and blankets though temperatures were low (NE-C-07). Nigerien migrants said they felt a lack of moral support from the Nigerien Embassy in Libya (NE-M-01; NE-C-07):

“I lamented the way the operations were managed and coordinated. I myself witnessed the conditions of repatriation. Migrants were stuck and needed papers [laissez passer], but the ambassador refused to make the trip to see the living conditions of Nigeriens, though other ambassadors came [for example, Mali’s ambassador visited the camp]. The Nigeriens were at the border for several days in the rain, cold and homeless. IOM transported people to the border, but the Nigerien authorities were unable to deliver laissez passer for repatriation. Also, the committee for receiving migrants did not play its role. For example, when migrants transited through Tunisia and Algeria, people welcomed them with water at the airport, which was not the case in Niger.” (NE-C-07)

Many migrants lost their travel documents (passports, identity cards, etc.) while rushing to flee. It was IOM, in collaboration with embassies, that helped get them temporary documents to return to Niger:

“During the crisis, migrants were in an unsafe situation and work opportunities declined. The fighting forced more than 100,000 migrants to return [to their countries of origin]. The migrants were traumatised, some were injured and without travel documents. That was especially difficult for families.” (NE-I-02)

A number of migrants in our sample had migrated to Libya with their family. They needed more humanitarian assistance and evacuation help because some had children to protect (NE-M-06). IOM helped these families evacuate (NE-I-02). Family in Niger sometimes helped too, sending money to pay for transportation and supporting returnees upon arrival in Niger (NE-F-02).

Many migrants could not bring their property with them back home, either because of the upheaval of the crisis or because gunmen stole their belongings en route (NE-M-01; NE-M-02; NE-M-07):

“When the bomb exploded, we fled into the bush. In the city, Libyan soldiers caught and imprisoned people. Then they took all our property. Furthermore, it was from our city that Gaddafi left to go to Sirte, where he was murdered. In short, the crisis pushed us back home. If it had not we would have spent at least three years in Libya before returning.” (NE-M-07)

Back in Niger, returnees experienced difficulty finding jobs and integrating economically. The literature confirms the obstacles faced by returnees, especially in occupational reintegration. Even migrants who had saved enough to start a business back home faced socio-economic and administrative

132 Order No. 00042 of the Prime Minister on 24 March 2011. establishing an “Ad-hoc committee for the coordination and monitoring of the situation of Nigeriens in Ivory Coast and Libya “. Returns from Libya intervene along with those for Ivory Coast because of the post-electoral crisis in that country.
134 International Organization for Migration (IOM) (n.d.).
barriers, including corruption, bureaucratic delays, lack of necessary legislation and the low dynamism of local economies\textsuperscript{136} (NE-M-01; NE-C-07). Returnees from Libya thus found themselves deprived of resources and unemployed. Many joined their families, which offered support, though that support was often unsustainable, since the families already had very limited resources (NE-F-02). Migrants who had once sent remittances to support family members now found themselves in an opposite role, with family now supporting them (NE-M-05; NE-F-05; NE-F-06).

A number of initiatives were organised to support the economic reintegration of migrants. For example, the government of Niger, NGOs and intergovernmental organisations provided some training in livestock breeding, business establishment, trade and commerce. But few benefited from these activities (NE-A-10; NE-C-07). Voluntary repatriation and reintegration assistance organised by migrants themselves contributed most to ease returnees’ situation and develop the country.\textsuperscript{137} Reintegration was the greatest difficulty faced by the forced returns. The returnees from Libya increased the number of unemployed and job seekers in a country that already offered few economic prospects (NE-A-05; NE-A-06).

\subsection*{5.5.2. Impact of Return on Families}

The abrupt returns reduced the socio-economic status of the migrants themselves, their families and their home communities (NE-A-06; NE-F-08). Return put an end to the transfer of remittances, affecting local trade as well as household incomes. In the localities investigated, trade had been fuelled largely by remittances, particularly in Tahoua and Tchintabaraden. At the three sites where interviews were conducted, many poor households appeared to have depended in some way on remittances, especially in rural areas (NE-A-10; NE-E-03). In migrants’ families, the impact was compounded: the end of migrant transfers diminished household income, while the migrants’ return increased pressure on household food stocks (NE-F-01; NE-F-02; NE-F-04; NE-C-03; NE-F-08):

“The main challenge in the household was the end of funds transfer. How are we going to fill the void? Then, the migrant came back, adding pressure on household consumption.” (NE-F-01)

“The main problem that our household had after my son’s return was the ending of [remittance] transfers and an increase in food needs.” (NE-F-08)

Some wealthy families helped their returned relatives start a business, while others incorporated them into family businesses (NE-F-02). However, the abrupt halt to remittance transfers also affected the dynamism of local trade:

“Yes, migrants contribute to development. Most of the money entering in the department of Tchintabaraden is related to the transfer of funds and property, like cars, food and electrical equipment, from migrants. Moreover, many households depend on remittances from migrants to survive.” (NE-A-10)

“The return of migrants had several impacts on migrants’ households and home communities. Indeed, in our village many families lived on remittances from migrants. Their return has reduced household incomes.” (NE-E-03)

“We are such a burden on our families, and the fact that we do not earn an income reduced our ability to support our families.” (NE-M-07)

“The return has really affected the community and households. Our household can no longer cover the children's school fees and the clothes I used to give them before. In addition, we are a burden on our families.” (NE-M-06)


“Our household is composed of seven people. Livestock breeding was the household’s main activity, but we lost a lot of animals. So migration became our household’s main activity. We depend on it. I have three brothers who are all migrants. Two are now in Algeria, the other in Libya was repatriated in 2012 because of the conflict. I know that his return from Libya decreased our income and increased expenses, but I do not know the exact amount.” (NE-F-08)

Returns to communities have led to disputes over land and some deviant behaviour, delinquency and petty crime (NE-A-06; NE-E-03). In pastoral areas, such as Tchintabaraden, returnees engagement in agriculture has caused conflicts between farmers and livestock breeders. In places like Tahoua, Agadez, Zinder and Diffa, returns from Libya have brought increased armed robbery, banditry and drug use (NE-E-03; NE-A-06; NE-I-02). The returns have also spurred an increase in youth unemployment and concerns about safety (NE-A-05; NE-M-01):

“The abrupt return of migrants, in addition to being a shortfall for families, reveals other issues too. A proliferation of land disputes has been noted in the areas of origin of migrants. There have also been cases of robberies and crimes in the Agadez, Tahoua and Diffa areas.” (NE-A-06)

Opting to stay in Niger, some migrants developed technical activities, like workshops for welding and mechanical work, even employing young people in these businesses (NE-M-01; NE-M-02). Some migrants had saved enough money to open a business or start a trade or taxi service upon their return to Niger (NE-M-04; NE-C-04). Some returnees in Niamey and Tchintabaraden organised associations and cooperatives to assist in the reintegration of their members (NE-C-07; NE-C-09; NE-A-10). The Collectif des Rapatriés Nigériens (CORNI), for example, leads advocacy for recruitment of its members by local businesses. It has also developed an as yet unfunded agricultural project to produce and market food, to provide employment for members (NE-C-07).

5.5.3. Remigration

Among the range of coping strategies, including selling animals and other family assets, some migrants turned to remigration. Some returned to Libya (NE-C-09), while others established new migration paths (NE-F-04; NE-E-01). Overall, there has been a reorientation of migration flows from Niger to Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria (NE-E-01; NE-C-01; NE-F-02). Six of the nine returnees interviewed in Niger had already remigrated since their return from Libya. One returned to Libya only a few months after his repatriation, because he had failed to find employment at home (NE-M-03). Another family helped a returnee from Libya migrate to Côte d’Ivoire (NE-F-02).

5.6. Tunisia

Tunisia was included in this study as a country of transit rather than as a country of origin. Indeed, migrants from many different countries fled Libya through Tunisia. Migrants crossed the Tunisia-Libya border in a range of ways throughout the crisis and thereafter (2011-2016). This section chronicles the journey, and the dilemmas and perils migrants met along the way.

5.6.1. Violence and Discrimination in Libya (2011)

The Libyan war had immediate impacts on migrants at several levels. First, there was the upsurge in violence against migrants. Many African migrants were threatened, attacked, detained and even murdered because they were considered ‘mercenaries’ of the regime. Xenophobic and racial attacks on blacks were reported (TU-M-03, Côte d’Ivoire; TU-M-14, Sudan; TU-M-27, Mali). Experiences of theft, looting and stripping of assets (laptops, mobile phones and other electronic goods) and money (TU-M-02) were common. Physical attacks were severe, with those who resisted or had nothing to give beaten or even murdered (TU-M-02, Côte d’Ivoire):

“Some people were burnt in their houses in Zawiya and Sorman. In Libya, we were referred to as mercenaries. […] They force people who don’t understand Arabic language to say they are mercenaries. The idea spread all over the region.” (TU-M-35, Sudan)

“These groups tortured an Egyptian who stepped outside. They stabbed him many times [...]. The neighbours robbed us and threw stones at us.” (TU-M-35, Sudan)

Second, the Libyan regime, before its fall in October 2011, used sub-Saharan migrants who had been unable to flee as a bargaining chip to put pressure on Europe. They kidnapped migrants and forced them onto boats for Lampedusa, pushing thousands to depart from ports the regime still controlled. About 35,000 migrants landed on Italian islands from the Libyan coast. Survivors gave dramatic testimonies of the violence, aggression and shipwrecks they suffered:

“The army sent us to Tripoli, they put us in a marine camp, then we were to be shipped off to Italy. I came with more than three hundred people on the boat. I didn’t pay for anything and did not have contact with smugglers.” (TU-M-02, Côte d’Ivoire)

5.6.2. Crossing the Libya-Tunisia Border

The idea of fleeing to Tunisia spread quickly in the days following the outbreak of the violence. Tunisia was described and presented to all of the migrants as a safe country that could provide them shelter:

“For me, Tunisia is a safe country compared to Libya. I spent two weeks walking, on foot, to reach the Tunisia border.” (TU-M-29, Côte d’Ivoire)

Migrants crossed the border in various ways, and often a combination of several: by bus (12 in our sample), by car or rented taxi, sometimes using smugglers (16 in our sample), on foot (13 in our sample), rescued at sea (4 in our sample) and transported by Libyan army trucks (2 in our sample).

Eight of the 12 migrants who had travelled by bus declared that their respective embassies had intervened to reserve buses, sometimes helped by UNHCR or IOM. Of those who travelled by car, half were dropped off before the border, then crossed it on foot. Of those who travelled on foot, five said they had done so because their money had been stolen. Table 2 in the annex provides a breakdown of the travel means and numbers.

Tunisians were the first to flee Libya, followed by the Egyptians. After the Tunisian regime fell, just two weeks after the toppling of the Egyptian regime, the Libyan authorities quickly accused the two populations of fomenting revolt against Libya’s leaders. Asian migrants, who worked in large numbers in the oil industry, and sub-Saharan Africans followed. At the height of the exodus, between 4,000 and 6,000 people were crossing the Tunisian border daily, reaching 8,000 at its peak, especially after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention.

The conditions in which foreign nationals fled Libya recall the different circumstances of migrants within the country, determined by their origin and socio-occupational status. From the first days of the conflict, the embassies of the rich and some emerging countries (e.g. China and Turkey) managed to evacuate their nationals. Buses waited for European staff and for Chinese and Turkish workers on the Tunisian side of the border to drive them to Djerba and Tunis airports. This was not the case for workers from Bangladesh, Egypt, Sudan and other sub-Saharan countries. They waited for weeks before being repatriated by international organisations, especially IOM, from the border camps to their home countries. Reportedly, Asian embassies (e.g. Sri Lanka and Philippines) worked faster and more efficiently, while African embassies seemed to have much less capacity and were therefore slower to

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respond (TU-I-02; TU-I-03). The embassies resident in Tunisia (such as those of Egypt, Sudan, Bangladesh, Chad, Morocco, Ghana and Mali) sent representatives to the Tunisian border to provide travel documents to their stranded citizens¹⁴² to facilitate their repatriation (TU-A-04).

Migrants were exposed to many dangers, both in their homes in Libya and on the roads to Tunisia. Reports chronicled murders, physical assaults, kidnapping, illegal restraint, harassment of families for ransoms, stripping travellers of money and goods (especially mobile phones) and difficulties finding transportation (buses) and fuel. On their way to Tunisia, migrants were protected by the Libyan police, but also harassed by armed gangs allied with the rebels:

“We faced problems on our way because we left late. The bus had no fuel, so we asked to be dropped at a police station in Al Zahraa. We were harassed by the Libyan rebels but later the general officer ordered us to change bus. In Maamura, the same thing happened again, we were dropped off again. They frisked us and took our money and mobile phones. [...] Our situation was abominable; we were stripped of our money and mobile phones. These groups disdain dark-skinned people. They either break our hands and release us or confine us in remote places or worse.” (TU-M-35, Sudan)

“People left work, some faced problems in the streets and were beaten. Myself I was not beaten but was I subjected to some discomfort. My employer didn’t pay me after the crisis broke out. He delayed paying me, pretending that he didn’t have money. We were forced to leave.” (TU-M-32, Chad)

Migrants became caught in a vicious sequence of violence: attacks by armed bands of robbers, followed by arrests by police and militia, perilous journeys to the Tunisian border and then arrests and police custody on the Tunisian side:

“At the outbreak of the crisis, they attacked us and took our money. They beat us and killed some others [...]. Some gangs were armed, they took 70 TND [EUR 30] and my mobile phone from me. We fled overnight. The [Libyan] police arrested and jailed us for a week. They beat and verbally harassed us, then released us.” (TU-M-34, Chad)

All migrants said they had no other choice than to come to Tunisia. They sought safety and survival. After the ordeals they experienced in Libya and on the way to the Tunisian border, security was a great relief at first, but soon worries resurfaced related to living conditions and survival (TU-M-37, Congo). All of the migrants interviewed in Tunisia were satisfied with the security situation and peace in Tunisia. There were some reports of physical attacks, such as stone throwing, and fights with young Tunisians in Tunis or in the south, but these were rare.¹⁴³

5.6.3. Migrants Stranded in Tunisia (2011-2013)

Many migrants who fled Libya in 2011 when the crisis began and those who left during the prolonged civil unrest in 2012 and 2013 ended up in the Choucha transit camp. Some were recognised as refugees. Among them, some were resettled to third countries by UNHCR. Migrants who arrived from Libya between 2011 and 2013 can be roughly divided into three categories: resettled refugees, non-resettled refugees and rejected asylum seekers.

Resettled refugees. Some migrants obtained refugee status through the UNHCR and were resettled.¹⁴⁴ Most recognised refugees were hosted at the Choucha transit camp, though some lived in Tunisian cities (recognised refugees living in Tunisian cities numbered 220 in July 2011, 276 in April 2012 and 343 in September 2012).¹⁴⁵ The total number of recognised refugees living in cities and

¹⁴² Egypt: 85,850 trapped migrants; Bangladesh: 27,780; Sudan: 13,857; Chad: 11,905; Morocco: 8,450; Ghana: 7,589; Mali: 6,940; China: 4,520; India: 3,708; Niger: 2,560; Philippines: 2,450. See: Chouat, M. & Liteyem, B. (2011). Migration et asile dans le Sud tunisien. Mémoire de fin d’étude [in Arabic], Université de Sousse.
¹⁴³ Also declarations of African students members of the NGO “AESAT” (Association des Etudiants et Stagiaires Africains en Tunisie).
¹⁴⁴ UNHCR offers three “durable solutions” to refugees worldwide: “resettlement to a third country”, “local integration” and “repatriation”. For further information, see: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cf8.html.
Choucha stood at more than 3,700 people in July 2011.\textsuperscript{146} Given Tunisia’s limited capacity and the refusal of many refugees to settle in Tunisia, UNHCR submitted almost all refugees who arrived before 1 December 2011 for resettlement. After this date, fearing a pull factor and to stop the flow of irregular migrants, UNHCR stopped submitting new refugees for resettlement.\textsuperscript{147} Given the commitment of 26 countries to a joint resettlement programme,\textsuperscript{148} the majority of these refugees, more than 3,500, could be resettled (53% in the USA, 15.7% in Norway, 7% in Sweden and 6.5% in Germany).\textsuperscript{149}

Non-resettled refugees. A number of migrants recognised by UNHCR as meriting refugee status and even resettlement ended up not being resettled in a third country. Most refused to take part in the UNHCR ‘local integration’ programme in urban areas in Tunisia, fearing loss of an opportunity to benefit from a new resettlement operation. Some of them migrated on to Italy, while others stayed in Choucha. In June 2013, when UNHCR officially closed the camp, about 400 refugees, including both rejected asylum seekers and non-resettled refugees, were still living in Choucha in makeshift tents on the Libyan side of the border, without water or electricity and without humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{150}

Rejected asylum seekers. Migrants not recognised by UNHCR as refugees in 2011-2013 were no longer considered ‘persons of concern’ (this category includes asylum seekers, status-holding refugees and returned refugees). UNHCR, in 2013, identified 222 rejected asylum seekers who refused to leave the Choucha camp. Some have since left by boat for Italy, but most stayed in Tunisia demanding a political solution to their displacement and situation of being stranded at Choucha. They have continued to address UNHCR as the agency governing their situation.\textsuperscript{151}

Since 2012, and particularly since 2013, by which time almost all the asylum claims had been processed, UNHCR began to remove rejected asylum seekers from its statistics.\textsuperscript{152} IOM, too, no longer considers rejected asylum seekers as ‘persons of concern’, since they refused repatriation. According to fieldwork interviews, they remained in Tunisia in the hope of one day heading to Lampedusa by sea.

5.6.4. Stranded Migrants who Arrived in Tunisia (2015-2016)

The resumption of the civil war in 2014 meant that the situation in Libya has remained a potential source of migrant arrivals, both by land and by sea (those trying to leave Libya by boat are sometimes rescued at sea by Tunisian authorities in case of a capsise).\textsuperscript{153} Tunisia has thus continued to serve as a platform for evacuation of migrants fleeing Libya. The majority of the migrants who continue to arrive in Tunisia are single men. We counted only two families among the new arrivals since 2014.

In 2015, 938 people were rescued at sea, by either Tunisian authorities or fishermen. Among them were 147 asylum seekers.\textsuperscript{154} The others were repatriated by IOM.\textsuperscript{155} As of December 2016, UNHCR had 1,000 refugees and asylum seekers registered in Tunisia: 725 ‘persons of concern’ to UNHCR. The refugees included 541 Syrians, 35 Palestinians, 32 Sudanese, 29 Iraqis, 9 Ivorians and 79 other nationalities. There were 275 asylum seekers.\textsuperscript{156}

\begin{itemize}
\item Baba, W. (2013).
\item Some exceptions have been granted to 25 vulnerable persons (women and unaccompanied children, suffering people whose care can be provided for in the host country, etc.). See: Baba, W. (2013).
\item Boubakri, H. (2015).
\item Garelli, G., & Tazzioli, M. (2016). \textit{Tunisia as a Revolutionized Space of Migration}. Springer.
\item On the homepage of Voiceofchoucha—a blog started by Choucha rejected asylum seekers in 2012—the big banner reads: “UNHCR finish your job.” For further information, see: https://voiceofchoucha.wordpress.com.
\item Garelli, G., & Tazzioli, M. (2016).
\item UNHCR (2016). 
\end{itemize}
As in 2011, Egyptians were the most numerous. In July 2014, Egyptian workers again began to flee Libya through Tunisia. Tunisia then banned several thousand Egyptians from entering. They remained blocked on the Libyan side, waiting for Egypt to set up an airlift to get them out. In August 2014, another airlift was organised which evacuated 16,000 Egyptians in ten days. After the assassination of the Egyptian Copts in 2015, Egypt evacuated 1,000 of its nationals in five days.

At the close of 2016, migrants were still crossing the border. Some turned themselves in to the Tunisian national guard post at the border, while others were arrested later. The national guard identifies migrants and presents them to the court in Medenine. There they are usually sentenced to 15 to 30 days in jail at Harboub (7 kilometres south of Medenine). At the end of the sentence, the national guard of Medenine delivers them to the office of the Tunisian Red Crescent in Medenine, which registers and accommodates them in homes that it rents in the city. UNHCR then investigates cases of asylum seekers, while IOM is responsible for migrants who, rarely, agree to a voluntary return.

Generally, the Tunisian Red Crescent provides support for three to four weeks. After that period, migrants face the choice of either voluntarily returning to their country of origin or illegally staying in Tunisia. In 2015, the arrangements appear to have been as follows:

- Egyptians who arrived in Tunisia were automatically and immediately returned to Egypt, their return funded by IOM and the Egyptian government. They had no recourse for claiming asylum.
- Senegalese were swiftly returned to Senegal, without opportunity to apply for asylum.
- Arrivals from Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Djibouti were automatically refused permission to apply for asylum, though they were not automatically repatriated.
- Ethiopians, Somalis and Eritreans could apply for asylum.
- For arrivals from Mali and Chad, the Tunisian Red Crescent consulted with UNHCR and a decision was made as to whether the individual concerned may apply for asylum.
- Syrians automatically received refugee status.

Migrants who had recently arrived in Tunisia, particularly in the south, did not raise issues of resources and the difficulties of daily survival. They were receiving assistance from the Tunisian Red Crescent, and had not confronted the same challenges faced by migrants in the first wave (2011-2013). All of the migrants in this second wave wanted to work, and some believed the stories they had heard of opportunities to find a job and to obtain a work permit in Tunisia. However, they still faced barriers regarding their irregular status, poor working conditions and lack of freedom of movement, similar to those migrants who had arrived in Tunisia in the first wave:

“I’m still seeking a job. The executive told us he would manage to provide us legal documents to work.” (TU-M-27, Mali)

“It is difficult to get a job because the employers always ask for legal documents. I worked in the informal sector, in construction. My illegal situation was always hindering me from finding employment. It is difficult to work here. We work 14 hours or more, not the universally agreed eight hours per day.” (TU-M-41, Sudan)

“In Libya, I had a job and it was fine. I had a regular job. But now things are getting worse since I became a day labourer. I’ve been jobless for days.” (TU-M-43, Chad)

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5.6.5. Long-term Consequences for Migrants, Refugees and Rejected Asylum Seekers

In 2016, Tunisia still hosted many migrants and refugees who had fled Libya over the course of five years of conflict. Their reception and status in Tunisia was a significant factor in determining the long-term consequences of the crisis for their lives.

Under the UNHCR ‘local integration’ programme, refugees who fled Libya were relocated to Tunisian cities, such as Tunis (52.3%) and southern cities including Medenine, Zarzis and Ben Gardane (47.7%). This has rendered the south of the country a new asylum pole in Tunisia. While most refugees with a status were resettled in 2011-2013, in June 2016 the Choucha transit camp still had about 60 people who were either rejected asylum seekers or refugees with status who had not benefited from resettlement and refused local integration. They were not recognised by the Tunisian authorities or by UNHCR or IOM. Non-resettled refugees who refused local integration also lost their UNHCR protection, and they were no longer recorded in statistics. Some have stayed in Medenine while others have crossed into Italy, and another group has stayed in Ben Gardane and Choucha.

A distinction can be made between migrants who fled Libya between 2011 and 2013 and those who continued to arrive in Tunisia in 2015 and later, due to the resumption of the Libyan civil war. Migrants who fled Libya between 2011 and 2013 and whose asylum applications were rejected have distanced themselves from international organisations (IOM and UNHCR) and even from CSOs. They no longer seek help. Instead, they pursue autonomous strategies, such as informal work and relations with the local population, to prepare for an irregular journey to Europe. Recent arrivals in Tunisia (in 2015 and 2016) received humanitarian assistance and did not express the same despair as the migrants who arrived in the first wave. Thus, responses and expectations of the two groups appear to differ. However, all migrants faced the obstacles sketched above, though their responses may have differed, depending on when they arrived in Tunisia:

“We are unemployed because to work we need identity documents other than the UNHCR certificate.” (TU-M-40, Côte d’Ivoire)

Refugees and asylum seekers, including those rejected in 2012 and 2013 and migrants rescued at sea, hosted in the southern cities of Tunisia or staying in Choucha seemed more resigned but also more able to combine several sources of income and various means of livelihood. They combined charity, money-sending transactions and aid from international organisations and NGOs, with temporary and precarious employment in trades such as bricklaying, construction, gardening and manual labour (e.g. hired by merchants to load or unload vehicles transporting products traded between Tunisia and Libya). This has enabled them to survive and guaranteed a minimum living:

“I’m jobless now and I just worked two days and earned 25 dinars [EUR 10] a day. It’s not always about having a job. Rather, it’s about feeling at ease first. I sometimes work in the construction field and other times I’m helped by Libyans who give me a few goods to buy so I can survive. [...] I also get help from the local population who provide me food. Even when I go to the market, the sellers give us goods for free. I’m accommodated by Tunisian Red Crescent and supported by Médecins du Monde. I feel relaxed. I can move freely, which is the best gift.” (TU-M-40, Côte d’Ivoire)

Migrants complain, however, about job insecurity and harsh working conditions. Too few day jobs were available, they said, to earn a living, while working hours were long and wages low. The low wages were particularly problematic, as they limited migrants’ ability to save and send remittances:

“In Tunisia, I don’t have a fixed wage. [...] I can work only for one day and spend the whole month jobless. I’m currently unemployed. I might be able to work for only one day in construction at a very low wage. The fixed wage is 20 TND [EUR 8] but they bargain down the price until I give in for lower pay. I am exploited at work. When I work [as a mason] I do it for more than eight hours a day. My financial situation is more difficult than in Libya. I can’t save money to send remittances to my family.” (TU-M-40, Côte d’Ivoire)

“I work from 8 AM to 5 PM at the auto repair shop. I get either 20 TND or 25 TND [EUR 8 or EUR 10] as a daily wage. My employer treats me well. Yet, I sometimes take a week off since

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the work is exhausting. I live at Choucha and work in Ben Gardane […]. I can’t save any money. I work to subsist.” (TU-M-33, Chad)

The need to send money to family is a major dilemma shared by virtually all of the interviewed migrants. Work in Libya was of key importance to all the migrants as a framework for providing income for households in countries of origin.

Non-resettled refugees and rejected asylum seekers were very critical of their living conditions in Tunisia: inadequate or lack of basic facilities, poor accommodations, vulnerability and administrative barriers to employment due to their irregular status, which closed the door to any prospect of permanent settlement or economic integration in Tunisia. Under these circumstances, migrants could not provide for their own needs, much less those of their families back home. Helping their relatives remained a major objective of their migration:

“In Libya, we had the means of self-managing and helping our families in our home country […]. I was paid every two months and able to send money to my family via the immigrants going back to the Chadian refugee centre […]. At all levels, our situation in Tunisia is worse than in Libya. […] Community leaders who assisted us in Libya before, no longer have the means and required resources to maintain those activities. Financially, we have the minimum of resources, due to the absence of jobs and earnings. In Tunisia, too, there are no savings and means available.” (TU-M-14, Sudan)

Between 2013 and 2016, dozens of rejected asylum seekers, as a last resort, sought the services of smugglers in the border area and in the western port cities of Libya, including Zuwara, to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Italy. Rejected asylum seekers felt “abandoned by everyone: the UN, the EU, the Red Crescent” (TU-M-31, Sudan). Rejected asylum seekers were also critical of intergovernmental organisations and NGOs:

“I’m disappointed in the role of the NGOs. At the beginning they helped us, but all of the sudden they disappeared, and we are still wondering why they closed the camp!” (TU-M-41, Sudan)

Some migrants who fled Libya in 2011, although their application for asylum was rejected by UNHCR, have tried to carve out a proactive path in Tunisia. But even these enterprises have been unsustainable due to the migrants’ irregular status in the country. For example, one interviewee (TU-M-01) was ruled out of two UNHCR and Tunisian Red Crescent programmes. He was undocumented because he refused to return to his country of origin (Côte d’Ivoire) for security reasons. But Caritas Tunis gave him a sewing machine. He moved to Tunis, where he managed to integrate and pass on his trade to the five people working in the workshop he set up there (three migrants from the Choucha transit camp and two young Tunisian girls). Later, he launched another project, manufacturing products out of burlap coffee bags that were being thrown out by the coffee grinder in the neighbourhood. Products were successfully sold under the 'Refugee' brand name. Manufactured products were sold by community associations and among supportive people in Tunis. Orders began to multiply, but the migrant’s irregular legal status remained an obstacle to the development of his activities. Finally, he left Tunisia in June 2016 for France, where he has since obtained a professional long-term visa. 161

“In Tunisia, we can make a good living. Income may exceed what can be earned in Libya. I did not send money to my family because my objective is to boost my project. When I was in Libya, I often sent money to my family. Migration is in itself an advantage. The only problem is regularisation of our administrative status.” (TU-M-01, Côte d’Ivoire)

Another case is that of a rejected asylum seeker originally from Côte d’Ivoire (TU-M-02, Côte d’Ivoire). A craftsman, after his stay in Choucha he got involved with a local development association (Planete Positive) and worked as a carved stone sculptor. A network of NGOs and international volunteers

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160 Some national groups had leaders who were the focal points with national or local Libyan authorities in different Libyan cities. Their roles were to facilitate relationships between foreigners and these authorities and to solve problems of migrant workers.

161 Some weeks after the interview, the researcher was informed that the interviewee obtained a visa to France.
helped him acquire tools and machines to carve the stone. He wanted to regularise his status, but could not get the work visa he needed to apply for a residence permit (TU-M-02, Côte d'Ivoire).
6. Institutional Responses

This section considers responses to the crisis by CSOs, intergovernmental organisations, the private sector and states, this last category including countries of origin, the country of immigration (Libya), transit countries and other state actors.

Civil society capacities varied in the countries studied. In Burkina Faso, which is a very poor country, there was a total absence of CSO capacity. In Ghana, community leaders and local CSOs played a vital role during the return and reintegration phase for returnees from Libya. Regarding Tunisia, migrants interviewed there and those in the Egyptian sample who had passed through Tunisia reported reception and support provided by residents and CSOs.

In all the study countries, intergovernmental organisations, particularly IOM, played a central role in managing migrant movements during the crisis. IOM ensured the evacuation of migrants from Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. It took over the transport of migrants and worked with embassies to provide temporary travel documents. UNHCR was a critical player in reception of and assistance to asylum seekers, as well as in launching asylum procedures, particularly in Tunisia. The European Commission, through the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), initiated a number of crisis responses in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. It provided funding for humanitarian assistance, facilitated evacuations via IOM and supported repatriation through IOM, UNHCR, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and OCHA. The European Commission also intervened through its Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), supporting stranded migrants and promoting projects in countries neighbouring Libya.162 EU responses within Libya following the 2011 crisis are not covered here, as the focus here is on responses by actors in countries of return or transit. A separate report examines European responses to the crisis within Libya.163

The Libyan state and the countries of origin of the African migrants living in Libya appear to have played a minimal role in migrant evacuation and repatriation. An exception is Ghana, which through its diplomatic mission in Libya liaised with international partners to arrange transportation and relief services. Government institutions in Tunisia were particularly proactive in dealing with the massive inflows of people crossing the border from Libya. The reception response in Tunisia was huge compared to the responses of the countries of origin under study. Indeed, the Libya crisis had an enormous impact on Tunisia, with fleeing migrants arriving continuously or being rescued at sea. Thus, Tunisia’s institutional responses were necessarily different from those of the countries of origin. In Tunisia the thousands of stranded migrants who did not return to their countries of origin were channelled into asylum procedures.

This research found no significant longer-term financial compensation offered to returnees in any of the countries studied, nor were targeted reintegration programmes identified for returning migrants. Intergovernmental organisations and states, both in the countries of origin and in Tunisia as a country of transit, did seek to respond to the arrival of returned or stranded migrants. However, these efforts were short lived, with longer-term crisis responses hindered by lack of funding, the upheaval of concurrent crises and the absence of future-oriented perspectives.

6.1. Burkina Faso

6.1.1. Intergovernmental Organisations

Intergovernmental organisations operating in Burkina Faso played an important role in arranging emergency returns in 2011, 2015 and 2016. IOM, UNHCR and the Red Cross were involved in two primary ways. First, they identified migrants in distress in Libya and provided them immediate assistance. Second these organisations assisted returnees in their socio-economic reintegration upon arrival in Burkina Faso (BF-I-02). In addition, the World Food Programme (WFP) was reportedly

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162 The Libya report focuses on EU actions in the selected countries of origin or transit of migrants, thus EU actions will not be discussed under next sections. For further details on European responses please refer the forthcoming report by ICMPD on European Responses to Migrants in Countries in Crisis (2017).

involved in providing immediate assistance. Since 2011, IOM has been actively involved in providing support to Burkinabe migrants formerly residing in Libya (BF-I-02). Indeed, IOM’s Burkina Faso office initiated emergency operations in areas of Libya with high concentrations of Burkinabe migrants, identifying all Burkinabe migrants wishing to return (BF-I-02). Once in Burkina Faso, returnees were greeted at the airport and assisted by IOM in completing their paperwork (BF-A-03). IOM also gave each migrant EUR 40 to enable them to return to their home village and support them in the initial days of their arrival (BF-I-02).

IOM did appear to have Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes which provided financial assistance to returned migrants to help them develop a small business or income-generating activity. These stemmed mainly from European experiences involving North-South returns from the EU area. However, these were said be undertaken in the context of South-South returns too, as articulated by the IOM representative:

“From Ouagadougou to the village of the migrant, we also provide them financial support. If the return process is finished, IOM embarks on the reintegration component. With the resources available, we support migrants in reintegration. It’s to say, with the migrant, we define a business plan according to his needs. The migrant has competence because he has acquired in Libya more competence during the journey. It’s the migrant who chooses the sector he wishes to work in. If the business plan is put in place, IOM provides the necessary equipment to start the activity.” (BF-I-02)

6.1.2. States

The Burkina Faso consulate in Libya provided logistics support – particularly help in obtaining travel documents and airplane tickets – to enable migrants to return (BF-I-01; BF-A-01). Though with a limited role, three Burkinabe state actors were involved in the evacuation and return of migrants from Libya: the Conseil Supérieur des Burkinabè de l’Etranger (Supreme Council of Burkinabe Abroad), the National Emergency Relief Council and the public policy directorate (BF-I-02). These actors assisted IOM in welcoming returnees at the airport in Burkina Faso (BF-A-01; BF-I-02). The rest of the work, including providing returnees first aid and clothing, was done by IOM (BF-A-03; BF-F-05). The consulate and embassy in Libya helped make involvement of these Burkinabe actors possible, by identifying the migrants who wanted to return (BF-A-02; BF-I-02).

The government of Burkina Faso did not develop a particular strategy in relation to returnees from Libya. However, more recent returns of migrants from other countries in crisis, such as Côte d’Ivoire, have precipitated interdepartmental government meetings to discuss the general issue of protection of Burkinabe citizens in foreign countries. In 2014-2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched awareness campaigns among Burkinabe abroad. However, the political crisis in Burkina Faso, with the uprisings of 2014\(^{164}\) that led to the peaceful ousting of president Blaise Compaoré, prevented their full implementation (BF-A-01).

6.2. Chad

Chad has been and is at the core of an intense movement of people fleeing conflict zones in Central Africa. This has limited Chadian institutional actors’ resources and ability to respond to all ‘persons of concern’ in the country at the same level over time. Because of the crisis in Darfur from 2003 onwards, as well as refugees and returnees from CAR in 2003 and in 2010-2011, Chad has witnessed an influx of migrants, refugees and internally displaced people, particularly in its eastern and southern regions.\(^{165}\) Boko Haram’s insurgency in the Lake Chad basin since 2009 has forced large numbers of refugees from Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria, as well as Chadian nationals, to flee to cities such as Bagassola. According to the International Crisis Group, in 2016 there were 2.8 million displaced

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persons in the Lake Chad basin, about 200,000 of them refugees.\(^{166}\) Thus, the return of Chadians from Libya took place in a context of already large-scale displacement within the country, and insufficient resources to respond.

### 6.2.1. Civil Society

Our research found limited involvement of CSOs in Chad in assisting the return and reintegration of migrants fleeing Libya. We identified only one national CSO assisting returnees from Libya, Al-Bihr.\(^{167}\)

> “When the crisis began in Libya and returnees started arriving, we started helping some people who were in need. We gave some of them CFA 25,000 [EUR 38], especially during the holy month of Ramadan.” (CH-C-03)

According to this interviewee, Al-Bihr was created “because there are a lot of old people here [Moussoro] abandoned and needing help around us” (CH-C-03). Initially the organisation focused on the most vulnerable in society, then progressively expanded its help to include, for example, poor orphans and widows. Al-Bihr started assisting Chadian returnees because they were vulnerable (CH-C-03). Al-Bihr’s coordinator said that the organisation received funds to help the returnees from partners in Qatar,\(^{168}\) mainly cash and food items:

> “They [partners in Qatar] sent us CFA 12 million [EUR 18.303] to help the returnees from Libya living in Moussoro [...]. This year, we received CFA 20 million [EUR 30.505]. Last year, we distributed food to some 25,000 people.” (CH-C-03)

Our interviews with migrants and their family members turned up little recognition for Al-Bihr’s efforts in Moussoro. This was perhaps because of the rather limited scope of the organisation’s assistance. None of our interviewees even mentioned it. The Chadian migrants interviewed said they received little assistance from humanitarian organisations. Assistance, where available, consisted of food and some non-food items like blankets, soap and medical care given upon arrival (CH-M-18; CH-M-19).

### 6.2.2. Intergovernmental Organisations

Similar to the other study countries, many UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP, OCHA, the World Health Organisation (WHO)) and IOM mobilised assistance for Chadian returnees from Libya as they started arriving in Chad in 2011. IOM led the repatriation effort, bringing some 66,000\(^{169}\) migrants to Chad by air and overland and registering them. IOM also provided assistance in the form of basic health care and vaccinations, water and food for those arriving in the north by road and air, in collaboration with the Red Cross, WFP and WHO. OCHA coordinated the interactions and moderated the interventions.

### 6.2.3. Private Sector

Our field research found no real connection between the private sector and the Chadian returnees from Libya. In Moussoro, private businesses were involved in trade with Libya, as with other countries, like Saudi Arabia, in apparel, perfumes, furniture, jewellery, blankets and carpets. However, the Chadian private sector was not offering job opportunities specifically for returnees.

### 6.2.4. States

Backed by IOM, the government of Chad — specifically the Department of the Interior, the Department of Social Affairs and the National Commission for Reception and Reintegration of Refugees and Returnees (CNARR)\(^{170}\) — assisted in repatriating Chadians from Libya:

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\(^{167}\) This association existed prior to the Libya crisis and the return of Chadian migrants.


\(^{169}\) OCHA (1 June, 2011).

\(^{170}\) French original: Commission nationale pour l’accueil et la réinsertion des réfugiés et rapatriés.
“IOM in partnership with the Chadian government facilitated our return to Chad. We were taken back by air.” (CH-M-17)

“The Chadian government does its best to repatriate Chadian people in distress. But in addition to that, it's really important to have those people integrated and reinserted into the communities. A mechanism for this task is required. Then agents need to be trained for it.” (CH-I-01)

Nonetheless, the Chadian migrants interviewed reported minimal support from the Chadian state:

“The Government [of Chad] assisted us just on the first days we arrived. A few days after we arrived back home, we were abandoned. Ill people were treated. The government provided vehicles to transport returnees home to their region of origin. If we remained there I think it would have been better for us. Those who stayed there in N'Djamena received support.” (CH-M-18)

CNARR was involved in repatriation of returnees and their registration when they arrived in Chad. After the Libya crisis, CNARR's mandate was expanded to include support to returned migrants (its remit had previously been limited to refugees) (CH-C-04). The northern cities of Faya and Zouarké were the two main entry and transit points for returnees from Libya. Between April and May 2011 Faya received more than 27,000 arrivals, assisted by IOM, the Chadian state and the Red Cross (CH-I-01). Returnees were also provided assistance, consisting mainly of transportation for repatriation, food, non-food items, health care and blankets. However, this support extended no more than five months after their arrival. In the medium term, CNARR itself faced serious difficulties in fulfilling its obligations to the returnees.

No explicit reintegration plan or mid-term assistance could be identified. The government intervened on an ad hoc basis when lives of Chadian nationals were at stake. Many of their concrete interventions in reintegration occurred long after 2011. For instance, in 2015, four years after the first Chadian migrants returned from Libya, the government finalised a national plan for returnees' reintegration with a budget of US$ 302.838 million (EUR 285.734 million). Even that plan, however, made no provision for medium and longer-term reintegration of Chadian returnees from Libya:

“The government shows its goodwill by elaborating a plan of global response in favour of Chadian returnees. Unfortunately, the implementation of the plan has been delayed because of funding and [other] Chadian state priorities.” (CH-I-03)

Furthermore, the plan is more focused on Chadian returnees from CAR. Regardless, it has not been operationalised, mainly because the state has been unable to mobilise the needed funds (CH-I-03).

6.3. Egypt

Migrant interviewees said they received no assistance from Egyptian authorities or any other entity upon return. They were also unable to attribute the relief support they did receive to IOM or others. The source of charter flights and ferries from Tunisia remained somewhat unclear as well. Interviewees in Sohag affirmed that transport was provided by the Egyptian government or other governments, in response to a hunger strike started by refugees. At other sites, migrants could not positively identify the sources of support. There was also a lack of awareness among the institutional stakeholders interviewed of the gaps in assistance experienced by Egyptian returnees from Libya. This seemed to reflect a lack of involvement with and knowledge of this group.

6.3.1. Civil Society

171 Before 2011 the commission was operating under the name CONAR - Commission nationale pour l'accueil et la réinsertion des réfugiés. A Law decree in 2011 added the returnees among the scope of action: Décret 11-839 2011-08-02/PR/PM/MAT/11, see: http://ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/97337/115456/F-930051841/TCD-97337.pdf.

In the face of a general lack of government services to Egyptian returnees from Libya, civil society sometimes stepped in to provide help with return journeys. In some instances, support continued after arrival in Egypt. In particular, the Tunisian public provided much-needed assistance, as will be discussed in the section on Tunisian civil society.

An international NGO conducted an assessment of the needs of Egyptian returnees from Libya in April 2015, with the aim of advocating for greater assistance (E-C-01). Minya and Fayoum were identified as governorates with large numbers of returnees. Field investigators spoke not only with returnees but also their families, including women. They found an absence of psychosocial support for victims of domestic violence, which was described as prevalent (E-C-01). No follow-up visits took place, however. The NGO’s regional office did not consider the situation of Egyptian returnees an emergency requiring rapid response (E-C-01).

Initiatives aimed at community stabilisation were similarly limited. An NGO representative who agreed to be interviewed on the condition of anonymity provided youth outreach and employment services, though not exclusively to returnees from Libya, via the offices of a ministerial entity. They had encountered various difficulties in working with government authorities, alongside funding difficulties, which had hindered training support (E-C-03).

6.3.2. Intergovernmental Organisations

IOM’s response to the Libya crisis focused on overall evacuation of refugees and return of non-Libyan nationals to their home countries. However, IOM also played a role in providing medical and return services to 30,583 Egyptian migrants in Libya (E-I-03). IOM’s first sea evacuations were to Alexandria. A ship transported humanitarian aid to Misrata, including medical supplies and equipment, and evacuated migrants on the return leg from Misrata to Benghazi. Land transportation was also provided to migrants to reach the Libya-Egypt border. There, consular representatives could identify migrants and provide them a laissez passer, if needed, without safety concerns (E-C-03). By January 2012, IOM, in cooperation with the border authorities, had recorded a total of 263,554 persons (including 173,873 Egyptians and 89,681 non-Egyptian nationals) crossing the Libya-Egypt border.

Egyptian migrants were provided medical and food vouchers in Libya and upon their return in Egypt (E-I-03). In response to the later crisis, in 2015, the government approached WFP in 2016 to request distribution of food vouchers in four districts in Sohag to 23,000 returnees; 6,000 recipients were still pending at the time of this writing. The target was to provide for 60,000 returnees identified by a needs assessment, potentially including those in Minya. The distribution, conducted through the Ministry of Manpower and Labour (E-I-04), faced many security and communication challenges. For example, Egyptian citizens who were not returnees, and thus excluded from the target group, expressed frustration at not receiving the food support (E-I-04).

6.3.3. Private Sector

This research found no private sector facilities targeted specifically to the Egyptian returnees from Libya. Nonetheless, matchmaking services tackling the general problem of unemployment may have benefited returnees. Some of these services were still being offered at the time of this research. The National Employment Pact (NEP) worked with partners in Egypt, including German Development Cooperation (GIZ), the German Embassy and IOM, to provide matchmaking services to blue-collar workers in the Greater Cairo area. Its Business Development Manager, Mohammed Ezzat, described the organisation’s aim as to improve participants’ employment prospects (E-C-02). In 2015, NEP

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173 Both the NGO and the ministerial entity are anonymous.
collaborated with IOM to set up two employment centres: one in Cairo and one in Sharqiya, an Egyptian governnate from which migration to Libya was common.

NEP also participated in an EU-funded project implemented by IOM, called ‘START: Stabilizing At-Risk Communities and Enhancing Migration Management to Enable Smooth Transitions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya’. Under that project, which seeks to facilitate transition processes and sustainable recoveries, NEP provided services to 5,200 individuals and conducted awareness training for 800 job seekers in Fayoum and Munufia, two governnates in which migration to Libya was relatively widespread. The project has also served returnees from Qalyoubia and organised employment fairs in Fayoum and Munufia (E-C-02). Ezzat noted that among those who benefited from the training and matchmaking services, “10% have been able to find and sustain a job” (E-C-02). Training was provided in social insurance and in maintaining a safe and healthy work environment (E-C-02).

6.3.4. States

Migrants interviewed noted an overall lack of assistance from the Egyptian representation in Libya (E-FGD-02; E-FGD-03; E-FGD-04; E-M-06; E-M-10). Some argued that migrants of other nationalities received more assistance from their embassies than Egyptian nationals in Libya (E-M-05; E-M-14). According to one interviewee in Sohag, the diplomatic representations of other states provided more help, for example, meeting citizens arriving on the evacuation flights to Cairo and offering them transportation home (E-FGD-04). Another returnee suggested that flights back to Egypt were provided only to Egyptian migrants in skilled professions, such as doctors and teachers, given their connections with Egyptian state officials (E-FGD-04). Interviewees repeated the importance of the assistance provided by the Tunisian army after they had crossed into Tunisia:

“Only in Tunisia [did we receive support], from the Tunisian army, but in Libya, nothing at all. People faced death right before our eyes. In Libya, they fetched us and shot at us.” (E-FGD-04)

“After 2011 the embassy didn’t do anything. It was almost closed. Libyan tribes helped the Egyptian government. The embassy didn’t help. If someone passed away you could go to the embassy, but that was pretty much it. It was no use.” (E-FGD-05)

However, from the focus group discussions it did emerge that the Egyptian authorities provided some flights – either charters or military ones – from Tunis, with the support of other Gulf State governments, to bring Egyptians back home (E-FGD-01; E-FGD-02; E-FGD-03; E-FGD-04). Egyptian authorities additionally provided ferries, in conjunction with IOM, to transport Egyptians to Alexandria and Matruh (E-FGD-04; E-I-03). However, air travel was the preferred mode (E-FGD-05). Migrants from Sohag said there were buses awaiting Egyptians at the Salloum border point to bring them to Alexandria for free. However, some drivers did ask for money, migrants said, and the travellers had to pay (E-FGD-03; E-FGD-04).

Egyptian consular authorities monitored movements through registration at the border. The government has since identified development of an integrated database on Egyptians abroad as a priority, in part to collect information on the Egyptian diaspora. This could be developed into a tool to support nationals caught in countries in crisis.

None of the migrants interviewed reported receiving any assistance from the Egyptian government in the period following their return. No financial compensation was identified. One anonymous interviewee said that the Ministry of Migration was unconcerned with irregular migration, which was relatively common among Egyptians in Libya. It had no documentation of the irregular Egyptian migrants in Libya, so returnees were unable to register with the entity (E-A-01). Migrants interviewed did say that they heard announcements in their villages asking them to complete forms to receive compensation for items lost in Libya. However, after filling in the forms, they never heard back from the authorities (E-M-04; E-M-07; E-M-09; E-M-10; E-M-12; E-M-15). The Ministry of Manpower and

177 The target group was not specifically Egyptian returnees from Libya, although returnees may have been amongst those provided with awareness training.


Labour was similarly said to have informed migrants of job vacancies for returnees through municipalities. Here again, however, after applying, returnees never heard back (E-M-01). An employment service and compensation programme for Egyptian returnees from Libya was to be implemented by another government entity, but it largely failed, despite payment of a small contribution by returnees. A returnee in Sohag noted that in 2015 the same government entity announced a similar service, and asked returnees to go to the post office and register. However, as of May 2016, no assistance had materialised. This interviewee suggested that the government had greatly benefited from the contributions paid by returnees without providing anything in return (E-FGD-05).

Following the 2011 crisis, returnees in Sohag did at last receive a food packet in 2012. The supplies, including cooking oil, sugar and ghee, were distributed through an NGO called the Bettering Conditions Association. Recipients noted that the box carried an Egyptian government label (E-FGD-03; E-FGD-04).

6.4. Ghana

6.4.1. Civil Society

Community leaders and some CSOs played a critical role in facilitating the return and reintegration of Ghanaian returnees from Libya (GH-E-01; GH-E-02; GH-C-01). A particularly active community leader was the director of a local radio station, Dormaa FM. He used radio broadcasts to establish regular communication between migrants in Libya and their families in Ghana prior to their arrival in the country (GH-E-01). This was done through phone-in programmes in which migrants shared their distressing experiences. Trapped migrants even used the broadcasts to lobby members of parliament and government. At the peak of the crisis they phoned into live broadcasts and made direct appeals for help to evacuate. Their harrowing stories galvanised public opinion in favour of government action to charter aircrafts to extract them from a country in crisis.

Open communication channels were maintained throughout the returnees’ journeys, as they arrived at the national airport and as they re-entered their various hometowns and villages. The radio station ran sensitisation programmes as well, which helped communities appreciate the circumstances surrounding the unplanned return of their relatives. These helped minimise rejection, humiliation and conflict between community members and returnees.

The radio station director, as a community leader, coordinated a range of other services for returnees as well, particularly related to health, community support and education. For health screening and medical treatment of newly arrived returnees, the radio station facilitated interactions between government healthcare providers, return migrants and NGOs:

“...When we get the information through the newspapers that some Ghanaians are being evacuated to Ghana, we use the radio to inform the district assembly of the situation, then we ask for a list of their names. Later we make on-air announcements for the Ghana Health Service to come and screen them against certain diseases like HIV-AIDS and others. So, we make the announcement for the returnees to assemble at the FM station here and then invite the health service personnel and other interested organisations to come here to give them the necessary support.” (GH-E-01)

This community leader (GH-E-01) also used the radio station to solicit community support in provision of humanitarian relief to the return migrants:

“...We also made appeals for support for the returnees. People brought second-hand clothes, money, food, etc. for the returnees. I remember in one of our appeals for support programmes, a chop bar [local restaurant] owner who operates near our station was touched and gave free food to any Libya returnee who went there to eat. We commended her benevolence on the radio. Others also did their best in various ways for the returnees.” (GH-E-01)

The community leader’s social networks were even put to work to provide educational opportunities for the children of some returnees. The unplanned returns were invariably associated with losses of
income, jeopardising retention in education for returnees' children. Realising this, the radio station director appealed to a successful returnee who owned a private school (St. Cecilia Educational Complex) to admit children of returnees impoverished by parents’ unplanned return. He subsequently mobilised funds to pay their heavily subsidised fees by instalment (GH-E-01).

Unemployment among return migrants was a source of distress for migrants and their households (GH-C-01; GH-E-01; GH-F-01; GH-F-10). The community leader described above helped link employers with prospective employees in the migrant returnee community. These efforts enabled returnees to exploit skills they had acquired in Libya to earn a living in Ghana:

“Sometimes people come to us that need casual workers and straight away I link some of the returnees to them. For example, the hospitals may bring an announcement that they need drivers and I’ll introduce the returnees I know can do the job to go and talk to some of the senior officers I know there. Many have gotten jobs through these little contacts.” (GH-E-01)

Acts of criminality and antisocial behaviour have posed significant challenges to community leaders’ ability to help returnees. They have also perpetuated stigma against returnees. The director of Dormaa FM captured these concerns:

“The biggest challenge is they [returnees] themselves. Most of the Libyan returnees tend to live a life that wasn’t their character before they travelled to Libya. They become wild! […] Secondly, whenever you hear that some armed robbers have been arrested, you’ll find at least one returnee among them. So, unfortunately, they live a kind of life that makes the community regard returnees as bad people.” (GH-E-01)

Local CSOs can play a pivotal role in dissuading potential migrants from migrating through irregular channels and in advocating for migrants’ rights. Scholars in Transit is one such CSO, operating in Nkoranza in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana. The NGO collaborated with IOM and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2011-2012 to deliver limited reintegration support to returnees from Libya (further project details are provided under the next heading). However, the decision to expand the project scope to include, in addition to returnees, the most vulnerable members of the beneficiary communities (10% of total beneficiaries), generated accusations of bias and favouritism against the NGO, as stated by the organisation’s director:

“Yes, it is true. The majority of people would not have much to say about any kind of benefit because the support goes to the minority. For instance, there was support that came and we had to choose from 900 people, only 50 to be supported. So definitely this would not be in good taste with those who did not get it.” (GH-C-01)

### 6.4.2. Intergovernmental Organisations

Reprisal attacks on African migrants, branded as mercenaries hired to maintain Gaddafi’s grip on power, exposed Ghanaians to various forms of physical abuse. This prompted an urgent evacuation operation spearheaded by intergovernmental and international organisations such as IOM and UNHCR, working closely with national governments. IOM played a leading role in the evacuation of Ghanaians from Libya (GH-I-01).

One of IOM’s immediate responses to returnees from Libya was provision of training and equipment for business start-ups in agriculture and commercial trades. Reintegration packages did not include direct cash payments but rather logistical support, partly due to fear that beneficiaries would use cash contributions to fund a return trip to Libya (GH-C-01; GH-I-01). IOM initiated two reintegration projects. These provided vocational and micro-business skills training, business counselling, basic business start-up kits and access to health insurance to promote returnees’ reintegration. To attenuate possible friction between community members and returnees, these projects extended beyond the returnee group to include vulnerable community members in migrant-sending areas such as Nkoranza. Moreover, IOM and its partners, such as the National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO), a government institution, and Scholars in Transit, a CSO, spearheaded educational activities and advocacy work.
NADMO and its implementing partners in Ghana also led formation of returnee associations as a conduit for mobilising returnees for reintegration support as well as to educate aspiring migrants of the perils of irregular migration. This was in line with an IOM recommendation:

"[Training could [...] be provided to groups of returnees in group formation, cooperative ventures, enterprise management and counselling, to help them establish successful enterprises. In addition, the establishment of cooperatives or associations of returnees should be encouraged."

Both the EU and the Japanese government funded training projects in Ghana (GH-I-01). Their main objective was long-term sustainable returns through skills acquisition among returnees who had adopted farming as a livelihood strategy. The training included basic bookkeeping skills to help returnees build their operation and regard it as a bona fide business. They also helped returnees obtain farming tools and equipment. Returnees were also encouraged to form cooperatives to improve their chances of accessing funding from financial institutions. The initial interventions focused on returnees in the Brong Ahafo region, as it was home to slightly over half of all returnees from Libya. Yet, as noted earlier, the project, in cooperation with the NGO Scholars in Transit, could reach only 50 of the 900 returnees registered in the region (GH-C-01):

“Out of 19,000 returnees, half of them have returned to the Brong Ahafo region alone. So we chose that area for the project and then after this primary project, funded by our office alone, we received funding from the Japanese government to implement similar projects in the three northern regions. Because about 20% of the returnees went back to the three northern regions and there were no jobs.” (GH-I-01)

The Japanese government funded another IOM project under the name ‘Emergency Reintegration Assistance for Ghanaian Migrants Affected by the 2011 Libyan Crisis’. As part of that effort IOM commissioned a study of key communities in the Brong Ahafo and Northern regions of Ghana. The aim was to measure the “difficulties and vulnerabilities, positive behavioural practices, partners or local institutions and livelihood strategies, including alternative livelihoods in host or return communities that can reduce future vulnerability to emergencies such as the massive return of migrants”. A key finding of the study was that households with migrants typically fall within the lower wellbeing categories in the Brong Ahafo and Northern regions. Moreover, these regions were characterised by “subsistence farming, low level of education and skills base, low employability levels, large household sizes, low income and assets base, little or no entitlements and limited livelihood choices”. The report, finally, highlighted the substantial challenges that migrant-sending households faced upon the unplanned return of their family members from Libya, particularly, “the stretching of the household income and related effects on food, shelter and clothing”. The ensuing financial pressures were said to have negative consequences for household nutrition, education and health.

Two main recommendations from the IOM study were (1) that migrant households and communities be helped to diversify their livelihood base through a combination of crop production, livestock production and petty trade and (2) that migrant-sending communities be provided training and general capacity building for disaster preparedness and risk management. The project, according to IOM Ghana, had strengthened the capacities of 161 returnees and vulnerable community members, providing them business development and management skills and in-kind support for start-up businesses. In addition, 2,108 returnees, their families and members of the migrant-sending communities were provided national health insurance coverage. A total of 152 returnees received psychosocial counselling.

In a similar way, the UNDP participated in the reception of Ghanaian returnees from Libya, though this was not its core mandate in Ghana. Funding for such interventions therefore had to be raised from

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Among the challenges encountered was lack of accurate data on the numbers of Ghanaians in Libya. This hampered stakeholders’ groundwork, as they were unprepared for the scale of the mass return. The magnitude of this challenge was captured by IOM Ghana staff:

“The money wasn’t sitting here. Now the structure has changed a bit, but headquarters has a specific fund that is there to handle emergencies when they occur because if you need to deploy support quickly, you cannot wait and go to the donors, because we are not donors. [...] We are a development agency that relies on funding from donors.” (GH-I-02)

6.4.3. Private Sector

Private sector engagement in Ghana was noted, but somewhat limited. Some telecommunications companies in Ghana (MTN and Vodafone-Ghana) donated free mobile phones and registered Sim cards to returnees. Beyond the facilitation of communication, the rationale behind the registration of Sim cards was to help agencies track returnees later when they said to be on the safe side let’s look at up to 12,000. That would be the maximum. Now, as you know, close to 19,000 arrived. Not to mention those who did not arrive and those who went to other countries. So the issue of data and statistics, we need to really look at that. It was a major, major challenge.” (GH-I-01)

Often our interviewees spoke of private actors, particularly landlords, in Libya as being crucial for their safety during the crisis and evacuation. Accounts by return migrants suggest that migrants gauged the severity of the crisis by the reactions of their landlords (GH-M-09; GH-M-08; GH-M-02; GH-M-11). Migrants also trusted landlords’ local knowledge and understanding of the ethno-political situation in Libya when making decisions about staying indoors, where to go, who to avoid and even how to relate to the different warring factions. For instance, some migrants were advised by their landlords to flee whenever they saw soldiers, because they were at risk of being arrested, tortured and killed (GH-M-11):

“The situation was bad because they were shooting indiscriminately and bombing most places. So I was seeing him off when we met soldiers [...]. Meanwhile my landlord had already told us that if we met soldiers, we should run for our lives or else they’ll arrest us. And when they arrest you, the pain you will go through and the stupid work they will make you do, you may just die. So avoiding the soldiers was part of the survival strategy there.” (GH-M-11)

This interviewee, moreover, said he had accessed medical care through his landlord. A close friend had been shot and killed but he survived, though with a gunshot wound to the leg. Such positive relations with landlords were not universal, this migrant said, but limited to those landlords who themselves had once migrated abroad, especially those who could speak English (GH-M-11).

Some landlords took considerable risk to extract trapped migrants from their hideouts and drive them to airports so they could board the chartered flights arranged by intergovernmental and international
organisations such as IOM, UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (GH-M-02):

“I ran away from the house and hid myself somewhere by the roadside and made a call to my landlord. He located me and took me in his car together with some boys. He brought me to Trekmatile Airport. [...] So when I called my landlord and he came he decided to take me directly to Trekmatile Airport. We travelled amidst gunshots and bombs all around us. But the airport was safe because of the presence of heavy security.” (GH-M-02)

However, some landlords were sceptical of migrants’ role in the conflict and interrogated them to ensure their neutrality (GH-M-09). Migrant tenants who could not convince their landlord of their non-involvement were immediately evicted, which exposed them to peril:

“At that time if you stepped out you could be killed. But your landlord could tell you to move out of his house knowing very well that it’s not safe outside.” (GH-M-09)

6.4.4. States

The Ghanaian government, through its diplomatic mission in Libya, liaised with international partners to provide transportation and relief services to trapped Ghanaian migrants in Libya. A former senior diplomat at Ghana’s Embassy in Libya said that the mission relied heavily on international organisations to provide and pay for transportation and health care during the evacuation:

“In the major evacuation when people were going to the border, UNHCR, the Red Cross and IOM were instrumental in getting us the buses. They had an office arranged so people could go there [Tripoli]. People on the verge of dying, people who had their hands cut could go there and they will pay their hospital bills for them. We always relied on them. They would send people to the border and airlift them to Ghana.” (GH-A-01)

Beyond the costs borne by international organisations, the Ghana mission in Libya had to pay to feed the nationals who had congregated at the designated airports awaiting evacuation. They reallocated funds that had been earmarked for administrative purposes and diplomats’ salaries. A former senior diplomat acknowledged the opportunity cost of these emergency outlays:

“It denied resources for daily administration expenditures, such as servicing vehicles at the workshop. To a large extent it also affected payment of salaries. For example, for two months we didn’t pay ourselves. We requested US$ 100,000 to cater for the trapped Ghanaians, but nothing came. We finally spent about US$ 30,000 of our meagre funds to feed the people because we had created a shelter at the airport.” (GH-A-01)

The Ghana Embassy arranged charter flights to airlift Ghanaian migrants from the Tripoli airport to Kotoka International Airport in Accra (GH-A-01). According to a former senior diplomat, these charter flights extracted trapped migrants over a nine-day period. Some 6,631 migrants were evacuated from the Tripoli airport alone (GH-A-01). Other research indicates that in total, 70 evacuation flights to Accra were organised from Cairo, Tripoli and Djerba. Some 97% of evacuees reportedly returned by air, with just 3% returning overland from Libya. According to NADMO statistics, by July 2012 a total of 18,445 nationals had returned home. The actual number could be greater, however, since this figure does not include those who returned without government or institutional support.

The vast majority of Ghanaian returnees from Libya were men in the 20 to 40 age bracket. Some 132 returnees were women, 96 were minors. Two of the adult men returnees were described as mentally ill, and more than 90 were freed prisoners.

Ghanaians who sought help from their embassy in Tripoli were mostly disappointed by what they described as the ‘uncaring attitude’ of staff at the diplomatic mission. A number of migrants resorted to social and mass media to galvanise support and compel their government to arrange evacuation

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flights out of Libya. Local radio stations, such as Dormaa FM, hosted live interviews with stranded migrants in Libya, who shared their traumatic experiences with the Ghanaian public:

“When it happened like that, all the countries were airlifting their nationals because a lot of people travel to Libya to work. America came for their people; France also did same, they had a lot of people there so they quickly came for them. So when we realised that every country was rescuing its nationals, we also started calling home but it was useless. The Ghana embassy over there [in Libya] doesn’t even recognise you. They have an office there but it only benefits them, not us the migrants.” (GH-M-06)

In Libya, trust between Ghanaian migrants and embassy staff was seriously undermined. This was exacerbated by the absence of a national policy on evacuation of nationals from countries in crisis. A former diplomat recalled some of the key challenges:

“The mentality of Ghanaian migrants during the crisis was a problem. For instance, two of the ambassador’s cars were destroyed by Ghanaian migrants, so we had to sell them. The perception they had was a problem for us. Another problem that I experienced was that there was no policy on evacuation. The lack of policy on evacuation was a serious hindrance. If we had a policy, a lot of the problems that we had wouldn’t have happened [...]. Generally, there is a lack of trust in the Ghanaian missions abroad. They see you as ‘an agent for deportation’.” (GH-A-01)

Some migrants disputed claims that the Ghanaian Embassy had coordinated assistance and supported evacuation and repatriation of trapped migrants from Libya (GH-M-06; GH-M-07; GH-M-11; GH-M-08). One described officials at the Ghana mission in Libya as “useless”:

“[T]hey don’t help anybody. The officials in Libya do not help at all.” (GH-M-08)

Migrants complained of a lack of support from embassy officials and recounted their desperate reliance on social media to shame the government into eventually chartering flights to evacuate them. When the Ghanaian government finally agreed to evacuate its nationals from Libya, three liaison posts were established: in Salum on the Libya-Egypt border, in Ras Jadir on the Libya-Tunisia border and in Tripoli. The Ghanaian mission in Libya managed these to aid the evacuation process.

NADMO, an organisation funded by a government grant and mandated to coordinate disaster management in Ghana, played a role in coordinating assistance to migrants upon their return from Libya. That support was provided by various stakeholders, such as IOM, UNHCR, the Ghana Immigration Service, the Ghana security services, the Ghana Health Service and UNICEF (GH-A-04; GH-I-01; GH-A-02; GH-I-02). NADMO’s coordinating role encompassed services such as health and immigration screening of returnees, profiling and tailored support to the vulnerable (the elderly, children, the infirm and women). It also coordinated the feeding, temporary accommodation and returnees’ transportation, providing token amounts of GHS 25 to GHS 30 (EUR 6 to EUR 7,32) to help returnees pay fares to their hometowns and villages from Accra (GH-M-04; GH-M-09; GH-A-03).

Misinformation and a lack of adequate financial support for returnees exposed some NADMO staff to physical abuse, as some returnees erroneously perceived them to be hoarding relief money that they were entitled to. The director of NADMO’s Livelihood Support Department described the situations his staff sometimes faced:

“Some of the returnees even slapped our staff. They were aggressive towards our staff because some alleged that Gaddafi had given us money to give to them but we were trying to keep it from them. Some said the Nigerien returnees received US$ 1,000 each and that the Ghanaians were also given US$ 1,000 each by Gaddafi. They say that the embassy doesn’t care what happens to them, but we know they don’t register with the embassy when they get there. Instead they went and shouted at embassy staff in Tripoli during the crisis.” (GH-A-03)

Part of the agitation among returned migrants was said to have emanated from what were described as the broken promises of the international institutions that worked jointly with the national

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government. Some return migrants claimed that IOM in Libya had promised them US$ 500 each upon return (GH-M-03). Others said they were promised support for a sustainable reintegration (GH-M-09):

“When we were in Tunis, we were told once we arrived in Ghana we would be given US$ 500 each to get to our destinations. However, GHS 30 [EUR 7.32] was what was given to those of us from Brong Ahafo.” (GH-M-03)

NADMO does not have a mandate to evacuate trapped nationals from abroad. This limited the organisation’s ability to provide support until such nationals had physically arrived in the country of origin. However, our research did show that NADMO played a role in advising the Ghanaian government to seek assistance from IOM and UNHCR to transport migrants home. It also advised constitution of a task force to travel to Libya and help the Ghanaian mission in the country identify nationals and coordinate chartered emergency flights (GH-A-03; GH-A-04; GH-A-01). The fundamental challenges NADMO faced were compounded by the lack of a formal reception centre to accommodate large numbers of distressed individuals and ease the necessary immigration procedures, health checks and security screenings. This meant returnees had to be accommodated at Elwark Stadium, a military sports stadium largely exposed to the elements, especially in bad weather. At the time of this research, some five years after the crisis, there was still no facility available to receive large numbers of nationals at times of crisis.

Logistical challenges furthermore constrained thorough assessments of the effects of trauma and hindered counselling and treatment for those suffering from psychosocial and post-traumatic stress disorders. The health of NADMO staff was compromised too due to prolonged exposure to very ill returnees who could not be quickly diagnosed. NADMO’s deputy national coordinator acknowledged the health risks staff were exposed to:

“The returnees usually brought diseases, and you saw them coughing, especially when they were coming from cold countries. Libya is hot but they also have very cold winters. Those places are cold and you see them coughing a lot due to exposure. Some of our staff caught the cough. [...] We have to have facilities like hostels so people can stay overnight when they arrive.” (GH-A-03)

Furthermore, funding constraints limited all of NADMO’s activities. Returnees could only be meagrely fed, the screening and profiling done was minimal and only small amounts of cash could be provided to cover transportation fares from a central bus terminal in Accra to bus terminals in the returnees’ hometowns and villages. Food parcels, blankets and transportation from the airport to the sports stadium were provided mainly by IOM, in conjunction with Ghanaian military personnel (GH-A-03). The focus of operations at this point was to save lives and ensure that migrants returned to where they came from. There was little concern in that phase for a sustainable reintegration of returnees into their communities of origin (GH-I-01; GH-A-03).

Our findings suggest that disaster management officials sought to hurriedly disperse return migrants in part for security reasons (GH-A-04). Under these circumstances, a laudable initiative by NADMO was its work to promote formation of returnee associations. This led to creation of several groups established along ethnic, political and religious lines. Prominent among these is the Great Jamahiriya Peace Group, an association for all returnees with a specific political interest in Libya. Another, apolitical group is the Northern Returnees Integrated Development Society, a regionally based association of Ghanaians affected by the Libya crisis. Its main focus is prevention of future migration crises and unsafe irregular migration.\(^{169}\)

6.5. **Niger**

6.5.1. **Civil Society**

In Niger, few local CSOs were active in the migration domain before the crisis. However, CSOs did respond to the crisis and returns of Nigeriens from Libya. Humanitarian assistance was provided in Agadez and Niamey, which were transit hubs for migrants (NE-C-04). Reception and hosting services, food, clothing and transportation were provided by Oxfam; Catholic Relief Services; Caritas

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Internationalis; ICRC; the French and Nigerien Red Cross; the Nigerien NGO Ecole, Parainnage & Actions de Développement (EPAD); and the Catholic Church of Niamey (NE-A-01; NE-I-02; NE-C-01; NE-C-03; NE-C-07). At the community level, assistance was provided by various NGOs, including Africare, Qatar Charity, Adkoul-Niger and Karkara. They distributed food, cash and animals to migrants and their families to help them cope with the interruption of remittances (NE-C-07; NE-C-08; NE-C-09). ICRC welcomed migrants, providing food and healthcare services for arrivals (NE-M-02).

EPAD opened a transit centre to help the children of returnees, with support from the Canton of Geneva (NE-C-03). It conducted fairground sessions where children could obtain their civil status documents and arrange for their reintegration into school. This was in addition to support for migrant resettlement and economic reintegration (NE-C-03). An EPAD coordinator discussed the NGO’s activities in smoothing the transition for Nigerien migrants returning from Libya during the crisis:

“The first action was funded by the Canton of Geneva in Switzerland and concerned reception, counselling and fairground sessions for establishment of civil status for children of returnees. The second activity, funded by the US Embassy, aimed at strengthening the economic capacity of women returnees [...]. For the first activity, a transit centre was opened at Agadez, with food and psychosocial support. The NGO also supported resettlement [of returnees], educational inclusion of children and economic reintegration [of returnees], in cooperation with local [government] authorities. Another transit centre was opened in Tahoua to take over when migrants arrived in the city.” (NE-C-03)

The Reflection and Action Group for a Solution to the Immigration Phenomenon (GRASPI), a local NGO, had limited means, but served in an ad hoc committee set up by government to manage the returnees (NE-C-05):

“The association has not made direct interventions for returnees because it does not have the means. But it organised an evaluation mission to discuss the conditions of return with the returnees.” (NE-C-02)

Other NGOs – particularly Karkara, Adkoul and the Collective of Nigerien Returnees, in addition to EPAD – helped migrants find work, get occupational training and even to obtain work equipment (NE-C-03; NE-C-07; NE-C-08; NE-C-09).

In terms of advocacy and defending the rights of migrants, a local CSO, Youth Movement for the Emergence of Niger (MOJEN), went to Libya several times both before and after the 2011 crisis. The purpose of these trips was to assess the situation of migrants in detention and slated for deportation and those arrested by militias. It also led advocacy campaigns urging Nigerien authorities to take action (NE-C-06):

“Since its creation, MOJEN has conducted several migration-related activities. Indeed, as [the organisation’s] president I have made several trips to Libya to help Nigerien migrants living in that country to organise themselves and obtain papers at the embassy. I also conducted many interviews on national and international media to draw the attention of the authorities and welfare organisations to the plight of Nigerien migrants living abroad.” (NE-C-06)

Two local associations, the Alternative Citizens’ Space and MOJEN, helped migrants organise themselves into associations, with two migrant associations thus emerging in 2011: the Collective of Returnees from Libya (CORLI) (which later became the Collective of Nigerien Returnees (CORN)), integrating returnees from Côte d’Ivoire and the Mutual of Returnees from Libya (NE-C-02; NE-C-06; NE-C-07). These associations were established and supported by CSOs to defend migrants’ rights (NE-C-02; NE-C-06; NE-C-07).

In Niger, media statements were issued by several organisations – including MOJEN, the Alternative Citizens’ Space, CORNI and the Collective of Organisations Defending Human Rights and Democracy (CODDHHD). These portrayed the difficult situation Nigerien migrants faced in Libya. The slowness of state responses was also emphasised, to galvanise action by authorities (NE-C-02; NE-C-06; NE-C-07).
6.5.2. Intergovernmental Organisations

Intergovernmental organisations, particularly IOM, played central roles in facilitating migrant movements during the crisis. IOM arranged the evacuation of migrants from Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, particularly transport by air (NE-I-02). When needed, IOM worked with the Niger Embassy to obtain temporary travel documents for migrants, as noted by the head of IOM’s mission in Niger:

“The IOM office in Libya worked with the Niger Embassy to issue temporary travel documents [laissez passer] for the evacuation of migrants. Others go through Tunisia and IOM provides evacuation [from there] to Niger.” (NE-I-02)

Upon their arrival in Niger, migrants were accommodated in the IOM transit centres set up in Niamey, Agadez, Dirkou and Arlit (NE-I-02). There they received healthcare services, food and a bed to sleep in. Eventually they could depart for their hometowns and villages on buses hired by IOM and the ad hoc committee established by the Nigerien government (NE-I-02). To help ease the negative impacts of the returns on the communities of origin, IOM developed a reintegration programme for returning migrants. It provided training and material support for mechanics, traders and farmers, as well as community development projects, in the regions of Tahoua, Zinder, Tillaberi, Agadez and Niamey (NE-I-02). Six of the nine migrants interviewed confirmed that they had received IOM support during their return or reintegration.

An ad hoc UN emergency fund was established to assist migrants returning to their countries of origin or transiting through other countries during the Libya crisis (NE-I-03). Under the UN system, specific activities are carried out by particular institutions. In the Libya crisis, UNICEF arranged sanitation-related subcontracts with Oxfam and Catholic Relief Services, WFP provided food and WHO provided healthcare services at the centres set up to receive migrants (NE-I-03). Nevertheless, some of our interview respondents commented that procedures for mobilising funds were delayed (NE-A-01). The activities were coordinated by OCHA (NE-I-03).

During the Libya crisis, IOM implemented projects funded by the EU to help migrants reach their communities of origin and reintegrate once arrived. Under these, migrants participated in income-generating activities and occupational training was provided in mechanics, business management and other fields of work chosen by returnees (NE-I-01).

6.5.3. Private Sector

No engagement of Niger’s private sector in facilitating returns from Libya emerged from our research. Yet, similar to the findings in Ghana, Nigerien migrant returnees did note the important role of private actors in Libya, in their case, employers. Nigerien migrants working in western companies reported being quickly warned by their employers to leave Libya:

“At the beginning of the crisis in Benghazi, my boss advised me to go home. I accepted in view of the extent of the crisis.” (NE-M-01)

Some companies even paid for return plane tickets for their employees. This was noted also by a study conducted in Tchintabaraden.¹⁹¹ The same applied to Nigerien migrants working for private individuals (NE-M-01).

6.5.4. States

First it must be noted that the Niger Embassy in Libya worked with IOM to provide temporary travel documents to migrants (NE-I-02). As the crisis developed, the Nigerien government developed institutional mechanisms and responses to deal with migrant issues. As a country neighbouring Libya, Niger was host not only to its own citizens fleeing Libya, but also to migrants from other West African countries seeking safety. These included nationals of Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Gambia, Liberia and Ghana. To manage return flows from Libya, alongside those from Côte d’Ivoire, due to the crisis there, the Nigerien government set up, in April 2011, an ad hoc committee to coordinate and monitor

¹⁹⁰ International Organization for Migration (IOM) (n.d.).
the situation of Nigeriens in Côte d’Ivoire and in Libya. This committee brought together representatives of relevant ministries, intergovernmental organisations and one CSO to ensure adequate reception, routing and support for reintegrating of returning migrants (NE-A-01).

To fulfil its mandate, the committee established national, regional, subregional and municipal committees. It developed an intervention plan and budget of CFA 1 billion (about EUR 1.5 million) in the hope that donor partners would provide support. However, it proved unable to raise the funds necessary to implement its plans (NE-A-02; NE-A-06). An emergency fund from the executive branch of the government made it possible to carry out assessment missions in the most affected regions (Agadez, Tahoua and Zinder). These enabled observation and evaluation of the situation and assessment of the needs of returnees (NE-A-01; NE-A-02). However, the ad hoc committee was unable to supervise all interventions by stakeholders (NE-E-01; NE-C-07). Interviewees commented on this lack of supervision and coordination, like the migration expert Moukaila Harouna:

“As far as the management of the returns from Libya is concerned, it is an ad hoc committee that was set up [...] [T]he government had no means to manage the situation, considering the scale of returns. There was also disorder in the management of returns. Each actor did what it wanted and the committee could not coordinate all actions.” (NE-E-01)

In conjunction with the ad hoc committee, at the end of 2011 the Office of the President of Niger instructed the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, a state institution to promote a culture of peace, to implement urgent actions to help host communities in border areas, to prevent instability, as the government feared the rebellion in Mali would spill over into Niger (NE-A-02). It should also be noted that some migrants returning from Libya came with weapons or knew how to handle weaponry (NE-I-02; NE-A-04). Thus, the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace implemented a two-phase programme in 60 municipalities viewed as ‘sensitive’ (highly exposed to risk of conflict) (NE-A-02). Interventions targeted communities rather than individual migrants, and sought to alleviate negative impacts of returns at the municipal level (NE-A-02). For instance, a grant of CFA 10 million (about EUR 15,240) was awarded to the mayor’s offices in the targeted areas for community activities and peace sensitisation programmes (NE-A-02). An official of the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace discussed this operation:

“The President of the Republic [of Niger] instructed the High Authority to urgently intervene in the sensitive areas [...]. The High Authority then led actions [...] in two phases [...]. [First] it was decided to provide each commune an amount of CFA 10 million [about EUR 15,240] in order to conduct common interest activities [...] [In] the second phase, the amount was increased to CFA 12 million [about EUR 18,288] [...] following an evaluation that showed the initial amount was not enough.” (NE-A-02)

The government also started selling goods at moderate prices and distributing animals and necessities to return migrants and their host families, while providing cash and food for work through the ‘social network’ programme (NE-C-07; NE-A-08). But these disparate and general actions were aimed at all vulnerable households, not only families of return migrants. In our sample, only three of the eight families of return migrants said they had received help from the state. One of the nine migrants interviewed – a member of the migrant organisation Collective of Nigerien Returnees – confirmed reports of support from government institutions (NE-M-07; NE-C-07). The actions, however, had limited impact, as local distribution of goods and services was said to be politicised and involved favouritism (NE-M-05; NE-F-07; NE-E-03). Yet, these programmes did somewhat help to mitigate the negative impacts of returns at the household level (NE-C-07).

6.6. Tunisia

In the aftermath of the 2011 crisis, until 2013, interventions in Tunisia by government authorities, international organisations and social actors focused on the Choucha transit camp and surrounding cities. The most urgent issues were reception, humanitarian aid and integration. This section discusses the various actors that contributed to the relief effort, drawing mainly on the interviews. For Tunisia, however, an additional key actor is also discussed: smuggling networks. These played a

192 Nigerien Prime Minister’s Office (24 March 2011). Order No. 00042 of the Prime Minister. Establishing an “Ad-hoc committee for the coordination and monitoring of the situation of Nigeriens in Ivory Coast and Libya”.

193 Nigerien Prime Minister’s Office (24 March 2011).
significant role in facilitating the movements of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers fleeing the violence in Libya. While interview subjects and focus groups in the other study countries, particularly Egypt, mentioned smuggling networks, they were (and remain to this day) particularly ubiquitous in Tunisia.

6.6.1. Civil Society

Due to the huge number of social actors involved in the humanitarian emergency in Tunisia since 2011, this section focuses on ongoing and completed activities of the actors interviewed. After the collapse of the Ben Ali regime in January 2011, insecurity in Tunisia persisted for several days, due to the destruction of a large number of police stations and the withdrawal of police from the street. At that point, alongside the army, neighbourhood committees called Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution sprung up throughout the country to ensure the safety of inhabitants. One month later, these same committees pledged Tunisia's solidarity with all migrants fleeing Libya, before the arrival of international aid and relief organisations.

Throughout our interviews, returnees in the different Egyptian governorates repeated their appreciation of the assistance provided by the Tunisian population and schools, which hosted migrants upon arrival in the country (E-FGD-04). An interviewee in Sohag provided an account of the experience of Egyptian returnees in Tunisia:

“When we arrived in Tunisia, we felt at home. We were met with food and shelter. The Red Cross helped us contact our families by phone. So did the Tunisian army, families and volunteers.” (E-FGD-03)

Another expressed particular thanks for the concern demonstrated by Tunisian army officers, who even suggested that a hunger strike by the stranded Egyptian migrants might be an effective way to draw the attention of the Egyptian government to their situation. According to that same interviewee, local business owners provided food for returnees (E-FGD-04).

Many local NGOs lent support to migrants in the emergency phase (from March 2011). In particular, we identified accommodations and health care for migrants, as well as rescue and care of sea disaster survivors, by the Tunisian Red Crescent, Caritas, the Danish Refugee Council and Mercy Corps. Food and livelihood aid was provided by the Tunisian Union for Social Solidarity. Health care and medical services were supplied by Médecins du Monde and Médecins Sans Frontières. There was advice and legal assistance from Maison du Droit et Migrations (the House of Law and Migration) and associated France Terre d’Asile, the regional office of the Arab Institute of Human Rights (IADH) and the Beity Association to Support Women Victims of Violence. Awareness and monitoring in the fight against human trafficking was conducted by Avocats Sans Frontières.

Numerous NGOs operated in the Choucha transit camp under the aegis of UNHCR. The role of the Tunisian Red Crescent was to liaise between UNHCR and refugees and asylum seekers in urban areas. Tunisian Red Crescent also provided protection and urgent treatment for vulnerable persons. The Danish Refugee Council provided cultural and educational activities in the camp, undertook preparatory actions for resettlement (information, language courses, lessons on the culture of the host country, preparations for interviews, legal aid and administrative support). The international medical corps provided care and psychological support for camp residents. Islamic Relief Worldwide provided logistical, sanitary and food preparation assistance in the camp.

ICRC was the first to assist the Tunisian Red Crescent on the ground at the borders. It provided blankets, mattresses and food. Tunisian Red Crescent also collaborated with ICRC to reconnect migrants and their families, for example, by providing SIM cards.

The Tunisian Red Crescent and Islamic Relief Worldwide played significant roles in providing for the immediate needs of arrivals, including those arriving after the initial emergency. All of the leaders and stakeholders spoken to by our researchers lauded the Tunisian Red Crescent as the central player in

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194 It is a branch of the organisation Tunisie Terre d’Asile. Active from 2012–2013, this organisation has not contributed in helping migrants in 2011. It has actually set to work the ADEM program (Accompanying and defending migrants) which aims at consolidating and reinforcing the means and strategy of civil society organisations in terms of the rights of migrants, refugees, unaccompanied minors and also victims of trafficking.
the humanitarian operations for vulnerable migrants in Tunisia, whether they came from Libya or elsewhere. Annex 2 describes their work and areas of action in more detail.

Strong partnerships between NGOs and civil society associations facilitated the relief effort. The different organisations came into action at different times, considering the ongoing nature of the arrivals fleeing Libya:

- The Tunisian Red Crescent, Islamic Relief, Danish Refugee Council and Médecins Sans Frontières launched their activities in 2011 and were still active at the time of this research.
- The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Red Crescent and Qatar Red Crescent launched their activities in 2011 but stopped at the fall of the Gaddafi regime in October 2011.
- Various organisations launched activities after 2011. These included France Terre d’Asile (2014), Médecins du Monde (2015) and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (in 2015). All these continued to be active up to the time of this writing.
- The Euro-Mediterranean Network for Human Rights, the Tunis Centre for Migration and Asylum (CeTuMA), the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES), Borderline and Migreurope developed intermittent activities.

The presence of such large numbers of migrants in Tunisia, coupled with the 2011 uprisings in the country, which had triggered significant civil society activism, prompted increased advocacy by Tunisian actors on migrant rights. Thousands of new NGOs were established in Tunisia to promote greater dignity, freedom and human rights – including for migrants in Tunisia and for Tunisians abroad. Civil society activism on migration before 2011 was limited.

Prior to the closure of the Choucha transit camp in June 2013, NGOs had already expressed serious concern about UNHCR’s decision to reject some refugee claims. Newly established Tunisian associations, together with transnational networks and organisations, put the rights of refugees at the Choucha camp high on their agenda. Among others, the Article 13 Association, inspired by Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was founded in the summer of 2012 in Tunis by a group of young women previously active in university groups and other human rights associations. They began to self-organise around questions of freedom of movement and refugee rights within Tunisia. Established organisations not specialised in migration also incorporated these kinds of issues into their overall human rights agenda. Among the most prominent at the time were the Tunisian League for Human Rights (la Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme, LTDH) and, on workers’ rights, the Union General des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), the country’s main trade union. Women’s organisations, such as the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (l’Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocratiques, ATFD) and the Association of Tunisian Women for Development Research (l’Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Développement, AFTURD) occasionally addressed the cause of migrant and refugee women within their scope of actions.

FTDES, CeTuMA and LTDH have organised conferences and published press releases to raise awareness of the obligations of the Tunisian government, UNHCR and the NATO member states involved in the war in Libya. In addition, migrants from Choucha and the Tunisian solidarity associations have been in contact with organisations and networks in Europe which collect funds and raise awareness of the situation in Choucha. Organisations such as Migreurope, Boat4People, Borderline, the Euro-Mediterranean Network for Human Rights, FTDES and the International Refugee Rights Initiative have organised campaigns denouncing UNHCR decisions.

195 At the end of the resettlement stage of more than 3,500 refugees, the DRC has redeployed its activities to Libya since 2013, but had to come back to Tunisia and re-opened its representative office in Tunis since the resumption of the war in Libya since 2014.
197 For example: Afrique-Europe-Interact; Boat4People; Welcome to Europe; Borderline Europe and Forschungsstelle für Flucht und Migration (FFM). For current events, such as the day of transnational protest in Tunisia in September 2013 or the protest in front of the conference of the ministries of interior in Germany in December 2013, see: http://chouchaprotest.noblogs.org/ & www.afrique-europe-interact.net.
Some associations working on the ground with new migrant arrivals have developed recent initiatives, since 2015, to define the specific roles of the involved organisations. As such, a grassroots network of associations was created to point migrants to organisations that could meet their specific needs: Maison du Droit et Migrations for legal aid; Médecins du Monde, Médecins Sans Frontières and the Red Crescent of Medenine for medical care. NGOs active on migration have organised meetings to set up a reference tool to strengthen their capacities and responses to migrants’ needs through a CSOs network. Some states have participated in these meetings, including representatives of Swiss and French cooperation in Tunisia (TU-C-04).

6.6.2. Intergovernmental Organisations

UNHCR and IOM were the main actors dealing with migrants stranded in Tunisia due to the Libya crisis. UNHCR administered the Choucha transit camp and provided for the needs of those residing in the camp, both migrants and refugees. Outside the camp, IOM took main responsibility for providing for migrants’ needs, especially those who were to be repatriated. IOM provided accommodations, food and transport, in coordination with the Tunisian authorities. Both IOM and UNHCR were still active in Tunisia at the time of this writing.

The EU delegation in Tunis was involved to a certain extent. It provided grants for local projects to protect and support migrants and refugees, and it backed actions, coordination and dialogue among humanitarian actors. Eventually, the EU delegation also played a role in formulation of a new Tunisian contingency plan to provide for a better response if a new migration crisis were to arise.

UNHCR. In collaboration with IOM, UNHCR was able to evacuate 30,000 non-Tunisian nationals from Tunisia. A third of them were migrants from Bangladesh and Ghana who opted to return voluntarily to their country of origin. They were accordingly registered and transported from the Choucha transit camp to the airport in Djerba, from which they were taken home on 150 flights. These emergency evacuations reduced pressure on the limited humanitarian capacities available on the border with Libya in the first months of the crisis. From the start of the emergency operation, UNHCR produced daily situation reports, tracking the numbers crossing the border and being evacuated (referencing IOM figures), and numbers of registrations at the transit centres and camps.

After the return and repatriation of the vast majority of migrants who fled Libya, the fall of the Libyan regime and the return of hundreds of Libyan refugees to their country, only the Choucha transit camp remained active, under UNHCR protection and supported by Tunisian and international organisations. Through coordination with other national and international organisations, UNHCR provided for the basic needs of the migrants in Tunisia, such as food, care and accommodations. Emergency teams were deployed to conduct interviews for refugee status determination. In the initial years (2011-2013), nearly 4,000 asylum applications were processed and most of resettlement submissions were made. As a second step, resettlement was implemented for the overwhelming majority of the refugees.

UNHCR ran the Choucha transit camp until its closure in June 2013. Thereafter, support services were (and still are) provided in the Ibn Khaldoun Foyer in Medenine by UNHCR subcontractors such as Islamic Relief, the Tunisian Red Crescent and the Danish Refugee Council. As far as health care is concerned, UNHCR has assisted hospitals in the region. It provided medical equipment, ambulances, radiology equipment and medicines worth about 65,000 dinars (EUR 26,700) to the hospital in Medenine (TU-C-02). UNHCR worked with a reimbursement system based on National Medical Assistance Fund (CNAM) tariffs. Thus, payments had to be advanced, and could then be refunded upon completion of a UNHCR form.

UNHCR also worked with public bodies to facilitate provision of vocational training to refugees without training or skills, to ease their integration. Migrants were also registered in the Tunisian educational system to learn Arabic and French:

“What we want to do is to make the work formal as much as possible for the refugees in Tunisia while awaiting the legislation so they are in ‘normal situation’ and can to some extent benefit from assistance from the UNCHR.” (TU-I-02)

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As Tunisia has no asylum law, the UNHCR offices in Tunis and Zarzis continued to scrutinise cases of new asylum seekers arriving in Tunisia by land (via Libya and sometimes via Algeria) and by sea, often rescued in Tunisian territorial waters and brought to land. These people were not displaced by the 2011 crisis but rather by the renewed violence in Libya and attacks on migrants since 2014.

IOM. Embassies in Libya without the means to evacuate their citizens (e.g., Egypt, Bangladesh and many sub-Saharan African countries) contacted IOM for help in repatriating their nationals via Tunisia. IOM organised travel and covered the associated costs, with international funding. The repatriation operation was one of IOM’s largest humanitarian operations to date. Indeed, IOM assisted in the repatriation of 180,000 migrants from Tunisia from March to May 2011 (TU-I-03).

Despite having a presence in Tunisia before 2011, IOM had to deploy new means to meet the massive needs of the migrant stream. Training programmes in delivering health care to migrants were developed during the crisis, and delivered jointly with the Tunisian Ministry of Health and WHO. Beneficiaries of this training were NGOs working in health care for migrants and hospital administrative staff. IOM was asked to provide assistance both in the south and in cities farther north (e.g., in Sfax and Tunis) if the flows grew more massive. After 2014, IOM was involved in elaboration of the Tunisian contingency plan.

In 2015, IOM Libya, with the help of the Libyan Red Crescent, organised an operation to evacuate 560 Senegalese migrants to the Tunisian border by bus, after which charter flights brought them to Dakar. Some of these migrants were detained, however, because of their irregular status. To remedy the situation, the Senegalese Embassy and IOM office in Tunisia joined forces with the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Tunisian border police to organise identification, issuance of travel documents and screening of the Senegalese when they reached the border.

6.6.3. Private Sector

Businesses. Between 2011 and 2013, it was relatively easy for migrants to gain employment from private sector employers:

“We always received phone calls from entrepreneurs asking if there were any refugees who needed help and saying they were willing to hire them.” (TU-C-01)

Businesspeople helped by sending blankets and food convoys. One businessman sent a milk truck every day in 2011, until the Tunisian Red Crescent had to ask him to stop because it had sufficient stocks (TU-C-02). Since 2014, private companies seeking to help migrants have become scarcer. In 2015, a supermarket chain gave the Tunisian Red Crescent use of an abandoned warehouse in Medenine to serve as a dormitory for migrants rescued from the sea (TU-C-02). However, it had to be closed because of the disrepair of the building and because conflicts arose between local residents and the migrants.

Smuggling networks. In the years since the official closure of the Choucha transit camp, dozens of refugees, including those who refused to leave the camp, have made use of the risky services of smugglers, who are very active in the border region and in the western port cities of Libya. Zuwara, particularly, has been a main departure point in Libya, both before and after 2011. Some of the migrants who fled Libya in 2011 and continued to occupy the camp have become intermediaries between the smugglers and the refugees and migrants rescued at sea and hosted in the cities. With their considerable knowledge of the area and of modes of travel in the border region, the smugglers are quick to offer services to move migrants back across the border to the embarkation points in Libya where they can set off for the Italian coast (TU-C-02).

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201 The years 2012 and 2013 were characterised by a weak presence of public authorities and a weak implementation of laws.

Few migrants who fled Libya in 2011 reported being victims of smuggling or trafficking networks (TU-C-02; TU-M-11, Senegal; TU-M-35, Sudan; TU-M-36, Eritrea; TU-M-37, Congo; TU-M-38, Benin; TU-M-39, Sudan; TU-M-40, Côte d’Ivoire; TU-M-41, Sudan; TU-M-44, Eritrea). We do know that these networks were active before 2011. However, they seem to have been well controlled by the former Libyan regime, which used its ability to keep them in check as means to put pressure on Italy and the EU in the fight against irregular migration. In our research, it was mainly migrants who had fled Libya since 2014 who reported use of such networks on several routes (see also: TU-C-02); from their country of origin to Libya (TU-M-36); from Libya to the Italian coast (TU-M-37, Congo); and from Tunisia to the Italian coast after first crossing the Tunisia-Libya land border irregularly.

Since 2014, many migrants in Tunisia affected by the Libya crisis have experienced first-hand the perils of the sea crossing. That is to say, they were rescued or intercepted in Tunisian territorial waters by the Tunisian navy and returned to the ports of Sfax, Zarzis or El-Ketef. The surge of insecurity and criminality in Libya has created an enabling environment for human smugglers to operate, as has been well documented in recent years. The smuggling networks have benefited from the chaos and absence of authority to attract migrants and refugees stranded in Tunisia and seeking to cross to Italy. This includes, in particular, rejected asylum seekers, refugees who have not been resettled, sea survivors brought to land in Tunisia and migrants arrested at the land border with Libya while attempting to cross into Libya in order to embark to Italy. Those in this last group are often sentenced to one month in prison and then entrusted to one of the regional committees of the Tunisian Red Crescent in Medenine, Zarzis or Ben Gardane. Having irregular status already, they begin seeking an irregular way to depart. If arrested again, they are taken directly to the Ouardiya Detention Centre in Tunis where they may spend months before being deported to their country of origin (TU-C-02).

Fees for crossings range up to US$ 2,000 to US$ 3,500, with no guarantee of success. If the crossing fails for any reason, migrants must return to the Tunisian border on their own, often under difficult and dangerous conditions:

“We even tried to reach European countries. We paid 2,000 TND [EUR 826] to a smuggler to go but we couldn’t get there. The boat was about to sink so we went back. The smuggler told us that he would change the ship, but he took the money and didn’t bring us. We were also expelled from the house. I got a taxi from Sabratha to Zliten on the border with Tunisia. I paid 70 TND [EUR 29]. The route to Tunisia was hard. We snuck through the desert. We walked for five hours at night to reach Tunisia. The Tunisian National Guard arrested us for a month, but we were not ill-treated in prison.” (TU-M-28, Sudan)

Migrant women are particularly exposed to all forms of violence and abuse: kidnapping, repeated rape, assault and injury. This is also true within the smuggling, trafficking and other criminal networks that operate along the routes to and via Libya. One migrant interviewed for our research testified to being raped on repeated occasions along her journey (TU-M-36, Eritrea).

### 6.6.4. States

**Setting up camps in 2011.** Several camps were set up in southern Tunisia between February and May 2011:

- The Choucha transit camp, set up by UNHCR, opened on 24 February 2011 and served all nationalities.
- The Emirati camp in Ras Jdir was set up 13 March 2011 and provided temporary shelter to people awaiting repatriation assistance to their countries of origin.
- The El Hayet camp, set up by IFRC, opened on 6 April 2011 and provided temporary shelter to people awaiting repatriation assistance to their countries of origin.

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205 UNHCR (1 August 2011).
- The Remada camp, sponsored by UNHCR, was set up on a football field and opened on 10 April 2011 to accommodate Libyan refugees.
- The Emirati camp in Dhehiba began operations on 13 April 2011. It was set up by the UAE Red Crescent to provide food, water, shelter and healthcare services to up to 2,000 people. It hosted Libyan refugees and provided temporary shelter to people awaiting repatriation assistance to their countries of origin.
- The Qatari camp, set up by the Qatari government in Tataouine, opened on 23 April 2011 and hosted Sudanese migrants.
- The Save the Children camp was set up in Ras Jdir by UNICEF and began operations on 9 May 2011.

At the camps, reception, screening, health care, housing and various social services were arranged by international organisations under UNHCR coordination. Foreign countries contributed different kinds of aid. Morocco, for example, set up a military hospital. Switzerland supported repatriation and local integration and provided funding for the Tunisian Red Crescent, UNHCR and IOM. Qatar provided medical assistance to displaced migrants and Libyans. All camps except Choucha were closed by October 2011.

**Tunisian authorities.** Tunisian authorities, particularly the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs and local authorities in the southern region, launched their activities in 2011, and they continued up to the time of this writing. Public authorities provided services such as protection (army/Ministry of Defence), social assistance (the Civil Protection Department of the Ministry of the Interior), health care (the Ministry of Public Health), buses for transporting migrants from the border to the transit camps and from camps to the Djerba-Zarzis airport (the Ministry of Transport).

The Ministry of Social Affairs played a leading role in managing the crisis in southern Tunisia, alongside the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence. It was the Ministry of Social Affairs that coordinated the interdepartmental meetings of the Southern Migration Working Group. That group coordinated all actions undertaken by public authorities in association with national organisations (e.g., Tunisian Red Crescent and Tunisian Union for Social Solidarity) and international organisations (e.g., UNHCR, IOM and Islamic Relief Worldwide). The governorate of Medenine, as the regional authority headquarters, handled working group logistics and organisation of the meetings, especially after all regional administration (including security, health and social affairs) was placed under the governor’s authority. The group met regularly, as needed, during the crisis, to discuss the evacuation and resettlement operations, incidents in the border area, management of Choucha, including its closure in June 2013, and other concerns. Its activities winded down in 2014, with the resumption of the Libyan civil war and implementation of the in 2014 adopted contingency plan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs helped link Tunisia’s external partners with local ones. As such, the Ministry facilitated implementation of international organisation programmes to meet the needs of the migrants who fled from Libya to Tunisia starting in 2011. From the onset of the crisis, it coordinated contacts with foreign embassies to smooth the issuance of travel documents to citizens stranded in Tunisia, facilitating their repatriation. Eventually, the Ministry opened an office at the Ras Jdir border crossing. This outpost served as a platform for contacts between embassies and NGOs, national and international organisations and the Tunisian government (especially the Ministry of the Interior, local authorities in the governorate of Medenine and the Ministry of Public Health) (TU-A-04). The Ministry also worked with governorate authorities to assist in migrant repatriation. The office hosted preparatory meetings for formulation of the contingency plan that was adopted and implemented in 2014 and 2015 (TU-A-04).

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206 UNHCR (2011).
207 UNHCR (1 August 2011).
209 Tunisia was under the emergency state after the fall of Ben Ali regime, Libya was in war and the borders area was a zone of gathering of migrants fleeing the war, including Libyan citizens.
210 Such as emergency operations and medical assistance.
211 A committee bringing together partners of the migrants’ assistance in the South of Tunisia since 2011.
Thousands of migrants and refugees needed to be housed during the first weeks of the 2011 crisis. The Ministry of Youth and Education provided shelter in youth and school dormitories in all major cities and towns in southern Tunisia: Ben Gardane, Zarzis, Djerba, Medenine, Tataouine, Remada, Dhehiba, Ghomrassen and Gabès. Some ministries provided UNHCR other accommodation facilities. The Ministry for Women, Family and Children, for example, made shelters available for vulnerable refugees and minors in Remada, Sfax and Tunis.

From the start of the crisis, the Ministry of Public Health was involved as the public agency with jurisdiction in matters related to preventive and curative health in the border area. Indeed, many health-related concerns arose, due to the massive influx of migrants as well as the arrival of those wounded in the war (TU-A-01). Among the arriving migrant workers, the main health problems encountered were fatigue and exhaustion, since many had travelled long distances on foot. Post-traumatic stress was also common, due to the deaths of relatives or friends and separation from and disappearance of loved ones. There were also chronic illnesses such as hypertension and diabetes that had gone untreated for weeks because of the unavailability of medications. The Ministry established three “front lines” to provide medical and sanitary services upon reception, covering the different regions.212

To respond to the health-related risks, a crisis management unit was set up in the regional Health Department, operating through an emergency medical unit and the Strategic Health Operation Centre (SHOC), which has been in existence since 2009. SHOC was equipped and prepared for emergencies, with the support of the WHO. It set up first in Zarzis and then moved to Medenine in 2016. There was also a local medical unit at the Choucha transit camp. Migrants arriving at the border received health care provided through coordinated action by the Civil Protection Department and humanitarian organisations, especially the Tunisian Red Crescent, Islamic Relief Worldwide and the Danish Refugee Council. The Military Health Department, under the Ministry of Defence, was also involved from the start of the crisis. It was especially active in treating the wounded from Libya and channelling the wounded from the border area to the most appropriate healthcare providers. The Directorate of Hygiene and Environment was responsible for hygiene screening and monitoring in the camps, for example, regarding migrant housing conditions, water and sanitation.

Various other actors were involved in both curative and preventive health care during the crisis:

- The Civil Protection Department, under the Ministry of the Interior, provided emergency services and medical assistance.
- Public health institutions in Tunisia, both hospitals and private clinics, were central actors in management of the crisis. Security forces often called the Tunisian Red Crescent and regional health directorate to arrange medical care for migrants arriving in particularly poor condition.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided coordination and intermediation between the Tunisian authorities, embassies and international organisations (TU-A-01; TU-A-04).
- The Ministry of the Interior, represented at the regional level by the governor, chaired a migrant monitoring committee for coordination and exchange of information between the various stakeholders (TU-A-02).
- The Ministry of Social Affairs coordinated social services in regard to the care and protection of minors, education and integration of children in schools.
- The Ministry of Culture supervised educational programmes in hygiene and health, and also produced public announcements and awareness-raising posters.

This involvement peaked from March to May 2011, when the crisis was at its worst.

**Tunisian contingency plan (2014).** In the realisation that such an influx from Libya could occur again, Tunisian authorities worked with national and international partners – mainly NGOs and intergovernmental organisations – to prepare a joint plan for potential future migration and humanitarian crises. That interagency contingency plan was adopted in May 2014 by UNHCR Tunisia and other UN agencies, IOM and the Red Crescent. The plan provides a management tool for refugee

212 The first line covering the south border areas of Ras Jdir (Medenine Governorate) and Dhehiba (Tataouine Governorate), with the sanitary structures of these two governorates; the second line, with sanitary structures of Gabes and Sfax; and the third line, in the north, covering Sahel, Kairouan, and Tunis.
crisis preparedness and response. It was first implemented in 2014-2015, determining every actor’s tasks, as well as the timing and locations of actions (TU-A-01; TU-I-02; TU-I-03). The objective of the plan is adequate reception of new arrivals, both overland and rescued from sea. Implementation is coordinated by the Tunisian national government, with responsibilities shared among the actors involved in crisis and emergency response.

No detailed information on the plan was available from the Tunisian government, either via interviews or institutional websites, except that it is coordinated by a dedicated national committee (TU-A-01). According to UNHCR,\(^{213}\) the plan foresees a three-month implementation period and two scenarios: a probable scenario and a worst-case scenario. The idea is to update the plan regularly, as emergency situations evolve. The overall response strategy applied is an alternative to the camp approach; that is, displaced people are to be hosted in collective shelters and communities in cities and rural areas. The plan favours cash-based interventions, deeming them most suitable for the urban context, given also the potential positive impacts of cash support on local economies and communities. These positive effects are recognised as helping to mitigate tensions between displaced persons and host populations. The contingency plan is tailored to the demographics of southern Tunisia, as well as its level of urban and social development. The strategy is to ensure that existing infrastructures and services can accommodate a sudden increase in population. The plan was developed through a collaborative process, and was said to have the full buy-in of the government, humanitarian organisations and other relevant partners.

7. Policy Learning

Crises such as the one in Libya starting in 2011 have been the subject of extensive investigation and recommendations. Nonetheless, stakeholders have often failed to take lessons learnt on board. Or perhaps processes of learning ‘from’ and ‘for’ crises require considerable time to be adequately implemented. This study identified a number of weaknesses in stakeholders’ preparedness for the 2011 crisis in Libya. Now, six years after the crisis began, most of these weaknesses have not yet been effectively addressed. A number of these weaknesses are particularly serious, considering the ongoing security situation in Libya:

- There is still a general absence of policies for evacuation of nationals caught up in situations of conflict.
- Migration policy is weak or absent, particularly in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Niger.
- Many gaps remain in migration data and real-time access to information on current migrants, as well as on migrant flows, though such data is crucial for effective crisis response and future contingency planning.
- Employment opportunities remain inadequate in both countries of origin for returnees and countries of transit for stranded migrants, and there is little availability of psychosocial support to help returnees work through traumatic experiences.

In the aftermath of the 2011 Libya crisis, a number of new laws and contingency plans were drafted. New budget lines were created for action in emergencies, and new departments or ad hoc committees were set up for future crisis policy and response. However, these novelties have not been immediately applicable to the persistent Libya crisis, and some have remained entirely unimplemented due to lack of funding.

Data challenges, particularly, have yet to be comprehensively addressed, years after the initial crisis. Some worthwhile steps have been taken by or with support of ICMPD, in the framework of the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (the Rabat Process). In Burkina Faso, for example, a guide to migration data was developed covering the 2013-2015 period. It identifies data holders and users, provides a directory of collected and missing data and suggests a roadmap for improving the data situation.\(^{214}\) In Ghana, similarly, ICMPD contracted the Centre for Migration Studies of the University of Ghana to draft a user manual on migration data collection and use, again in the framework of the Rabat Process.\(^{215}\)

As noted in section six, on institutional responses, there is little clarity about who is responsible for coordinating evacuation and repatriation, what roles particular agencies should play and which ministries and departments should lead the procedures. This ambiguity delayed evacuations of vulnerable migrants from Libya, putting them at additional risk.

The Libya crisis has highlighted the importance of establishing high-level, coordinated responses early on. None of the countries studied in the current research had a policy in place for evacuation, repatriation and reintegration of return migrants. Yet, these tasks needed to be done in collaboration, executed by diverse stakeholders in different spaces. Our fieldwork pointed to the multiple agencies involved in responding to a crisis like that in Libya. Interventions were typically led by IOM and UNHCR. Tunisia’s newly developed contingency plan, detailing roles and responsibilities in such an emergency, represents an important step forward in that country’s crisis response capacity.

This section examines policy gaps and lessons from the various countries studied, organised according to three stakeholder groups: (1) national authorities, (2) intergovernmental organisations and civil society actors, and (3) the EU.


7.1. States and Crisis Management

All countries examined in this study, both countries of origin and the country of transit, promoted some kind of response to the return or arrival of migrants and stranded migrants. In most cases, however, plans were hindered by lack of funding, concurrent crises – whether in the country of origin or in other destination countries of nationals – and lack of a comprehensive, long-term perspective.

The government of Burkina Faso confronted the challenges arising from the returnees from Libya without a strategy. The issue was not perceived as a major national problem. The returns did not generate significant media coverage, perhaps because of their relatively small numbers, and IOM more than the Burkina Faso state took responsibility for the evacuations. However, later migrant returns from countries in crisis – Libya, but even more so, Côte d’Ivoire – did precipitate interdepartmental meetings of government officials to discuss the general issue of protection of Burkinabe citizens in foreign countries. Awareness campaigns were even launched for Burkinabe abroad. However, political crisis in the country forestalled their full implementation.

Lack of policy on migration and citizens abroad increased confusion about roles and responsibilities of stakeholders. In this regard, IOM’s Burkina Faso office has recommended more deliberate management of migration, and development of a national migration strategy. The organisation has also stressed the need for coordination of migration policies and procedures at the national government level, to facilitate harmonised activities and sound decision-making (BF-I-02). However, as of this writing, no concrete measures in this direction had yet been taken.

In Chad, a law adopted in 2011 added returnees to the scope of its existing National Commission for the Reception and Reintegration of Refugees (Commission Nationale pour l’Accueil et la Réinsertion des Réfugiés, CONAR), which later became the Chad National Refugee Agency (CNARR). But funding has been insufficient to implement activities. In 2015, Chad elaborated a national plan for reintegration of returnees. However, that plan focuses on short-term reintegration, mainly of Chadian returnees from CAR. It makes no provision for the medium and longer-term reintegration of Chadian returnees from Libya, as this was one of the CNARR goals. Regardless, that plan too has not been operationalised. In the face of other pressing state priorities, the government has been unable to mobilise the needed funds (CH-I-03).

An absence of policy on migration was similarly evident during the evacuation of Ghanaian migrants from Libya in 2011. The terms of the collaboration between government departments and intergovernmental and international agencies such as IOM, UNHCR and ICRC were not immediately clear. In April 2016, Ghana did launch a national migration policy to provide a comprehensive framework for migration management. That policy enjoins stakeholders to “draft guidelines for the evacuation of Ghanaian nationals abroad, during situations of political crisis, deportation or natural disaster”.

However, no detailed, specific policy had yet been formulated as of this writing. Nonetheless, inclusion of this enjoinder, in the section on return, readmission and reintegration of emigrant Ghanaians, was certainly informed by mass returns to the country from Libya in 2011, among others.

Ghana’s disaster management organisation, NADMO, has drafted a bill to create, among other things, what is referred to as the Disaster Management Fund, to boost its funding base and thus enable a better response to disasters in the future. If adopted, it would create a facility for donors to contribute funds into a central account, available prior to a disaster happening. Another relevant NADMO initiative is its promotion of returnee associations. As noted previously, this has led to creation of several returnee groups, organised along ethnic, political and religious lines. Nonetheless, six years after the crisis, the country still had no facility for receiving large numbers of nationals in a crisis.

In Egypt, there have been few significant developments in policies targeting migrants and returnees since the 2011 crisis. However, lessons learned were mentioned on occasion during our interviews with stakeholders. A representative of an international NGO said that it was developing contingency plans for Egyptian migrants in Libya. An interviewee from an intergovernmental organisation working with returnees said that the organisation’s work had been particularly challenging because of the lack...

of any prospect of cooperation from ministerial bodies. The employment service and compensation programmes set up by the government for returnees from Libya have both largely failed, first in the aftermath of the 2011 crisis and then again in 2015. An interviewee from an intergovernmental organisation noted that the Egyptian government has shifted its attention away from issues of irregular migration for unskilled labour migration to promote skilled labour migration to boost remittances. One expert interviewee, Ayman Zohry, said that Egyptian returnees from Libya no longer constitute a group “in crisis”:

“[T]heir needs resonate with those of all young Egyptian men [...] [being] prone to migrate. So the interventions should be to encourage them to stay.” (E-E-01)

In Niger, migrant return management was delegated to an ad hoc committee bringing together all stakeholders and located in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet. Following the Libya crisis, the government created several new mechanisms: a humanitarian coordination unit in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, a ministry for humanitarian affairs and a review of contingency plans for integrated migrant management during a crisis. Moreover, the Nigerien government asked IOM for help in managing the returns from Libya (NE-A-01; NE-I-02). Significant policy lessons have been taken on board by both government authorities and intergovernmental organisations, according to an IOM Niger representative:

“As a lesson learned, the [government] authorities became aware of the magnitude of Nigerien migration to Libya. The [government] institutions were reorganised and one feels the government’s desire to manage crises better [...]. At the central level of the state, institutions for managing migration and crises were strengthened. A humanitarian coordination cell in the Prime Minister’s Office was created, and recently a Ministry of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action [was established].” (NE-I-02)

In general, Niger has demonstrated political will to address issues of return migration. But the government lacks the financial, material and human resources to develop and implement all the appropriate policies and strategies. Niger began formulating migration policy in 2007, but that process has stalled because of lack of funding. Representatives of both government and intergovernmental organisations stressed the need for Niger to establish a tailored migration policy to guide responses to crises such as the one in Libya:

“The Ministry of the Interior coordinates the design of a national migration policy. An interministerial committee has been created to this end since 2007 and has conducted several studies on the national profile of migration, and recently a study [was] conducted with a view to developing the [migration] policy. [June 2014] The committee will build on these studies to develop the policy, but the policy has not yet been designed [...]. In terms of human resources, there is a lack of training of law enforcement agents and specialised units on migration.” (NE-A-01)

“The problem is that in Niger there is no migration policy which could facilitate migration management, defining roles and also crisis management.” (NE-I-02)

The High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace in Niger coordinated training activities under an EU-funded project in 2012-2014 to mitigate adverse impacts of mass returns of migrants from Libya. A priority was to prevent the ‘Mali effect’; that is, criminality among returnees arriving with weapons or the knowledge of how to handle weapons. This can be seen as application of a significant lesson from another crisis.

As regards Tunisia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded more quickly and capably following the resumption of the civil war in Libya in 2014 – thanks to the experience gained in the 2011 crisis. Since 2014, the contingency plan has been updated on a three-monthly basis, in line with developments in Libya, refining anew the roles of organisations such as IOM, the Tunisian Red Crescent, UNICEF and UNHCR, and the timing of their interventions. This has strengthened capacities and responses of the CSOs network. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared better prepared than in 2011 to mobilise international partners in a new crisis. In association with IOM and the concerned embassies, it managed to swiftly return Egyptians and Senegalese to their countries after they fled Libya in 2015. However, institutional responses have remained incomplete or insufficient, due to the absence of an asylum law in Tunisia and the consequent lack of a framework for refugee integration. Furthermore, there continues be an absence of public structures specialised in management of humanitarian crises.
The interagency contingency plan has been in place since 2014. It guides responses to migration crises and huge inflows of people, but the small groups of migrants still arriving in Tunisia do not benefit from the plan. These migrants must still rely mainly on their own networks and capacities. There remains a deficit in assistance procedures for asylum seekers and individual evaluations of cases. Moreover, the most active organisation in the field is the Tunisian Red Crescent, whose actions are largely funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. There is concern that when that funding stops, there will be no one left to take charge of assistance to new arrivals.

7.2. International and Societal Actors

The Libya crisis produced important policy lessons for development partners about crisis response and humanitarian assistance, as acknowledged by an interviewee in Chad:

“We learnt about people moving from one site to another, about creation of communication structures and transit centres. […] When a governor who worked in Abéché was redeployed for example, he brought experience on humanitarian issues. He knew what a cluster was, and he knew what humanitarian coordination was. We started capitalising on experience and built human resources for the future.” (CH-I-04)

As regards intergovernmental organisations, the crisis brought enormous amounts of funding for emergency response and assistance, as well as for migration management more generally, particularly for IOM, as the main actor providing for migrants’ needs in the emergency phase in all of the countries under study. IOM established the Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism (MEFM) in 2011, to boost the organisation’s ability to respond quickly, as soon as a crisis erupts. With the MEFM, IOM can bridge the gap between the start of emergency operations and subsequent receipt of donor funds. It has since been utilised in responding to humanitarian crises in Libya, Yemen and Syria.217

IOM has also sought means of targeting its assistance through representations in individual countries. IOM’s Niger office established four transit centres for migrants fleeing Libya. These centres were subsequently strengthened to respond to possible future migration crises, and as of this writing, they were still active in welcoming migrants who had chosen voluntary return (NE-I-02). Reportedly, they were recently used for repatriation of more than 10,000 Nigerians from Algeria (NE-I-02). IOM’s Egypt office was promoting establishment of a National Migration Platform (NMP) to coordinate migration management. Its aim would be to serve all ministerial stakeholders, particularly Foreign Affairs, Interior, Manpower and Labour, Emigration and Expatriate Affairs, International Cooperation and Justice. The platform ideally would provide a venue for discussion “to reach a common understanding and vision on the evolving migration trends and [to] propose solutions to address the same through complementary actions and policies amongst all actors”218.

IOM’s office in Tunisia has pursued long-term responses at two levels: (1) preparation and planning and (2) implementation of plans and role sharing:

“It is not enough to have crisis management experience, but it is also necessary to plan and organise in advance.” (TU-I-03)

IOM has considered ways to accelerate registrations of entry and ensure that adequate conditions are provided to receive migrants in any new crisis. To that end, and in the framework of the Tunisian contingency plan, IOM recently suggested that the Tunisian authorities consider electronic processing of passports and admissions. This is a component of the IOM Humanitarian Border Management programme219 for countries at risk of being confronted with this type of migratory and humanitarian emergency.

219 “The International Organization for Migration (IOM)’s Humanitarian Border Management (HBM) programme recognises the need for appropriate border management responses at times of humanitarian crisis arising from both natural and man-made disasters. HBM activities aim to improve preparedness and responses to protect those who cross borders in emergencies, as well as to ensure that the security of the border is maintained”. See:
UNHCR was an important actor in all of the countries studied, particularly in Tunisia. It has suggested changes in the way authorities deal with refugees and asylum seekers. Providing refugees ordinary resident status in Tunisia is the one of the goals of UNHCR’s partnership with Tunisia.

At the civil society level, CSOs have developed projects to assist in reintegration and provide psychosocial support for returnees and stranded migrants, with increasing attention to issues of migrant rights. CSOs have become more vocal in leading advocacy for migrants and encouraging migrants to organise themselves in associations to defend their rights. These efforts were particularly evident in the fieldwork in Niger and Tunisia. In Tunisia, the Choucha transit camp became a focal point for activism involving many Tunisian and international NGOs defending the rights of migrants and refugees.

7.3. Crisis and EU Migration Management

The 2011 Libya crisis, and since 2014, the Libyan civil war, have accelerated migrants’ efforts to cross the Mediterranean from Libya. Many European policymakers have responded by focusing on border control; due also to other concurrent crises, such as that in Syria, which have produced large refugee flows bound for the EU in recent years. Having to deal with several crises in a fairly short period has induced the EU to push ahead in cooperation with Libya on border management while stimulating greater emphasis on migration agreements with North African countries, though it must be noted that both these aspects were part of the EU’s pre-2011 strategy as well.

After the fall of Gaddafi, the EU initiated a border assistance mission, EUBAM (EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission), in Libya. However, the operation came into action too late, and its activities have been rendered impossible by the increased intensity of fighting in Libya. Moreover, it has been defined as purely technical assistance; that is, capacity building to transfer customs and border security expertise to the Libyans. EUBAM-Libya’s initial mandate was for two years, but it has been extended twice and is now slated run until 21 August 2017.

The Libya crisis being only one factor among others, a major outcome of the 2015 EU Valletta Summit on Migration was the launch of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to address regional migration and cross-border challenges. It targets three geographical areas: the Sahel and Lake Chad region, the Horn of Africa and Northern Africa. The trust fund covers all of the countries selected for this study except Ghana. The EU has also worked to establish migration partnerships with countries of origin and transit. Some of the countries studied here have been involved in these partnerships to various extents, for example, in border management programmes (Burkina Faso), in migration cooperation agreements (Ghana and Niger) and in dialogues to pursue common understandings (Egypt and Tunisia). At the regional level, a cooperation framework was being developed with EU


support as a follow-up to a June 2016 trilateral meeting on border management involving the foreign ministers of Libya, Niger and Chad.\textsuperscript{226}

On 3 February 2017, the 28 EU heads of state and government held an informal meeting in Malta to discuss the ‘external dimension of migration’. They adopted the Malta Declaration, concerning measures to stem the flow of migration along the Central Mediterranean route, particularly from Libya to Italy.\textsuperscript{227} In particular, the need for increased cooperation with the Libyan authorities (the government based in Tobruk) was emphasised.\textsuperscript{228} Priorities outlined in the Malta Declaration include supporting the Libyan coast guard, disrupting human smuggling operations and supporting local community development in Libya. In line with the findings of the current research regarding the key role of both UNHCR and IOM in crisis response in the Libyan context, EU leaders called for increased cooperation with UNHCR and IOM. Their added value was particularly recognised in reception capacity for migrants, in information campaigns aimed at migrants and in voluntary returns. Finally, the Malta meeting emphasised the need for cross-border cooperation between neighbouring countries and for improved border management abilities in Libya, to reduce the pressure on its land borders.\textsuperscript{229} All these developments have clearly been fuelled by the ongoing crisis in Libya and the ensuing migratory flows from the country.

Thus, while the EU provided support in the midst of the 2011 crisis, in the face of the continued upheaval, its policy responses have evolved towards support for post-crisis recovery.\textsuperscript{230} There has also been a clear shift away from emergency responses towards strengthening the border management capacities of Libya and other Northern African countries, in the hope of reducing migratory flows across the Mediterranean Sea.

8. Conclusions

This report has synthesised themes and challenges emerging from research on migrants caught in the 2011 Libya crisis in five selected countries of origin (Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ghana and Niger) and one country of transit (Tunisia). All of the migrants interviewed were affected by the sudden outburst in 2011 of violence against foreign nationals. Migrants were accused of being mercenaries. They became targets of xenophobic and racial attacks. They were harassed, intimidated and physically abused by Libyan citizens and militias. Thieves stole their entire savings. Migrants’ positioning within the host country society prior to the crisis determined to a large extent the options available to them during the crisis. The majority of the migrants interviewed for this research had irregular legal status and were engaged in unskilled or low-skilled work.

When the crisis erupted, migrant interviewees reported manifold ways of fleeing, from self-organised trips to IOM-arranged evacuations and transport provided by smugglers. They left on foot or by bus, taxi, plane or ship. Most migrants lost their savings and livelihoods as a result of the crisis. Upon their return, they became dependent on relatives’ financial support. In the households and communities they returned to, they were no longer a source of remittances but became instead an economic burden.

In general, we can cluster returnees into three categories depending on their time of return. The first category is migrants who returned for fear the crisis would escalate, that is, before the violence erupted. This category was clearest in the Nigerian sample, and consisted mainly of migrants working in western companies. Employers were quick to warn their workers, and they helped cover the cost of employees’ travel home. The second category is those who returned during the crisis. These are the most numerous, in part because they were the target sample of this research. Considerable suffering was reported by this group. It was particularly during their attempts to flee Libya that the humanitarian agencies got involved in organising returns and assisting migrants. The final category is those who returned after the immediate crisis. These, too, were very numerous, as the situation in Libya remained unstable.

We also detected truncated migrations.231 Migrants who had just arrived in Libya in 2011-2012 or thereafter had to cut short their stay and return quickly to their country of origin because of the crisis. They, like many migrants before them, had often borrowed money from family or friends to pay for their migration journey. Thus, their immediate return placed them in debt, even more than those who had been able to work in Libya for months or years before the crisis erupted.

The crisis had immediate and long-term effects on the socio-economic status of migrants and their families. The most difficult problem returnees currently face is lack of employment and income, linked to their loss of jobs in Libya. Furthermore, some migrants and their families had to borrow money to pay for the emergency return journey. Many migrants, furthermore, lost savings and property during their escape. Once home, their families experienced an abrupt drop in household income because of the halt of remittance streams. In some cases, loss of income has made returnees financially dependent on older family members. This support has been accompanied by feelings of failure and shame, leading some to gravitate to the relative anonymity of capital cities.

Returns have thus led to deteriorated living conditions, increased food insecurity and greater household expenses. Under these circumstances, one of the most common strategies adopted by families has been to sell animals and other possessions, though loss of such assets makes households more vulnerable to food insecurity. The loss of income has had longer-term effects too for returnees and their families. Returnees have struggled with depression, loss of access to health care and reduced educational opportunities for children. Frustration, stress and trauma among the migrants who were caught in the Libya conflict have sometimes manifested in anti-social behaviour. Some families reported domestic violence following a migrant’s return. Thus, the conflict can be said to have affected migrants’ family members through losses of remittance income, dependence of returnees on meagre household resources, the burden of catering for depressed and seriously ill returnees and estrangements within households due to accusations of mismanagement of remittances. These pressures have triggered acrimony, separations between spouses and reduced social mobility for some.

As for the migrants stranded in Tunisia, the consequences of the crisis varied widely, depending on migrants’ legal status and the duration of their stay in Tunisia. Migrants fleeing Libya in 2011-2012 faced long asylum procedures, and hundreds were denied refugee status. Stranded migrants who were not recognised as refugees found themselves in limbo, due to the absence of a legal framework for their stay in the country. If they stayed, they had no prospect of obtaining legal residence status and being integrated into the labour market. If they migrated back to Libya, or onward to Italy, they risked arrest and deportation. These migrants were disheartened by their own situation and disillusioned with the support provided by the humanitarian organisations that had previously assisted them. More recent migrants, those who arrived in Tunisia in 2015 and 2016, were still receiving humanitarian assistance and hopeful of finding their way in the country.

Being considered a safe country, migrants fled to Tunisia in 2011, and they continued to arrive in 2017, in the wake of the most recent escalation of violence in Libya. The turbulent regional context – with conflicts in Mali, Libya and elsewhere – and Tunisia’s central geographical position have led institutional actors in the country to take significant steps to prepare for future humanitarian crises and be able to respond quickly to the needs of people on the move.

In none of the study countries did migrant interviewees report any substantial long-term reintegration support from government. Most returnees continued to live a precarious existence. A few of those opting to stay in their country of origin or the country of transit had been able to develop economic activities with the help of intergovernmental organisations and NGOs. In Niger, returnees reported participating in workshops for technical occupations like welding and mechanical work. Some migrants had saved enough money to open a business, begin a trade or start a taxi service upon their return. Others organised into associations and cooperatives to support reintegration of their members.

In Tunisia, we found a few migrants whose application for asylum had been rejected by UNHCR but nonetheless had sought to carve out a livelihood in the transit country, in a artisanal craft or sewing, managing to sell their products with local support. However, these enterprises were unsustainable because of the migrants’ irregular status in the country.

Remigration was the main coping strategy among migrants who fled from Libya in 2011. In all the countries studied, migration was viewed as a means of achieving aspirational targets related to the transition to adulthood, such as buying a home, marrying and starting a business. Many migrants went back to Libya, some even doing so on a yearly basis, as Egyptian interviewees reported. Or they migrated elsewhere in Africa or embarked on the risky journey across the Mediterranean Sea. A large share of returnees in all our migrant samples, except Chadians, travelled back to Libya. The lack of prospects for employment and integration in their country of origin or the country of transit (Tunisia in this case) likely influenced this decision. Many migrants returned to Libya even before the crisis ended, or in 2015 and 2016, when violence flared up again. A number of Egyptian returnees referred to surviving ‘two revolutions’. Many who returned to Burkina Faso in 2011 remigrated to Libya after a lull in the crisis, and many Burkinabe migrated to Libya for the first time after 2011, despite the danger. More than 500 returned in the first two months of 2016. Among Ghanaian and Nigerien migrant interviewees, some reported travelling back to Libya at least once after escaping in 2011. As for Chad, none of the returnees in our sample had gone back to Libya, and many were still fearful of the kind of violence and instability they had fled in 2011:

“There is misery here [Chad] but we are alive and safe.” (CH-M-18)

Regarding state actors, the crisis demonstrated a lack of clear responsibility in the current international system for protecting and assisting migrants displaced by a crisis in a host country. The countries of origin studied here experienced difficulties and were sluggish in evacuation and repatriation procedures. Indeed, this crisis provided impetus for shifts in national and global policy priorities towards protection and assistance of migrants in countries of destination and transit, fuelled as well by the other concurrent crises in the region. Regarding Tunisia as country of transit, institutional responses were necessarily different, due to the thousands of stranded migrants who elected not to go

back to their countries of origin and were channelled instead into asylum procedures. These migrants stayed in Tunisia for years after 2011, and many remain there today.

IOM emerged as the foremost actor in managing evacuation procedures from Libya, and UNHCR played a pivotal role in management of stranded migrants from Libya who became asylum seekers in Tunisia. UNHCR also had an important role in the management of refugees from Libya, but this is beyond the scope of the current research. It warrants mention, however, that the position and role of international organisations as an intermediary between people in need and state responses can be criticised as ultimately diluting state responsibility for policy and its implementation.

All of the countries in this study sit at the crossroads of several major humanitarian crises – in the Sahel, Nigeria, CAR, Sudan (Darfur), Libya, Yemen and Syria. Any investigation of the impact of the Libya crisis on migrants is incomplete without consideration of the effects of the concurrent crises in the area and in the countries of origin of the returnees from Libya. Instability in some of the countries themselves was another key factor. Chad, for example, continues to feel the impact of the crisis in Nigeria and the Lac region, in addition to the conflicts in neighbouring Libya, Sudan and CAR. In Niger, the return of Nigeriens from Libya coincided almost exactly with the return of migrants from Côte d’Ivoire, which is also an important host country for Nigerien migrant labourers. In both cases, these concurrent events increased social pressure and humanitarian challenges on all stakeholders involved in migrant returns and reintegration.

Instability, as well as the closure of alternate migratory routes, has made Libya an even more frequently used transit point for people seeking to reach Europe. More than 181,000 people reached Italy in 2016 via the Central Mediterranean route. The armed conflict in Libya continued at the time of this writing, with war crimes and human rights violations being committed by a range of actors, including those affiliated with the two rival governments, armed groups operating in the country such as ISIS and criminal networks including smugglers. The overall security situation thus remained highly volatile and unpredictable. The history of crisis and protracted tensions confirm that, in 2017, it is impossible to speak of a clear ‘post-crisis’ phase in respect to the events of 2011, or of 2013 or 2015. Rather, we must speak of periods of heightened violence and civil unrest, with recurrent acute flare-ups that can only be tackled with long-term, modular and flexible contingency plans.

To conclude, this study has underlined the need for a clear policy on evacuation of nationals caught up in crisis situations abroad. Furthermore, contingency plans are needed in countries of origin, transit and destination. These plans must be costed and budgeted for, and provide clearly delineated mandates to the relevant stakeholders. Concurrent crises in the region of the current study meant that actors did not have the option of dealing with each ‘crisis’ individually. Emergency humanitarian aid had to be prioritised over long-term reintegration plans. Strictly speaking, those who fled Libya at the onset of the crisis may at present no longer be categorised as returnees, as considerable time has generally lapsed since their return. Nonetheless, effective and transparent reintegration programmes from governments are still needed.

9. Reference List


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technical assistance and capacity-building measures received by the Government of Libya. Human Rights Council, Thirty-fourth Session.


### 10. Annexes

#### 10.1. Annex I: Tables

**Table 1. Tunisia – Nationalities of Migrant Interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TU-M-01</td>
<td>Ivoirian</td>
<td>TU-M-16</td>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>TU-M-31</td>
<td>Sudanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-M-02</td>
<td>Ivoirian</td>
<td>TU-M-17</td>
<td>Chadian</td>
<td>TU-M-32</td>
<td>Chadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-M-03</td>
<td>Ivoirian</td>
<td>TU-M-18</td>
<td>Chadian</td>
<td>TU-M-33</td>
<td>Chadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-M-04</td>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td>TU-M-19</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>TU-M-34</td>
<td>Chadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-M-06</td>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>TU-M-21</td>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>TU-M-36</td>
<td>Eritrean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-M-07</td>
<td>Senegalese</td>
<td>TU-M-22</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>TU-M-37</td>
<td>Congolese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-M-08</td>
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<td>TU-M-23</td>
<td>Eritrean</td>
<td>TU-M-38</td>
<td>Beninese</td>
</tr>
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<td>TU-M-10</td>
<td>Senegalese</td>
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<td>Eritrean</td>
<td>TU-M-40</td>
<td>Ivoirian</td>
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<td>TU-M-11</td>
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<td>TU-M-26</td>
<td>Guinean</td>
<td>TU-M-41</td>
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<td>TU-M-27</td>
<td>Malian</td>
<td>TU-M-42</td>
<td>Sudanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-M-14</td>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>TU-M-29</td>
<td>Ivoirian</td>
<td>TU-M-44</td>
<td>Eritrean</td>
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</table>
### Table 2. Tunisia – Means of Travel to Tunisia from Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ways</th>
<th>Number (*)</th>
<th>Including migrants assisted by their embassies</th>
<th>Including crossings facilitated by smugglers</th>
<th>Interview codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By buses (***)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>TU-M-03; 13; 15; 16; 17; 18; 21; 23; 31; 33; 35; 42; 43; 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By cars</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TU-M-04; 5; 7; 8; 9; 11; 12; 13; 20; 22; 24; 28; 30; 32; 34; 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossings on foot</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TU-M-01; 6; 7; 8; 9; 22; 27; 28; 29; 38; 39; 40; 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants rescued at sea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TU-M-02; 25; 36; 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TU-M-10; 14; 19; 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) There are duplicate accounts for migrants who have taken transport means (cars, rented taxis or private Libyan cars, Libyan army trucks), and then have been deposited at varying distances from the Tunisia border.

(**) Two cases of migrants brought to the border by Libyan army trucks (before the fall of Tripoli in August 2011).

### Table 3. Summary of results of focus group sessions in Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-FGD-01</td>
<td>Minya</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-FGD-02</td>
<td>Minya</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-FGD-03</td>
<td>Sohag</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-FGD-04</td>
<td>Sohag</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-FGD-05</td>
<td>Fayoum</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-FGD-06</td>
<td>Fayoum</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 10.2. Annex II: Tunisian Civil Society Stakeholders – in Detail

**The Tunisian Red Crescent**

The Tunisian Red Crescent (TRC) is, in the opinion of all leaders and stakeholders met, the central player of humanitarian operations for migrants in vulnerable situations in Tunisia, whether they come from Libya or not. The Tunisian Red Crescent has always been an auxiliary branch of the public authorities. It is the leading force in assisting and providing first aid to migrants who fled Libya. Its role remains crucial in the operations and assistance programs for migrants. It is always the main partner with organisations and international NGOs that lead such operations in Tunisia.

“If we talk about the structure, experience, expertise and the capacities for the humanitarian work, then yes I would say it is the TRC that was omnipresent […] We have the TRC for the livelihood; we have also a partner in the south, Islamic Relief that provides language courses and socio-cultural activities.” (TU-C-01; TU-C-02)

It has a dense network of local and regional offices and teams of volunteers, well distributed throughout Tunisia. The local and regional offices in the governorates of Medenine and Tataouine were proactive and effective in the aftermath of the Libya crisis. The previous experiences of the TRC was the intervention and assistance of Algerian refugees who fled the civil war in the 1990s, when TRC opened an office in GharDimaou, on the Tunisia-Algeria border, in partnership with the UNHCR. The TRC intervenes with the department of health and accompanies migrants until they are either registered or covered by hospitals. The TRC has since 2011 been active in two stages. During the 2011 crisis, when it was the main contributor in direct contact with migrants who fled Libya (TU-C-01; TU-C-02):

- From the beginning of the war in Libya, in February 2011, the regional committee of Medenine mobilised its local volunteers of Ben Gardane and Zarzis to welcome refugees on the borders;
- It provided assistance (reception, assistance, guidance, shelter) to 900,000 people who have crossed borders, alongside other NGOs and international organisations. The main operations ended in May 2011, at the end of the evacuation operations;
- Provision of food, blankets and first aid to those who were injured during their journey from Libya to the Tunisia border;
- Settling and monitoring of camps with the assistance of other international organisations such as UNHCR, IOM, DRC, Islamic Relief, etc.

After the closure of the Choucha camp in 2013, the TRC’s activities moved to the cities of the Eastern South in order to participate to the programs of assistance to migrants and refugees who were displaced to the cities of this area such as Zarzis and Medenine. The main activities to which the TRC contributed were:

- the implementation of the urban integration program (in Medenine and Zarzis) of refugees of the former camp of Choucha;
- the association with the Swiss Cooperation (Swiss Embassy in Tunis) to lead a program to assist vulnerable migrants in the region: reception of sea survivors and migrants released by the National Guard after their incarceration following the illegal crossing of borders, accommodation and daily food providing, provision of clothing and blankets, medical care (medical consultations and purchase of medications). The program started with 83 migrants and there were only about 30 still in the project in June 2016. That means that more than fifty migrants left Tunisia by their owns means, likely by illegal

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234 Information on migrants is well shared between the TRC and the authorities. The Red Crescent has succeeded in gaining the trust of the authorities who consult it whenever the police control or arrest an undocumented migrant who has been assisted by the CRT. The authorities often tolerate the presence of these migrants or turn a blind eye to their undeclared work if they are recommended by the TRC.
crossing of land borders thanks to the smuggling and migrant trafficking networks (TU-C-01; TU-C-02);
- renting of ten houses (individual houses or small buildings in the neighbourhoods) in Medenine, Zarzis and Ben Gardane, to host migrants fleeing Libya or saved at sea. The Swiss program covered the rent costs a building of 200 places for a monthly rent of 4,500 TND (EUR 1,850);
- awareness-raising campaigns for medical and educational personnel on migrants’ access to hospitals and schools;
- provision of vouchers for young children to buy clothes, and monthly financial support (250 to 450 dinars/month, EUR 100-180) to vulnerable people who – based on their assessment – cannot have a job;

“Aid is not infinite because it depends on our programs; we train them and try to integrate them into professional life through other organisations like ADRA which works in partnership with UNHCR."

(TU-C-02)

- TRC accompanies migrants when it comes to administrative procedures (health assistance, legal aid, assistance related to daily needs such as food and education), supporting also irregular migrants (TU-C-02);
- contribution to the establishment of a standardised operating system to organise the reception of the survivors of the sea who sail from the Libyan coasts. This system aims to define the roles of the various partners of the Red Crescent (UNHCR, IOM, Swiss Cooperation, ADRA, Médecins du Monde) as well as those of regional authorities (Ben Gardane Community, National Guard) to establish a network operating system, which intervenes at the arrival of a ship with survivors.

The Tunisian Red Crescent seeks to extend its partnership network with public or private institutions to try to expand the range of services needed by migrants or refugees such as cultural activities, integration activities or activities that help find long-lasting solutions for vulnerable migrants.

Islamic Relief Worldwide

It intervened since 2011 only in Southern Tunisia to assist migrants fleeing Libya and played a key role in providing assistance and vital services to migrants, such as temporary accommodation, education for children, health, and protection (TU-C-03). Since 2011, 15,000 migrants have benefited from services provided by the NGO in Southern Tunisia Choucha transit camp, towns of Zarzis and Ben Gardane (TU-C-03). This NGO has set up (TU-C-03):

- An educational and training centre in languages (French and English) and computer science, led by Tunisian professors;
- A community development centre in Ben Gardane, with a recreation centre for refugees, a reading centre for children with teaching and computer equipment, and a space dedicated to sports activities;
- A technical training centre for women (sewing, hairdressing) and another one for men (plumbing and electricity);
- The organisation of tourist trips for migrants to other regions to let them know the area.

Islamic Relief was present in southern Tunisia at the outbreak of the 2011 crisis. Its activities reached their height during the waves of arrivals of migrants who fled Libya in its wake. However, the above-mentioned activities were actually developed by a UNHCR deputy, and mainly refugees under UNHCR protection or asylum seekers who were waiting for the evaluation of their asylum requests have benefited of these actions. The activities of this NGO have been retracted since 2013, following the closure of the Choucha camp and its activities have been mainly limited to the city of Medenine where it continues to assist the refugees of the ‘Ibn Khaldoun Foyer’ in this city.
In 2015, the European Union (EU) launched ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an Evidence-based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action’, a four-year project implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This EU-funded project is a contribution to the global Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative, a government-led process co-chaired by the governments of the Philippines and the United States, which shares similar goals. The project aims to improve the capacity of states and other stakeholders to assist and provide protection to migrants who find themselves in countries affected by crisis, as well as address the long-term implications of such situations. Within the project, six regional consultations with states and other relevant stakeholders have been conducted, contributing to the development of the MICIC initiative ‘Guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster’, which provide guidance for states and other stakeholders in responding to the needs of migrants caught in crisis situations. In addition, the project also develops capacity building activities to follow up on key recommendations that have emerged over the course of the project. This report presents one case study of the Research Component of the EU-funded MICIC project, whose goal is to complement these efforts by providing policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises for host, transit and origin countries.